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Manpower programs for the disadvantaged have been 
operated in the United States for approximately fifteen 
years. The programs - introduced under the authority of the 
Manpower Development and Training Act of 1961, the Economic 
Opportunity Act of 1964, the 1967 amendments to the Social 
Security Act, and the Comprehensive Training and Employment 
2 
Act of 1973 - were all concerned with the employment and 
earning of certain groups. This body of legislation was 
intended to intervene in particular sectors of the labor 
market having a differentially high unemployment rate, not 
offset by higher wages and other benefits. The intent was 
to reduce labor market immobility due to geographical loca-
tion, lack of skills, and age, sex or color discrimination. 
The ultimate objective of the manpower programs was to 
improve the employment and earnings experience of the dis-
advantaged target population. Little is presently known 
about the impact of the programs on the earnings and em-
ployment of participants after they leave the program. 
This retrospective study attempts to determine the 
impact of the Portland Concentrated Employment Program 
(PCEP) on the post-training incomes of 1985 peEP partici-
pants and a control group of 1150 individuals applying to or 
enrolled in the peEP between 1968 and 1972. The control 
group is a group of persons who are statistically equivalent 
to the participants as far as demographic variables and 
their application to and eligibility for the peEP; but, who 
for some unknr~n reason, did not enter the program. Follow-
up income information was purchased from the U.S. Social 
Security Administration in coded cells containing five or 
more individuals. The five digit numeric code classified 
individuals by participation or nonparticipation in the 
3 
peEP, sex, race, age, and education. The Analysis of Vari-
ance statistical technique was utilized in analyzing the 
1973 mean earnings of the code groups included in the study. 
The analysis of the data resulted in the following 
major findings. Of the five independent variables - par-
ticipation, sex, race, age, and education - there were 
significant interactions between participation, race, and 
age; participation and race; and sex and age. The first 
interaction is a result of Black participants and the White 
control group earning their highest incomes between the ages 
of 21-25 years. White participants and the Black control 
group had generally rising incomes as age increased up to 45 
years. All groups 45 years and over earned low incomes 
relative to other groups in the study. The interaction 
between participation and race resulted from the Black 
control group in most cases earning more than all other 
groups in the study. Black participants earned slightly 
more than White participants. But, the White participant 
group appears to have benefitted more from participation in 
the peEP, in comparison with the White control group, than 
did Black participants. Enrollment in the peEP in most 
cases did not raise the incomes of participants signifi-
cantly higher than the incomes of the control group. Sex 
and age demonstrated a significant interaction which was 
primarily due to the poor performance of males ages 45 and 
over. In all other age groups males earned significantly 
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more than females. The groups with a high school degree and 
under 45 years of age earned significantly more than those 
without a high school degree. The education group benefit-
ting most from participation in the PCEP included persons 
with 1-9 years of education. 
Over seventy percent of the persons included in this 
study in both the participant and the control groups earned 
incomes below the official 1973 poverty level. Participa-
tion in the PCEP did not raise the mean earnings of groups 
studied above the poverty level. Considering income alone, 
approximately thirteen percent of the participants in com-
parison with their control groups are considered to have 
benefitted significantly from the PCEP. Six percent of 
the participants may have gained more benefit from continued 
labor market participation than from enrollment in the 
PCEP. The findings 'of this study indicate that the benefits 
to participants in the PCEP were not as substantial as 
expected. 
PREFACE 
This dissertation was funded by u.s. Department of 
Labor Doctorial Dissertation Grant Number 91-41-75-16. 
Certain data used in this dissertation were derived 
from statistics furnished by the U.S. Social Security 
Administration. The author did not at any time have access 
to any information relating to specific individuals or 
reporting units. The author assumes the full responsibility 
for the analysis and interpretation of the data. 
The information concerning the functioning of the 
Comprehensive Employment & Training Act of 1973 (CETA) in 
the Portland metropolitan area was obtained through taped 
interviews with city officials and manpower staff personnel 
in the metropolitan area, and the Executive Secretary of the 
CETA Balance of State Prime Sponsor for the State of Oregon. 
The interviews took place during February and March 1975. 
Each subject taped was asked for permission to record the 
interview and all consented. One interview was not recor-
ded. At the time of the interviews CETA VI was in the 
beginning stages of implementation. Consequently, the 
concentration of Chapters III & IV is on the implications 
and effects of CETA Title I which authorized a decentra-
lized, decategorized manpower system. Detailed observations 
iv 
on the operation of only two of the five prime sponsors in 
the Portland area are included. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The major purpose of this dissertation is to evaluate 
the impact of the Portland Concentrated Employment Program 
(CEP) on participants in tr2 manpower program. Income 
information on CEP participants between 1968 through 1972 
and a control group was obtained from the u.s. Social Secur-
ity Administration. The analysis and the findings are 
covered in Chapters V and VI of the dissertation. 
The Concentrated Employment Program is one of many 
programs which are subsumed under the general category of 
manpower policy. To relate the Concentrated Employment 
Program to the body of manpower policy, the first chapters 
of the dissertation present a historical review of the evo-
lution of manpower policy in the United States during the 
last fifty years. This review reveals three major periods 
in which the focus or organization of manpower policies 
underwent significant changes. The first period, which 
spans the years from 1930 until the late 1950's, marked the 
beginning of a national concern legitimized through legis-
lation about unemployment levels. The New Deal and the 
Employment Act of 1946 are the major legislative milestones 
during this period. The second stage occurred during the 
2 
decade from approximately 1960 to 1970. High and seemingly 
stable unemployment rates among the disadvantaged were com-
bined with the optimistic belief at the federal governmental 
level, that centrally administered programs providing train-
ing, education, and placement would provide the desired 
impact on the problems of structural unemployment. The 
programs were expected to raise the incomes and employment 
rates of participants. The Manpower Development and Train-
ing Act of 1961 was the major piece of legislation passed 
during this decade. Gradual disillusionment with the feder-
al programs occurred during the second half of the decade. 
Various attempts to consolidate and coordinate the manpower 
programs while maintaining federal control were unsuccessful 
in significantly reducing the problems. The creation of the 
Concentrated Employment Program was an example of the federal 
attempt to reduce the confusion, fragmentation, and duplica-
tion which characterized the manpower delivery system in the 
late 1960's. But, for various reasons discussed in the body 
of the dissertation, a workable efficient federally adminis-
tered manpower system appeared doomed to failure. The 
continuing problems led federal policymakers to search for 
alternative methods of service delivery. After lengthy 
consideration national elected officials chose to decentra-
lize and decategorize manpower programs. The resulting 
third stage which reaches up to the present time, is charac-
terized by the shift in control of manpower programs from 
3 
the federal to the state and local levels. The major legis-
lation empowering the shift in the delivery system was the 
Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1973 (CETA). 
Chapters III and IV discuss the expectations of CETA's 
sponsors and the functioning of the new CETA programs oper-
ating in the Portland, Oregon, metropolitan area. 
This dissertation attempts to examine the manpower 
policy area from the framework of policy analysis. The 
emphasis is placed on the identification of the manpower 
problem, the formulation of a course of action, the legiti-
mation of the policy, the application of the policy, evalu-
ation, and feedback into the policy process. The evaluation 
of the impact of the Portland CEP program is considered a 
necessary and important part of the policy-making process. 
Although the method of delivering manpower services has 
shifted, the basic assumption that manpower programs pro-
viding a group of services can have a positive impact on the 
long-term incomes and employment of the disadvantaged parti-
cipant has not been adequately examined. The analysis of 
the impact of CEP on its participants provides new infor-
mation which may be of use to decision makers when consider-
ing changes in future manpower programs. The evaluation of 
the Portland CEP should have particular relevance to plan-
ners for Portland CETA programs which are currently based on 
the CEP model and include participants from the same geo-
graphic area. 
4 
~~NPOWER POLICY 
The word "manpower" is a fairly recent addition to the 
vocabulary, but in the largest sense we have always had 
manpower policies - policies affecting the size, skills, 
and disposition of the working force. Immigration, slavery, 
land laws, and universal education were all at their heart 
I 
manpower policies. A clear definition of manpower policy 
is made difficult by its overlap with many other policy 
areas, particularly economic and education policies. It is 
possible to separate, in concept at least, education and 
economic policy from manpower policy by examining the 
emphases and primary goals which have emerged in these areas 
over time. 
Education policy in the United States has been con-
cerned primarily with general education and literacy levels. 
The primary goal of education is to teach people to think, 
not to prepare them for employment. Little emphasis in 
education has been placed on developing skills training for 
specific occupations. 
General economic policy, using the federal govern-
mentis fiscal and monetary tools, has concentrated on moni-
toring and influencing the aggregate levels of demand and 
supply in the general economy, as well as aggregate unem-
2 
ployment levels. Fiscal and monetary tools, which include 
regulation of the quantity of money circulating in the 
economy and the manipulation of federal government expendi-
tures and revenues, have been perceived by policy-makers as 
affecting both aggregate unemployment levels and inflation. 
The development of manpower policy in the early 1960's was 
an outcome of national political leaders' reluctance to 
employ an aggressive fiscal policy to lower high aggregate 
unemployment levels. The primary reason for the hesitation 
was the fear that expansionary monetary and fiscal policies 
would lead to price increases and spiralling inflation. 
Alternatively, national leaders pursued a policy 
intended to intervene in the more narrowly defined problems 
of structural unemployment. This legislation became the 
foundation of present manpower policy. "Structural unem-
ployment exists in particular sectors of the labor market 
having differentially high unemployment rates when these 
differentials are not offset by relatively high wages or 
other advantages, and workers find it difficult or impos-
3 
sible to move to sectors with lower unemployment rates." 
Immobility which may be due to geographical location; lack 
of skills; or age, sex, and color barriers is an essential 
5 
feature of structural unemployment. Consequently, manpower 
policies intended to reduce structural unemployment are 
aimed more at specific sectors of the labor force and are 
concerned more with the employment and employability of par-
ticular individuals and groups, than aggregate levels of 
employment. The goals of manpower policy, which may include 
6 
increasing clients' literacy levels or reducing unemployment 
within target areas, are more specific than the goals of 
economic policy. Nevertheless, economic policy is inextri-
cably tied to manpower policy in that economic policies 
invariably affect the number and availability of jobs. 
Aggregate unemployment levels determine the number and 
quality of applicants for job openings. Thus, different 
manpower intervention strategies are more likely to benefit 
the victims of structural unemployment during favorable 
economic cycles than during recessions and vice versa. The 
development of mechanisms to integrate economic, education, 
and manpower policies is an administrative function within 
the Executive Branch of the government. 
Very broadly the goals of manpower policy are to 
develop employment opportunities for all who want them, to 
improve the skills of the labor force, and to match the 
4 
labor supply to the demand for labor. ~ore specifically, 
manpower policy in the last decade has been primarily con-
cerned with increasing the skills, incomes, job opportuni-
ties, and length of employment among the disadvantaged 
population. Manpower programs have attempted to provide 
education, occupational skills, counselling, and job place-
ment for that portion of the labor force which has historic-
ally been at the end of the labor queue. In attempting to 
open the door for the disadvantaged workers in the private 
7 
sector or in creating new jobs in the public sector, man-
power policy is directed at the demand side of the economic 
equation. In providing education and marketable skills 
which lead to gainful employment, it focuses on the supply 
side. By improving the imperfect functioning of the labor 
market through providing information to employers and appli-
cants and by matching men with jobs, it bridges the gap be-
tween supply and demand. In brief, manpower policy attempts 
to assure individual access to available and expanding 
opportunities. 
For the most part in the United States since the 
1930's, public manpower policies work at the margin of the 
labor market. For the majority of citizens, the labor mar-
ket works fairly well without government intervention. ~10st 
of the population manages to obtain education and skills 
with which they successfully compete in the labor market, 
without enrolling or participating in a government manpower 
program. "Manpower decisions are made by individuals, 
families, schools, employers and unions, in that order, with 
5 
public manpower programs playing a minor role." In reality, 
the decisions to increase or decrease government spending in 
such areas as defense, research and technology, agricultural 
subsidies, and public works, although outside of the boun-
daries of manpower legislation, have a much greater impact 
on both the structure and the level of demand in the labor 
market than do all the manpower training programs. 
8 
There is no federal manpower policy in a strict, dic-
tionary sense. Policy implies more than the existence of 
programs which have some impact on a problem. A policy 
requires identification of a significant public problem; 
explicit recognition of goals; the formulation of a definite 
plan of action selected from among alternatives to realize 
those articulated goals; and an evaluation of the policy 
with feedback into the decision-making process. 
In the u.s. manpower policy, insofar as it exists, has 
evolved incrementally over time. Programs have been insti-
tuted more or less one at a time in response to a particular 
6 
crisis or a newly identified problem. Elected officials 
have tended to look for specific solutions to particular 
problems rather than developing a comprehensive and integra-
ted manpower policy. Consequently, rather than a coherent 
federal manpower policy, there are a large number of pro-
grams and policies that have been instituted and from which 
7 
general manpower policy emphases can be extracted. 
Several assumptions appear to underlie federal man-
power legislation. The basic assumption is the belief in 
the "work ethic", i.e. that it is better to provide jobs or 
income for work performed than to provide unearned income. 
Furthermore, the manpower legislation passed since 1960 has 
the following general theme: "People who can work should 
work; jobs are available if workers are adequately prepared; 
training and education can provide the needed preparation, 
for those with severe problems; and employment, increased 
income and greater self-esteem - which are the expected 
benefits gained from participation in the program - will be 
worth far more in the long run than the cost of remedial 
8 
attention." 
The underlying theory assumes that generally training 
and economic incentives will be sufficient to overcome 
historical labor market discrimination against certain 
9 
groups, as well as possible innate or environmentally deter-
mined individual differences which resulted in the clients' 
need for manpower services in the first place. Manpower 
programs would presumably effect the necessary changes to 
allow participants to enjoy the benefits accruing to those 
in the mainstream of the American labor force. 
The favorable economy and low unemployment rate be-
tween 1965 and 1969 reinforced these assumptions. During 
this period a large majority of manpower clients found jobs 
in private sector employment. But, as unemployment rose in 
1970, private sector placements for the disadvantaged became 
increasingly difficult. Participants placed in better times 
9 
were laid off or fired. Passage of the Emergency Employ-
ment Act of 1971 and Title VI of CETA in 1974, both of which 
created public service jobs for the unemployed, held an 
implied recognition that perhaps the expectations of the 
private labor market were unrealistic. publicly funded jobs 
were considered necessary to reduce the unemployment rates. 
But, the continued belief in work for income received, was 
present in both pieces of legislation. 
10 
The postulates which provide the foundation for pres-
ent manpower policy have evolved in the approximately forty 
year period in which unemployment has been perceived as a 
legitimate concern for public policy. Chapter II attempts 
to trace the evolution of manpower programs through the 
policy-making process in the United States. 
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CHAPTER II 
HISTORICAL REVIEW OF MANPOWER POLICY 
In 1921 President Harding presumably expressed the 
attitude of the federal government in his welcoming speech 
to the President's Conference on Unemployment. He stated, 
"There has been vast unemployment before and there will be 
again. There will be depression and inflation just as 
surely as the tides ebb and flow. I could have little 
enthusiasm for any proposed remedy which seeks either palli-
10 
ation or tonic from the Public Treasury." The general 
level of employment and the functioning of the economy were 
considered outside the bounds of appropriate government 
business. Unemployment was considered a private problem, 
and individuals faced with the loss of their jobs, turned to 
families, friends, or private charities for aid. 
Official policy remained unchanged until 1933. But, 
basic social and economic changes were altering the public 
and political opinions concerning the appropriate role of 
the government in economic decisions. Between 1929 and 1931 
unemployment in the U.S. rose spectacularly - from between 
three and four percent of the labor force to approximately 
sixteen percent. During the depth of the Depression in 
1933, approximately one quarter of the labor force waG 
11 
13 
unemployed. Industrialization and urbanization had caused 
economic and social changes in the structure of society. A 
constantly increasing portion of the labor force had become 
dependent upon wage and salary income. The decline of the 
extended family and increased geographic mobility, left 
unemployed individuals increasingly isolated from traditional 
means of support during periods of personal or national 
economic crisis. Private charities were unable to cope with 
the large numbers of unemployed people in need of services. 
Gradually many different individuals and groups began 
to perceive unemployment, not as a private problem affecting 
only individuals directly engaged in the transaction, but as 
a public problem which affects others not immediately 
12 
concerned. Unemployment was newly perceived as a public 
problem requiring government attention and intervention. 
The Administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt responded 
and placed the issue of federal responsibility for employ-
ment levels on the national political agenda for the first 
time. This was a highly significant step in the development 
of manpower policy. The great majority of the concerns of 
the political policymaking process are previously defined 
and accepted issue areas. The Roosevelt Administration's 
formulation of unemployment as a public issue requiring 
federal intervention was an example of what Charles Lindblom 
describes as a "giant step" infrequent in the policy process 
14 
13 
which only rarely considers "new problems". 
Franklin D. Roosevelt after a brief commitment to the 
traditional balanced budget, developed a course of action 
which included unprecedented programs for both relief and 
public works - at the same time that other measures were 
taken to stimulate economic recovery. In retrospect, the 
revolutionary New Deal consisted of few basic reforms. Only 
two pieces of permanent legislation in the manpower area 
emerged from the Depression. The Wagner-Peyser Act estab-
lished the United States Employment Service as a joint 
federal-state system operated with federal matching grants 
and aimed at linking unemployed men with jobs. The Social 
Security Act of 1935 established a federal-state system of 
unemployment insurance for jobless workers. Other legis-
lative and administrative efforts under the New Deal were 
temporary in nature - such as the Civilian Conservation 
Corps, the Public Works Administration, and the Works 
Progress Administration. The measures were inadequate con-
sidering the magnitude of the problem. The national unem-
ployment rate in 1940 was still in the range of fifteen 
14 
percent. 
But, the importance of the New Deal is not measured 
only by the immediate effectiveness of its programs. The 
New Deal legitimized government intervention in the economy 
and established unemployment as a rightful area of govern-
ment concern. Machinery was set up to administer, evaluate 
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and reformulate employment policy. The first great hurdle 
in the policy process had been passed. Problems introducing 
new legislation in this area were greatly reduced. 
The New Deal marked the end of the notion that the 
federal government should not interfere in the economy. The 
theoretical rationale for the government assuming active 
responsibility for economic policy was provided by John 
Maynard Keynes' The General Theory of Employment, Interest, 
and Money. Keynes argued that government should pursue an 
active fiscal policy, effecting total spending by tax chan-
ges or government expenditures. Employment depends on the 
level of aggregate demand, and government, through its 
economic policies, can influence aggregate demand to gener-
15 
ate jobs for all who want to work. The experience of 
World War II demonstrated the responsiveness of employment 
levels to federal expenditures. Federal expenditures in 
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1943 nearly equaled the total spent between 1929-1941. 
Unemployment dropped from fifteen percent in 1940 to 1.2 
percent in 1944. 
As the war came to an end, there was widespread fear, 
reinforced by memories of the recent Depression, that con-
version to a peacetime economy would create considerable 
unemployment. Prompted by such fears and recognizing the 
effectiveness of government activity in eliminating unem-
ployment during the war, Senator James E. Murray and others 
introduced legislation to ensure a public commitment to full 
16 
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employment. As it finally emerged from Congress in 1946, 
the Employment Act did not guarantee jobs as its liberal 
sponsors had hoped. It did, however, declare a federal pol-
icy of promoting maximum employment, production, and pur-
chasing power, and legitimized continued federal government 
concern over employment levels. It placed on public record 
a broad federal responsibility for this area. The legisla-
tion was also important in establishing the Council of 
Economic Advisors (CEA) who were to prepare an annual report 
on the economic state of the nation to be delivered by the 
President and were to advise the President whenever unemploy-
ment or inflation were becoming serious problems. The 
Employment Act also created the permanent ,Joint Economic 
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Committee of Congress. The existence of the CEA insured 
continuing expert analysis of the economy. The Joint Com-
mittee in Congress, investigating reports and evolving new 
legislation, guaranteed continued Congressional interest in 
unemployment levels and its continuing place on the federal 
political agenda. 
SUSPENSION OF EMPLOYMENT AND MANPOWER POLICIES 
The Employment Act of 1946 was the last major piece of 
legislation dealing with employment to be passed by Congress 
until 1961. Gradually, as the country returned to peacetime 
without the feared economic relapse, the concern for full 
employment slipped down on the level of priorities. The 
antiunemployment consensus dissolved as Congressmen turned 
their attention to other areas. 
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Unemployment was not at a satisfactory level during 
the postwar decade. The Council of Economic Advisors in 
1947 suggested a moderate goal of four percent unemployment 
as a satisfactory level. This figure was reiterated as a 
target goal by both the Eisenhower and the Kennedy Adminis-
trations. Table I indicates that the u.s. failed, and often 
by a wide margin to achieve the goal of four percent total 
unemployment. 
Given levels of unemployment above four percent and the 
philosophy expressed in the Employment Act of 1946, why was 
no legislation passed during this period to alleviate unem-
ployment? The following factors were important in dis-
couraging the necessary majority building which precedes the 
passage of legislation through Congress: 
- Throughout his eight years in office from 1952-1960, 
President Eisenhower was predominantly concerned with 
inflation and strongly opposed federal spending for 
employment programs. Congressional majority building 
is a very difficult task in the face of a threatened 
Presidential veto. 
- The climate of political opinion in the early 1950's 
was strongly influenced by the rhetoric surrounding the 
McCarthy Hearings, the Cold War with the USSR, and the 
Korean War. A free economy and the free enterprise 
TABLE I 
EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF THE NONINSTITUTIONAL POPULATION 
16 YEARS AND OVER, BOTH SEXES: 
ANNUAL AVERAGES, 1947-73 
Percent of Civilian 
Year Labor Force Unemployed 
1947 3.9 
1948 3.8 
1949 5.9 
1950 5.3 
1951 3.3 
1952 3.0 
1953 2.9 
1954 5.5 
1955 4.4 
1956 4.1 
1957 4.3 
1958 6.8 
1959 5.5 
1960 5.5 
1961 6.7 
1962 5.5 
1963 5.7 
1964 5.2 
1965 4.5 
1966 3.8 
1967 3.8 
1968 3.6 
1969 3.5 
1970 4.9 
1971 5.9 
1972 5.6 
1973 4.9 
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Source: 1974 Manpower Report of the President, (Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), p. 
271 and 272. 
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system were idealized. Support for government inter-
vention in the economy temporarily declined. 
- Politicians are generally more responsive to regis-
tered voters than to other sectors of their consti-
tuency. The distribution of unemployment in the period 
between 1947-1957 was uneven. Those hardest hit by 
unemployment were also an ineffectual portion of the 
electorate during that period. As demonstrated in 
Table II the unemployment rate for Blacks and teen-
agers was consistently much higher than that of 
the general population. 
Individual Congressmen, particularly those representing 
areas with higher than normal unemployment rates, continued 
a high priority interest in unemployment intervention legis-
lation. But, the majority coalition necessary to formulate 
and pass such legislation could not be obtained. 
In 1958 the country was in its third postwar recession, 
and by April the unemployment level had reached 7.4 percent. 
Unemployment among white males, an important voting group, 
rose to 6.1 percent. 
Republicans, facing elections in Fall 1958, as well as 
Democrats in the Congress, were increasingly concerned in 
the high levels of unemployment and the recurring recessions. 
An antiunemployment consensus was slowly being rebuilt. No 
fully conceived economic or manpower programs were offered 
TABLE II-A 
UNEMPLOYMENT RATES BY SEX AND COLOR 
FOR PERSONS 16 YEARS AND OVER: 
Annual Averages, 1948-65 
White Negro and Other Races 
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Hale Female 
1948 3.8 3.6 4.1 3.5 3.4 3.8 5.9 5.8 6.1 
1949 5.9 5.9 6.0 5.6 5.6 5.7 8.9 9.6 7.9 
1950 5.3 5.1 5.7 4.9 4.7 5.3 9.0 9.4 8.4 
1951 3.3 2.8 4.4 3.1 2.6 4.2 5.3 4.9 6.1 
1952 3.0 2.8 3.6 2.8 2.5 3.3 5.4 5.2 5.7 
1953 2.9 2.8 3.3 2.7 2.5 3.1 4.5 4.8 4.1 
1954 5.5 5.3 6.0 5.0 4.8 5.6 9.9 10.3 9.3 
1955 4.4 4.2 4.9 3.9 3.7 4.3 8.7 8.8 8.4 
1956 4.1 3.8 4.8 3.6 3.4 4.2 8.3 7.9 8.9 
1957 4.3 4.1 4.7 3.8 3.6 4.3 7.9 8.3 7.3 
1958 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.1 6.1 6.2 12.6 13.8 10.8 
1959 5.5 5.3 5.9 4.8 4.6 5.3 10.7 11.5 9.4 
1960 5.5 5.4 5.9 4.9 4.8 5.3 10.2 10.7 9.4 
1961 6.7 6.4 7.2 6.0 5.7 6.5 12.4 12.8 11. 8 
1962 5.5 5.2 6.2 4.9 4.6 5.5 10.9 10.9 11.0 
1963 5.7 5.2 6.5 5.0 4.7 5.8 10.8 10.5 11.2 
1964 5.2 4.6 6.2 4.6 4.1 5.5 9.6 8.9 10.6 
1965 4.5 4.0 5.5 4.1 3.6 5.0 8.1 7.4 9.2 
Source: 1974 Manpower Report of the President, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1974), p. 271 and 272. 
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TABLE II-B 
UNEr1PLOYMENT RATES BY SEX AND AGE: 
Annual Averages, 1947-65 
Total 16 & 17 18 & 19 20-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 67 Yrs 
& Over Yrs Yrs Yrs Yrs Yrs Yrs Yrs & Over 
MALE 
1947 4.0 10.3 11. 3 8.5 3.4 2.6 2.6 2.9 2.8 
1948 3.6 10.1 9.6 6.9 2.8 2.4 2.5 3.1 3.4 
1949 5.9 13.7 14.6 10.4 5.2 4.3 4.3 5.4 5.1 
1950 5.1 13.3 12.3 8.1 4.4 3.6 4.0 4.9 4.8 
1951 2.8 9.4 7.0 3.9 2.3 2.0 2.4 2.8 3.5 
1952 2.8 10.5 7.4 4.6 2.2 1.9 2.2 2.4 3.0 
1953 2.B B.B 7.2 5.0 2.2 2.0 2.3 2.8 2.4 
1954 5.3 13.9 13.2 10.7 4.B 4.1 4.3 4.5 4.4 
1955 4.2 12.5 10.8 7.7 3.3 3.1 3.2 4.3 4.0 
1956 3.B 11.7 10.4 6.9 3.3 2.6 3.0 3.5 3.5 
1957 4.1 12.4 12.3 7.8 3.3 2.8 3.3 3.5 3.4 
1958 6.8 16.3 17.8 12.7 6.5 5.1 5.3 5.5 5.2 
1959 5.3 15.8 14.9 8.7 4.7 3.7 4.1 4.5 4.8 
1960 5.4 15.5 15.0 B.9 4.B 3.8 4.1 4.6 4.2 
1961 6.4 18.3 16.3 10.7 5.7 4.6 4.9 5.7 5.5 
1962 5.2 15.9 13.B B.9 4.5 3.6 3.9 4.6 4.6 
1963 5.2 18.8 15.9 8.8 4.5 3.5 3.6 4.3 4.5 
1964 4.6 17.1 14.6 B.l 3.5 2.9 3.2 3.9 4.0 
1965 4.0 16.1 12.4 6.3 3.0 2.6 2.5 3.3 3.5 
FEMALE 
1947 3.7 9.B 6.B 4.6 3.6 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.2 
194B 4.1 9.B 7.4 4.9 4.3 3.0 3.0 3.1 2.3 
1949 6.0 14.4 11. 2 7.3 5.9 4.7 4.0 4.4 3.8 
1950 5.7 14.2 9.8 6.9 5.7 4.4 4.5 4.5 3.4 
1951 4.4 10.0 7.2 4.4 4.5 3.8 3.5 4.0 2.9 N 
1952 3.6 9.1 7.3 4.5 3.6 3.0 2.5 2.5 2.2 I-' 
TABLE II-B (Continued) 
Total 16 & 17 18 & 19 20-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 
& Over Yrs Yrs Yrs Yrs Yrs Yrs 
F'EMALE 
1953 3.3 8.5 6.4 4.3 3.4 2.5 2.3 
1954 6.0 12.7 10.5 7.3 6.6 5.3 4.6 
1955 4.9 12.0 9.1 6.1 5.3 4.0 3.6 
1956 4.8 13.2 9.9 6.3 4.8 3.9 3.6 
1957 4.7 12.6 9.4 6.0 5.3 3.8 3.2 
1958 6.8 16.6 12.9 8.9 7.3 6.2 4.9 
1959 5.9 14.4 12.9 8.1 5.9 5.1 4.2 
1960 5.9 15.4 13.0 8.3 6.3 4.8 4.2 
1961 7.2 18.3 15.1 9.8 7.3 6.3 5.1 
1962 6.2 16.8 13.5 9.1 6.5 5.2 4.1 
1963 6.5 20.3 15.2 8.9 6.9 5.1 4.2 
1964 6.2 18.8 15.1 8.6 6.3 5.0 3.9 
1965 5.5 17.2 14.8 7.3 5.5 4.6 3.2 
Source: 1974 Manpower Report of the President, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1974), p. 271 and 272. 
55-64 
Yrs 
2.5 
4.6 
3.8 
3.6 
3.0 
4.5 
4.1 
3.4 
4.5 
3.5 
3.6 
3.5 
2.8 
67 Yrs 
& Over 
1.4 
3.0 
2.3 
2.3 
3.4 
3.8 
2.8 
2.8 
3.9 
4.1 
3.2 
3.4 
2.8 
IV 
IV 
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by either Party, but a number of specific measures were con-
sidered. The Democrats were spectacularly successful in the 
1958 election, gaining a total of thirteen seats in the 
Senate and forty-seven in the House. All analyses of the 
1958 election, including Eisenhower's own, rate unemployment 
19 
and the recession as the major factors. After a twelve-
year hiatus, the issue of unemployment again became a high 
priority on the federal government agenda. 
A Senate Special Committee on Unemployment Problems 
was appointed in 1959, and its hearings and report were 
important in rebuilding the consensus against unemployment 
among both Republicans and Democrats. The hearings revealed 
that full recovery from the 1957-58 recession was slow in 
coming. Production did rise in the last half of 1959, but 
employment did not rise correspondingly. Unemployment aver-
aged 5.5 percent throughout 1959. It was particularly high 
in certain geographical areas and among older workers. Al-
though the economy in the 1950's had recovered after each 
recession, after each recovery a larger residue of unemploy-
20 
ment remained. New terms such as automation, structural 
unemployment, and mechanization crept into the vocabulary, 
and gradually were perceived as public issues. The Senate 
Special Committee's recommendations, which included an area 
redevelopment program, retraining programs, and a Youth 
Conservation Corps, were to become the agenda for manpower 
legislation in the early 1960's. 
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THE EMERGENCE OF MANPOWER PROGRAMS 
Positive Manpower Policy Support Cycle 
By 1960 manpower policy, which is a subcategory of 
employment policy, had entered into a positive policy sup-
port cycle which has continued up to the present time. The 
beginning of the cycle occurred in the late 1950's with the 
identification of structural unemployment as a public prob-
lem requiring government intervention. The supporters of a 
depressed areas bill, which was vetoed by President Eisen-
hower in 1958 and again in 1959, had attracted public atten-
tion to the problems of depressed geographical areas and had 
formulated a plan for intervention which had received the 
support of the Congressional majority. The Senate Special 
Committee on Unemployment Problems identified additional 
problems caused by structural unemployment. By 1961 high 
priority was given to these problems by both the Congress 
and the Administration. 
Charles o. Jones in Introduction to the Study of 
Public Policy presents a policy-making model which approxi-
mates the policy cycle in manpower policy from 1961 to the 
present. (See Figure 1) 
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Figure 1. The policy-making cycle 
The public policy-making process at the national level 
is very complex, and the manpower policy-making process is 
not an exception. A simple process by which a clearly 
defined problem was solved through a single legislative act 
cannot be identified. The pluralistic multinucleated struc-
ture of policy making involves vast networks of specialized 
groups linked together in intertwining "decision chains". 
To anact a policy or change a program requires mUltiple con-
21 
sent and the need for coalition building. Compromises 
necessary to avoid political deadlock may shift the focus of 
the legislation, fragment its administration through differ-
ent agencies, or change the legislation to such an extent 
that the connection between the original conception of the 
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bill and its operation in the field is difficult to trace. 
The national public policy-making process is inexact, incre-
mental, and difficult to chronicle in an easily understood 
way. 
In the area of manpower policy-making many different 
actors were involved in the complex process from the initial 
stage of problem identification through evaluation and 
reformulation. Initial legislation in 1961 was intended to 
benefit primarily the adult, experienced worker who had been 
displaced by advancing technology or residence in a depres-
sed geographical area. The legislation was intended to 
intervene in narrowly defined problems of structural unem-
ployment. As the policy advanced through several cycles, 
the Congressional definition of the problem widened. The 
new perceptions and definitions of the manpower "problem" 
emerged from the experience gained in previous policy 
cycles. Manpower policy was then reformulated or amended to 
increase its effectiveness in intervening in the newly 
identified problem areas. 
The input into the Congressional policy process came 
from the Administration, agencies administering the legis-
lated programs, testimony from experts in the involved 
areas, officials from other governmental levels, and the 
beneficiaries of the program. Each participant in the 
process attempted to lobby Congress and receive majority 
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support for their position. Lobbying by agencies adminis-
tering or desirous of administering the programs was parti-
cularly intense and often influenced final legislation. 
Passage of related legislation, changes in fiscal policy, 
and all public and private actions affecting employment had 
an impact on manpower policy. New legislation was con-
stantly being introduced and old legislation amended in an 
attempt to meet the needs of a constantly changing political 
and economic environment. But, throughout the period from 
1960 to 1974, there existed continuing support for the 
manpower policy goals of training the unemployed and placing 
them in jobs. Evaluations and feedback indicated that at 
least in the short run the policy was realizing these goals. 
Economic Policy 
The Kennedy slogan of "Get America Moving Again" indi-
cated the return to the political forefront of economic and 
unemployment issues. In the winter of 1961 the unemployment 
rate had reached a postwar peak of 8.1 percent (unadjusted 
for seasonality). But the political consensus was divided 
on the question of appropriate fiscal policy. The slack 
economy received high priority attention, but radical inno-
vations in fiscal policy were not politically feasible in 
1961. As Charles E. Lindblom postulated in The Policy 
Making Process, the more different an alternative is from 
past policy, in this case an unprecedented tax cut in a 
28 
sluggish economy, the more unpredictable the outcome and the 
more difficult it is to recruit support. Policy-makers 
acted as predicted in Lindblom's "Incremental Change Hodel", 
and neither the Administration nor the Congress were willing 
in 1961 to adopt innovative policy. Instead, the search for 
alternatives covered only alternatives incrementally differ-
ent from past policies and formulation of new legislation in 
1961 was developed from those alternatives. The programs 
aimed at structural unemployment had precedents and were 
politically acceptable. 
The passage of the Tax Cut of 1964 should chronologi-
cally be located later in this chapter. I include it here 
so as not to intrude the discussion of fiscal policy into 
the material on social legislation. For ten years following 
the Korean War, the economic policies of fiscal orthodoxy 
had been tested. The results had been three recessions, a 
slow rate of economic growth and chronic unemployment. 
President Kennedy, sensitive to Republican charges of fiscal 
irresponsibility, attempted to maintain a balanced budget 
for his first two years in office. But, in 1962 with unem-
ployment still averaging 5.5 percent in a slack economy, 
Kennedy launched a public education campaign on the "New 
Keynesian Economics" primarily aimed at Congress. The key 
actors in the campaign for the tax cut were Keynesian eco-
nomists, the leaders of the nation's business community -
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including the u.s. Chamber of Commerce - and the Administra-
tion. The support of Wilbur Hills, Congressional Represen-
tative from Arkansas and the Chairman of the powerful House 
Ways and Means Committee, was crucial to its passage. After 
months of sharp debate the tax cut became law in February 
1964. The deliberate tax cut to increase aggregate demand 
and expand the economy was successful and marked the begin-
ning of a new era in fiscal policy. The economy experienced 
rapid growth and unemployment dropped from 5.2 percent in 
1964 to 4.5 percent in 1965, despite the accelerating rate 
of labor market growth. 
The tax cut had an important impact on related man-
power and social welfare programs. The sharp debate had 
focused public and Congressional attention on the high 
unemployment rates among the disadvantaged. The success of 
the tax cut supported a theoretical rationale for increased 
government spending to spur the economy which led to a 
favorable Congressional climate for new legislation. 
STRUCTURAL UNEMPLOYMENT: 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF MANPOWER POLICY 
In 1961 the first piece of legislation aimed at the 
problems of structural unemployment was signed into law. 
The Area Redevelopment Act (ARA) did not fulfill the hopes 
which accompanied its passage. It failed to make a signifi-
22 
cant impact on unemployment nationally or in target areas. 
New industries operating in a sluggish economy were not 
attracted to depressed communities by low interest loans, 
small scale training programs, and new public facilities. 
However, the lessons learned under the ARA were applied in 
the Economic Development Administration created in 1965. 
The Manpower Development and Training Act 
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The Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962 was 
the major piece of manpower legislation passed during the 
1960's. Its passage and subsequent amendments provide a 
good example of the operation of the Congressional manpower 
policy making system during the 1960's. 
By 1961 bipartisan support for a broad training pro-
gram on a national level had developed. General agreement 
existed between the Administration and Congress that national 
intervention was necessary to combat structural unemployment 
among adult, experienced workers. The proposed training 
program was not a radical innovation, and it attracted 
support from fiscal conservatives as well as expansionists. 
The conservatives' support stemmed from their position that 
nothing was basically wrong with the economy and stimulation 
was not necessary. High unemployment rates were due to 
technological change which had displaced large numbers of 
workers. The upgrading of skills would reduce the unemploy-
ment rate as the workers filled available jobs. For fiscal 
expansionists training was viewed as a necessary supplement 
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to increasing aggregate demand through monetary and fiscal 
policy. Thus, the program gained support for different 
theoretical reasons. On the more political level both 
Senators and Representatives recognized that retraining 
programs offered direct aid to constituents. A Gallup poll 
showed 67 percent of the people "willing to sacrifice" to 
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pay for retraining the unemployed. Retraining was en-
dorsed by a national consensus, the necessary majority was 
assured, and Congress began debate on the nature of the 
program. 
The central issue in the ensuing debate was which fed-
eral agency should have control over the new program. A 
large scale training program would mean funds and power for 
the administrating agency. The question of who should 
administer a new program invariably brings new actors into 
the Congressional policy making process, each lobbying for 
his own interests and attempting to persuade key Congressmen 
to include their agency in the legislation. In this case 
the battle for control was between the existing federal-state 
vocational education program under the Department of Health 
Education and Welfare (HEW) and the Department of Labor 
(DOL). Critics of the vocational education program charged 
that the program, which at that time was predominantly 
oriented to training in home economics and agriculture, was 
too far out of touch with the modern labor market to be 
useful. The Bureau of the Budget strongly supported this 
32 
opinion and attempted to have the program placed in the DOL 
and run as a direct federally funded and controlled program 
using the facilities that the DOL selected. Due to the 
lobbying pressure of the powerful American vocational Asso-
ciation, the responsibilities were ultimately divided 
between HEW and DOL. The uneasy compromise officially 
resolved the issue of control. But, the interagency con-
flict continued and had a long term impact on the manpower 
delivery system. 
The basic features of this important manpower legisla-
tion were: .. (1) Full federal financing for the first two 
years, followed by continued federal support for on-the-job 
training but providing only fifty percent matching funds for 
institutional training of the unemployed in occupations with 
reasonable expectations of employment; (2) Heads of families 
with at least three years of working experience could qualify 
for up to fifty-two weeks of training allowances at levels 
equal to average unemployment compensation benefit in the 
state; (3) Limited number of youths aged nineteen to twenty-
one years could receive training allowances of twenty 
dollars a week; (4) Title I required an annual Manpower 
Report by the President and the DOL was authorized manpower 
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research and development funds." The legislation was 
aimed almost exclusively at the adult, displaced, experi-
enced worker. 
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When the first debates over the MDT A began in 1961, the 
unemployment rate among married men averaged 4.6 percent and 
the rate for white males from ages 25 through 65 was approx-
25 
imately 4.7 percent. The assumption of many of the 
sponsors of MDTA was that many of these and other experi-
enced workers had been displaced by advancing technology, 
Government sponsored retraining was necessary to assist 
these workers in finding new positions. But, as the economy 
recovered, those workers who theoretically had been dis-
placed by automation found employment without government 
assistance. By 1963 the unemployment rate for married men 
had fallen to 3.4 percent and the figure for white males 
26 
between the ages of 25-65 was approximately 3.6 percent. 
Once the MDTA was in operation it became apparent that 
the enrollees were not the target group envisioned by the 
policy-makers. The enrollees were increasingly what has 
since been termed the "hard core" unemployed - youth, minor-
ities, illiterates, and aged workers. The enrollees did not 
meet the assumed basic literacy levels expected by the pro-
gram designers. The clients, in the opinion of those 
administering and monitoring the program, required much 
longer training programs including basic education to pre-
pare them for employment. The youth allowances, which were 
limited under the Act to five percent of expenditures were 
inadequate when 25 percent of the MDTA enrollees were 
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youths. Agencies involved in the program returned to Con-
gress to ohtain amendments which were necessary to meet the 
demands of the disadvantaged client population. Neither the 
Congress nor the involved agencies appeared to seriously 
consider alternative program models which might serve this 
newly identified target population more effectively. The 
MDTA program had attained momentum and had developed con-
stituent agencies and groups concerned with its continuation. 
MDTA amendments to accommodate the needs of the disadvan-
taged clientele were passed almost unanimously by Congress 
in 1963. 
By 1965 the MDTA had taken a significant step away 
from being a temporary program to aid adult displaced work-
ers towards becoming a permanent remedial program to a11evi-
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ate serious inequalities in the competition for jobs. 
Congress had assumed a national responsjbility for attempt-
ing to raise the incomes and increase the employability of 
the disadvantaged portion of the population. It was assumed 
that providing basic education, skills training, and p1ace-
ment services would aid the disadvantaged population in 
reaching these goals. MDTA amendments in 1965, 1966, and 
1967, broadening the scope of the program and increasing 
expenditures, received almost unamimous bipartisan support. 
The Era of Social Engineering 
The MDTA was one of a series of legislative acts which 
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received Administration and Congressional endorsements dur-
ing the decade of the 1960's. An unprecedented number of 
programs purporting to "solve" the social and economic in-
equities of American society were passed under the rhetoric 
of Kennedy's New Frontier and Johnson's Great Society. Many 
of the programs were aimed at the disadvantaged population. 
The theoretical framework for the legislative programs was 
derived primarily from empirically untested assumptions 
developed in the social sciences. "Underlying most of the 
theories was the belief in 'environmentalism' - the assump-
tion that man is almost limitlessly malleable: through 
manipulating the external conditions of living, it should in 
principle be possible to secure almost any desired behavior 
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and any level of achievement." This almost unquestioning 
belief in environmental determinism and the equality of all 
persons if given equal opportunities is a general theme 
which runs through the social welfare legislation, including 
manpower legislation, adopted during the 1960's. The re-
formers postulated that government intervention could effec-
tively alter individual behavior. They were overly optimis-
tic about the U.s. policy making process and the effective-
ness with which government programs can intervene in a clear 
cut fashion in the structure of a highly complex society. 
The promises and slogans surrounding the legislation raised 
popular expectations to unrealistic levels. 
36 
The plethora of social intervention legislation in-
eluded many programs expected to have an impact on the 
employment rates and income levels of the disadvantaged. 
Experience gained under the early years of the MDTA helped 
in formulating the new legislation. Recognition of insti-
tutional barriers to employment and a widespread reaction to 
discrimination, resulted in the 1964 Civil Rights Act which 
forbid discrimination in employment on the part of all 
private employers with more than a minimal number of work-
ers. Recognition that more than prejudice stood between the 
disadvantaged and satisfactory jobs was illustrated in the 
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emphasis of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964. The one 
billion dollar "War on Poverty" created the Job Corps and 
the Neighborhood Youth Corps for providing youth with train-
ing and remedial education; the work study program to assist 
college students; one hundred percent federal financing for 
training programs for welfare recipients; and loans to small 
businesses. The legislation was the combination of one new 
idea - the Community Action Agency (CAA) made up of local 
citizens which would administer and plan the programs - and 
long discussed programs designed to "help the poor help 
themselves". The manpower programs included in the bill 
were aimed at either employing or training the employable 
poor, particularly the youth. The legislation was a "foot 
in the door" for advocates of public service employment. 
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In 1965 the consensus against unemployment, poverty, 
and discrimination was at its height. Advocates for man-
power programs found a warm reception. But, by 1966 unem-
ployment had reached a thirteen year low of 3.8 percent, ~nd 
the continued escalation in Vietnam provided a drain on fed-
eral dollars. Inflation was threatening, and pressure to 
decrease federal spending was developing. Traditionally, 
the combination of low unemployment and inflation would have 
signalled a withdrawal of interest in manpower issues. But, 
once policy cycles have developed in a particular issue 
area, stopping the process is a major assignment. By 1967 
criticisms of the operations of manpower and poverty legis-
lation were steadily increasing, but too many commitments by 
too many people existed at that point for termination of 
programs to occur. A constituency existed which was created 
by earlier manpower and poverty legislation and which had a 
vested interest in their continuation. 
Bureaus, Congressional committees, and lobbyists popu-
late the policy-making systems. Termination of a particular 
pattern is almost never a clean break, but a gradual shift-
ing of functions. The initial shifting in the manpower area 
was characterized by attempts on the part of involved agen-
cies to create administrative order out of the maze of 
existing programs. 
Administrative Reform 
By 1967 the manpower system encompassed seventeen major 
programs and thousands of separate contracts. Each of the 
programs in operation had different eligibility rules, 
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allocation formulas and application procedures. The Depart-
ment of Health Education and Welfare, the Office of Economic 
Opportunity, and to a minor degree the Departments of Agri-
culture and the Interior were all active in the manpower 
field. The confusion created by conflicts between the 
administering agencies was heightened by intra-agency 
competition between the three separate bureaus responsible 
for manpower under the Department of Labor. At the lower 
levels of government the federal conflicts and the lack of 
coordination between programs serving the same target group 
contributed to almost chaotic conditions. Local power 
struggles interjected an even greater level of confusion 
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into the system. Federal administrators recognized the 
need for administrative reform. 
Gradually, as manpower control was consolidated at the 
federal level under the DOL and HEW, several important 
attempts were made to improve planning, coordination, and 
administration at the local level. Two of the attempts are 
discussed in the following material. 
Ghetto riots had placed a high priority on interven-
tion in the employment problems of inner-city residents. A 
major attempt to meet these needs was launched with the 
creation of the Concentrated Employment Program (CEP) in 
1967. The program was designed to concentrate manpower 
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funds on targeted high unemployment areas. A central admin-
istrative unit was to coordinate the existing programs and 
provide one-stop, individualized manpower services to the 
ghetto unemployed. Experience in other programs attempting 
to train the hard core unemployed indicated that a straight 
on-the-job setting was not enough. The disadvantaged popu-
lation often had multiple problems, such as poor health, 
child care needs, etc., which interfered with their ability 
to perform on the job. The CEP program, modeled after the 
new Chicago YMCA's "Jobs Now", provided for orientation to 
the world of work, counselling, medical and social services, 
and individual job coaches to follow the participant from 
enrollment through job placement. Administratively, the 
concept of the program was a step forward. But, jurisdic-
tional conflict between OEO and the DOL created service 
delivery problems before the program began operation. 
Furthermore, CEP never gained the intended control of MDTA 
Institutional funds and the NABS-Jobs program. Expansion 
from the original twenty-two areas to eighty-two areas 
diluted available funds and decreased effectiveness. CEP 
was unsuccessful as a coordinating agent and became one more 
local program among many. 
The second attempt to bring order into the chaos of 
the local manpower system was the establishment of the 
Cooperative Area Manpower Planning System (CAMPS). CAMPS 
was initially envisioned as a method to bring the state 
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governments into the delivery system with the possibility of 
eventually funneling manpower funds through the states to 
the localities. State committees were to create a compre-
hensive manpower plan by consolidating local CAMPS plans and 
bringing unity to a disjointed system. Unfortunately, most 
governors failed to appreciate the possibilities, and the 
majority of state plans were simply a collection of local 
plans, which in turn were a collection of separate programs. 
CAMPS lacked any direct control over funding, and thus 
lacked any real power in the manpower system. CAMPS failed 
to perform as anticipated, but it did create a means of 
communication between groups and individuals concerned with 
manpower. It also provided preliminary manpower planning 
experience at the lower levels of government. Both the CEP 
and the CAMPS programs were to provide important experience 
and models for new legislation in the 1970's. 
By 1969 the Administration and Congress were aware of 
the need for reorganizing the manpower delivery system. 
National administration of the programs did not appear to be 
workable. Under the American system policy decisions are 
often made by the agencies charged under legislative acts 
with administering the legislation. The administration of 
manpower policy, divided between powerful departments, pro-
vides an example how administrative policy making can 
greatly impair the effectiveness of legislated policy. The 
attempts at coordinating the various programs into a unified 
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whole were doomed to failure due to underlying agency con-
flicts. Successful coordination demands that all involved 
agencies have the same substantive interests, presumably in 
this case serving the target population in the best possible 
fashion. But, it appears that the primary interest of the 
bureaucracies concerned was often to maintain or increase 
their own authority. Serving the best interest of the 
intended beneficiaries was secondary to their own survival 
and/or growth. 
Members of Congress are well aware of the problems 
created when competing agencies are involved in the adminis-
tration of one issue area. But, powerful agencies such as 
those involved with manpower have influential Congressional 
lobbies which often prevail during the formulation of legis-
lation. The power of the agencies also contributes to the 
difficulties encountered in reforming poorly functioning 
delivery systems. 
Congress is also slow to deal with administrative prob-
lems because such matters generally lack public visibility. 
Officials prefer to focus on programs which have easily 
identifiable benefits for their constituents and broad 
political appeal. In the manpower area, strong pressure 
from the Administration was necessary before Congress acted 
on the reorganization of the delivery system. For approxi-
mately four years from 1969-1972 manpower reform was an 
underlying issue in a battle between a Republican President 
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and a Democrat dominated Congress over public service 
employment. 
Public Service Employment 
The notion of the government as "the employer of last 
resort" grew in popularity throughout the 1960's. Ameri-
cans, who have always placed a positive value on work for 
income received, appeared to favor public service jobs over 
transfer payments. A national Gallup poll in the late 
1960's found 80 percent willing to guarantee job opportuni-
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ties and an equal percentage opposed to guaranteed incomes. 
Creation of limited numbers of public service jobs had been 
written into a number of programs. By 1969 the creation of 
a large-scale public service job progrant had become a major 
concern of such groups as the AFL-CIO, the Urban Coalition, 
and the League of Cities-U.S. Conference of Mayors. Several 
commissions, such uS the Kerner Contmission, and task forces 
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had also recommended public sector job creation. 
The Employment and Training Opportunities Act intro-
duced in May, 1969 was a multibillion dollar public service 
employment program. The Nixon Administration and particu-
1ar1y Secretary of Labor Schultz, who had opposed public 
sector job creation on the grounds that fiscal and monetary 
policy combined with limited training-linked jobs would curb 
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cyclical unemployment, were forced by the strength of 
Senate support to commit themselves to public service jobs 
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in exchange for the introduction of a series of amendments 
aimed at tightening, but not eliminating, the program. One 
amendment was adopted, and the bill passed the Senate 68-6 
in 1970. In the House, where the Administration had more 
support, Malcolm Lovell, Assistant Secretary of the Depart-
ment of Labor, bargained more successfully. In an all night 
session Lovell with leading Democrats and Republicans from 
the House Select Labor Subcommittee, produced a new manpower 
bill, retaining a major section on public service jobs, but 
also including large-scale manpower reorganization, decen-
tralization, and decategorization which were priority aims 
of the Administration. The House passed the bill after 
vigorous debate in late 1970. 
The House-Senate Conference on the bill marked the 
breakup of the bipartisan support which had backed manpower 
legislation for nearly a decade. The Senate position on 
public service employment which prevailed in the Conference 
created what could have become a permanent large scale pro-
gram. The issue of public sector job creation which divided 
the Conference was fundamentally an ideological one which 
had separated conservatives and liberals, Democrats and 
Republicans for decades. It was a question which had mainly 
been avoided under previous manpower legislation. Although 
Republicans were willing to compromise to the extent of 
supporting temporary public service jobs, massive permanent 
programs were not fundamentally acceptable. Politically 
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realistic, they voted for the bill while privately urging a 
presidential veto. On December 16, 1970 President Nixon 
vetoed the Conference bill which had narrowly passed the 
House. The Senate failed to override the veto. 
The intensive debate over public service jobs over-
shadowed the question of manpower service delivery system 
reform. But, the hearings on the bill marked the first 
overall Congresssional assessment of the manpower programs 
of the 1960's, and the first major attempt at change since 
the MDTA and the EOA. The delivery of services had received 
explicit attention and the appropriate functions of the fed-
eral, state and local government had been seriously consid-
ered. The fundamental need for change was recognized in 
Congress, but continued to be a low priority among the 
majority. Facing a 5.9 percent unemployment rate in 1971, 
the Congressional majority considered public employment, an 
issue with high public visibility and immediate benefits, as 
a high priority. 
The sponsors of public service employment in Congress 
persisted and introduced the Emergency Employment Act of 
1971. The bill authorized the Secretary of Labor to con-
tract with lower levels of government to create public ser-
vice jobs. Shrewdly written to avoid a presidential veto 
the act was to be operative for only two years. It was also 
a step towards revenue sharing in that mayors and governors 
were given broad powers in selecting jobs and participants 
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and in operating local programs. For pragmatic political 
reasons, it was difficult for President Nixon to veto a 
transitional public service employment bill with wide public 
support. The White House supported the bill in exchange for 
Congressional promises to move quickly on comprehensive 
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manpower reform, preferably manpower revenue sharing. 
Manpower Revenue Sharing 
The Congressional hearings in 1969 and 1970 had ex-
posed the need for a general overhaul of manpower programs. 
Host analysts agreed that the objective should be similar to 
the CEP model - a centralized, easily accessible, adminis-
trative unit where a client needing manpower services could 
go and receive individualized help from the initial counsel-
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ling to the final job placement. The local agency would 
have access to information about the needs of the local 
labor market and developed contacts for job placement. 
Local manpower plans should be drawn up by a representative 
decisionmaking body. The plans should be realistic and 
allow for flexible response to changing clientele and the 
local labor market. 
The Nixon Administration's position was that these 
objectives could best be met by manpower revenue sharing. 
In keeping with this goal was the desire to eliminate the 
existing maze of categorical programs with their rigid fund-
ing and eligibility requirements. Federally managed cate-
gorical programs, while in many ways commendable, were by 
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their nature not sensitive to local needs. Decentralization 
of manpower planning, design, and operation responsibilities 
was considered desirable by the Administration, to allow 
local and state governments to decide for themselves the 
types of manpower services required in their area. The 
Administration argued that State and local units, being 
closer to their problems, would be able to act more quickly 
and efficiently in supplying effective manpower services. 
Program guidelines and goals originating in Washington, D.C. 
could not possibly foresee the varied situations with which 
the localities must contend. 
In 1971 President Nixon had submitted the proposed 
Manpower Revenue Sharing Act of 1971 to the Congress, but 
Congressional resistance to revenue sharing, as well as 
other considerations, prevented its passage. During 1973, 
the Administration stepped up decentralization and decate-
gorization of manpower programs through administrative 
means, and threatened Congress that manpower revenue sharing 
would be implemented by executive fiat in 1974 regardless of 
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whether Congress acted on or rejected the concept. 
Continuing pressure was put on Congress to pass a cornpre-
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hensive reform manpower bill. On December 28, 1973 
President Nixon signed into law the Comprehensive Employment 
and Training Act of 1973 (CETA), the first legislation to 
incorporate the essential principles of special revenue 
sharing. 
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CETA largely eliminates categorical programs author-
ized under previous legislation. Instead, the Secretary of 
Labor is authorized to make block grants to about 500 local 
and state and general government units with populations of 
100,000 or more who will act as prime sponsors for their 
areas. The prime sponsors are expected to plan and operate 
manpower programs to meet local needs with little federal 
direction or interference. Specific provision for the tran-
sitional period through fiscal 1974 was included in the 
legislation. 
The basic features of this important new legislation 
are as follows: (1) State and local prime sponsors are to 
receive 80 percent of the authorized Title I CETA funds to 
provide comprehensive manpower services in their areas. One 
percent of this allocation is to be available for staffing 
and serving State Manpower Services Councils which will 
review state and local manpower plans, monitor their opera-
tions and make annual reports to the government. The 
remainder of the funds is to be used by the prime sponsors. 
They are authorized, but not limited to, using the funds to 
provide recruitment; orientation; counselling; testing; job 
placement; subsidized on-the-job training; trainee allow-
ances; supportive services; and transitional public employ-
ment programs. Individuals may not receive training allow-
ances for more than two consecutive years, as the intent is 
to provide training for permanent private employment and not 
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long-term public support. The public service employment 
program must be fully integrated with the comprehensive man-
power services. A representative Planning Council to plan, 
monitor, and evaluate manpower efforts in light of local 
needs is to be appointed by the prime sponsor. Of the 
remaining twenty percent of Title I money, five percent is 
available to encourage combinations of local government 
units to serve as prime sponsors; five percent is available 
for grants to provide needed vocational education services; 
four percent is to help States make comprehensive plans and 
to coordinate services; and the remaining funds are to be 
used at the discretion of the Secretary of Labor. (2) Title 
II provides for a transitional public service employment 
program in areas with 6.5 percent unemployment rates for 
more than three consecutive months. Persons unemployed for 
more than thirty days are eligible. Priority is to go to 
unemployed veterans who served in Korea or Vietnam after 
August 4, 1964 and to the most severely disadvantaged. (3) 
Under Title III the Secretary of Labor is authorized to 
provide federal supervision of manpower programs for Indians 
and migrant and seasonal farmworkers; and for special target 
groups such as youth, older workers, and others with parti-
cular labor market disadvantages. The Secretary of Labor is 
also to undertake research, experimental and demonstration 
programs, evaluations of all programs, the development of a 
labor market information system, and a computerized job 
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placement program. (4) Title III grants the Secretary 
responsibility for operation of the Job Corps. (5) Title.v 
creates a National Commission for Manpower policy to iden-
tify national manpower goals, prepare an annual report to 
the President and Congress, examine the effectiveness of 
manpower programs, and evaluate and make recommendations to 
the Congress on the impact of the energy shortage upon 
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manpower needs. 
SUMMARY 
The passage of the Comprehensive Employment and Train-
ing Act of 1973 marked the beginning of a major new approach 
to the delivery of manpower services. In the 1960's man-
power policy had received bipartisan support at the federal 
level. Programs had multiplied as national leaders attemp-
ted to develop a manpower policy which would deal with the 
emerging problems. Concomitant with this development, 
serious problems had arisen - a proliferation of separate 
categorical programs; excessive duplication of delivery 
systems; and overcentralization at the national level. For 
four years a general consensus existed in Congress that 
reform was necessary, but it took that four years to develop 
a majority consensus on the substance of the reform. With 
the passage of CETA Congress essentially turned over the 
planning and operation of manpower programs from the national 
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to the state and local levels of government. Federal super-
vision and funding included in the legislation insured that 
national purposes would be carried out, but the responsi-
bilities for planning, designing, and implementing the 
programs passed to the lower levels of government. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE COMPREHENSIVE EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING ACT: 
DECENTRALIZATION, DECATEGORIZATION AND THE DISADVANTAGED 
The passage of the Comprenensive Employment and Train-
ing Act of 1973 (CETA) reflected the changing perceptions 
concerning social intervention strategies for government 
programs. The initial enthusiasm for large federally 
controlled social programs had declined throughout the 
country as both supporters and critics grew disillusioned 
with the programs' high costs and questionable effective-
ness. Waste, duplication, and inefficiency in the opera-
tion of social programs created a visible target for public 
complaint. The experience of the Vietnam War had generated 
a growing distrust of the federal government. The idea of 
local control of social programs gained popularity. Presi-
dent Nixon's support for revenue sharing coincided with the 
need for manpower reform and the decategorization of man-
power programs. CETA was based on practicality and Ameri-
can political ideology which enshrines the value of local 
control. Congress turned manpower over to the lower levels 
of government on the assumption that local officials would 
know best what their local areas required and would respond 
more quickly and effectively to the needs of their citizenry. 
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In December 1973 when CETA became law, the national 
unemployment rate was 4.5 percent. Titles I through IV 
which authorize operating programs were intended to effect 
structural unemployment. The disadvantaged, who make up a 
high percent of the unemployed during times of low unem-
ployment, were the intended beneficiaries - although the 
terms unemployed and underemployed appear often in the 
actual legislation. By 1974, when local prime sponsors had 
barely begun implementation of Title I programs, the 
national unemployment rate had passed seven percent and was 
still climbing. In some localities unemployment rates were 
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above eight percent. The need for countercyclical pro-
grams appeared urgent, and the Emergency Jobs and Unemp1oy-
ment Assistance Act of 1974 (EJUAA) was quickly passed into 
law in December 1974. It became Title VI of CETA and 
authorized 2.5 billion dollars for public service jobs to 
be administered by CETA prime sponsors. Shortly afterwards 
an additional 473 million was added for summer youth pro-
grams to be administered through CETA channels. Categori-
cal programs to meet national priorities were again accep-
table to the Congressional majority. 
The federal addition of two well-funded categorical 
programs raises several major questions about CETA. CETA, 
which accounts for only fifty-six percent of federal manpow-
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er program funds, was intended originally to act against 
structural unemployment problems through decategorized, 
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decentralized manpower programs. But, Title VI and the 
summer youth program are categorical programs aimed at 
cyclical unemployment. These programs, which undermine the 
intent of CETA, were nevertheless passed by the federal 
government to be administered through the CETA system. If 
this trend continues the CETA program may become a decen-
tralized delivery system administering categorical programs. 
As Figure II demonstrates, the "decategorized" funds avail-
able to prime sponsors for flexible use - with some shift-
ing between Titles permitted - in fiscal year 1975 make up 
only 42 percent of the CETA funds authorized, but 89 per-
cent of the CETA funds were administered through the 
decentralized delivery system. The promised local control 
may be illusionary. If Congress continues to react to 
perceived national economic problems by tacking legislation 
onto CETA, the local prime sponsors will be limited in 
their flexibility and tied to a rigid manpower system which 
has shifted responsibilities for delivery of service, but 
not definition of the problem. Local prime sponsors may 
become as limited in their capabilities for reaction to 
local problems as were the federal agencies who previously 
administered manpower programs. The U.S. Department of 
Labor's role, which is presently ambiguous, may become 
increasingly powerful as it reasserts its responsibilities 
for federal oversight of categorical programs. 
Figure 2. Amounts authorized for program activities under 
the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act, fiscal year 
1975. 
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Serious consideration should be given to the effects 
of combining programs aimed at structural unemployment with 
programs aimed at cyclical unemployment. Although both are 
intended to benefit the unemployed, the disadvantaged 
unemployed require training programs, counseling, etc. to 
prepare them for employment. The temporarily unemployed 
skilled worker has quite different needs, and the inclusion 
of Title VI under CETA has strained the abilities and 
resources of prime sponsors attempting to effectively 
administer CETA programs. Separation of counter-cyclical 
programs from structural unemployment programs should be 
considered. 
DECENTRALIZATION 
The decentralization and decategorization of manpower 
programs were expected to result in superior planning and 
administration of programs while eliminating the overlap, 
duplication, fragmentation and inefficiency of earlier 
federal programs. The normal Congressional process of 
compromise and negotiation preceded the final decision on 
the definition of prime sponsors under CETA. The desire to 
designate a prime sponsor covering an entire labor market 
area was sacrificed for practical and political reasons. 
Practically, there existed no units of government covering 
the labor market area in the great majority of localities. 
The existing units of general government - including states, 
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cities, and counties - testified to their abilities and 
interest in becoming prime sponsors. The final legislation 
designated general units of local governments with popu-
lations of 100,000 or more, consortia of such units, and 
states as eligible prime sponsors. Funds to induce the 
formation of consortia, which may have covered a labor 
market area, were limited to not more than 5 percent of the 
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amount available under Title I. The legislation made it 
possible for many manpower prime sponsors to operate in the 
same labor market area. The Act created the potential for 
excessive decentralization with accompanying fragmentation, 
duplication and inefficiency. 
Most of the labor market areas in the U.S. include a 
number of general units of local government eligible for 
prime sponsorship under CETA. Lacking strong incentives it 
is unlikely that a single labor market area will be served 
by a single prime sponsor operating programs aimed at the 
total area. Political rivalry, the distrust existing 
between many suburban or rural governments and city units, 
and the desire to control manpower funds inhibit the forma-
tion of consortia. The fragmentation of manpower programs 
by political boundaries rather than program category is 
likely to result in similar inefficiency, duplication and 
lack of coordination in the manpower area. 
Little is presently known about the economics and 
diseconomies of scale in manpower programs, but it appears 
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likely that at least some functions such as planning, 
developing labor market information, developing management 
information systems, and evaluation could be performed more 
effectively at the labor market area level. For example, 
in 1973 no system existed for defining or identifying skills 
shortage occupations at the local level. Sophisticated 
methodologies and matrices were developed for national and 
state forecasting, but little usable or reliable infor-
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mation existed for localities. The cost of such informa-
tion is high, and it is unlikely that a single prime spon-
sor would attempt to develop the needed system. Without 
reliable information systems, much local planning must be 
based on attempts to break out local data from national or 
state studies~ or, more frequently, to rely on "intuition" 
or the "feel" of the local labor market. With several 
local prime sponsors competing for job placements in the 
same market area, it is possible reliable information on 
job openings may be closely guarded. 
Decentralization in the Portland Metropolitan Area 
In the Portland, Oregon Standard ~etropolitan Sta-
tis tical Area (SMSA) there are currently five different CETA 
prime sponsors operating manpower programs. ~1ultnomah and 
Washington counties with a combined 1970 population of 
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332,710 excluding the City of Portland, formed a consor-
tium in May 1974. Columbia County, lacking sufficient 
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population for eligibility as a prime sponsor, was picked up 
by the Oregon Balance-of-State plan. Clackamas County with 
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a population of 196,900 became its own prime sponsor. 
Across the Columbia River in Washington, Clark County, with 
a 1970 u.s. census population of 128,454, also became a 
prime sponsor. The City of Portland, with a population of 
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372,500 also became a CETA prime sponsor and was the only 
incorporated city government of sufficient size in the 
metropolitan area to qualify as a prime sponsor. 
Prior to the passage of CETA no significant DOL funded 
manpower programs were operated by any of the county or city 
governments. The Portland Metropolitan Steering Committee 
(PMSC), a local Community Action Agency (CAA), served as 
the prime sponsor for the largest manpower program in the 
area, the Concentrated Employment Program (CEP). The Port-
land Mayor's Manpower Area Planning Council (~mpC) was 
responsible for planning in the Portland metropolitan area. 
The City essentially provided the expertise in the manpower 
field, although the four Oregon counties were represented 
on the MAPC. Little attention was paid to manpower deci-
sions by local elected officials prior to Spring 1974, and 
officials were barely familiar with manpower categorical 
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grants. The City's manpower director, who was responsible 
for writing manpower plans and was most familiar with man-
power programs, had a tendency to hold things close to his 
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chest. 
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In 1973 local governments and agencies began planning 
for implementation of CETA. Negotiations to form a consor-
tium between the City and the four Oregon counties began. 
During this period county officials became increasingly 
interested in manpower programs and Multnomah County hired a 
consultant to study current programs. County officials 
discovered that although federal manpower funds had been 
budgeted for the counties, no manpower service system had 
been developed for the counties. This failure was blamed on 
the City and the manpower director, in particular. The 
manpower director offended several of the counties' repre-
sentatives during the negotiations. ~1u1tnomah County, which 
contains the City of Portland, decided to pullout of the 
consortium and the other counties followed. The U.S. 
Department of Labor and the state manpower department did 
not interfere when the consortium negotiations began to 
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break down. The consortium which would have covered the 
majority of the labor market area fell apart in April, 1974. 
The primary reason for the collapse of the consortium 
was the counties' fear of domination by the City of Port-
land. The Mayor was a young aggressive politician, and 
county politicians perhaps feared that too many of the man-
power dollars would be diverted from the counties to the 
City under his leadership. Columbia, Washington and 
Clackamas counties were also concerned that a city domi-
nated consortium would pay inadequate attention to their 
geographically large rural populations. All the counties 
evidently wished to obtain autonomy for their own programs 
which they felt association with the City might preclude. 
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The possibility of the City of Portland entering into 
a consortium with any or all of the concerned counties 
appears to be a dead issue. Although all involved parties 
agree that such a consortium would be theoretically ideal, 
in that it would improve coordination, and eliminate present 
duplication and fragmentation of manpower services, none of 
the involved units were considering reopening negotiations 
in 1975. 
Fragmentation, duplication, inefficiency and lack of 
coordination between manpower programs may have increased in 
the Portland metro area under CETA. The five prime sponsors 
are all offering similar services, based on the model of 
former federal programs. All feature intake, orientation 
and assessment (I,O, & A); counseling; vocational education; 
institutional training; public and private on-the-job train-
ing; public employment programs; supportive services; 
placement; and follow-up. All utilize a portion of their 
CETA funds for administrative costs; the development and 
operation of a Management Information System (MIS); labor 
market analysis; job development; planning and supervision; 
and other related activities. No working coordinating 
mechanism exists between the five prime sponsors. Officials 
and bureaucrats appear to be unaware of the activities of 
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their counterparts in other units of government. Interviews 
with concerned staff and officials revealed a lack of 
knowledge and communication between the five prime sponsors, 
and between the prime sponsors and the state manpower 
office. The prime sponsors, operating in the same labor 
market area, appear to be operating independently of each 
other. 
Access to manpower programs in the Portland metro-
politan areas has probably improved under CETA. A citizen 
residing in any part of the metro area is now eligible for 
manpower programs. Previously only residents of certain 
geographical areas were eligible. All five prime sponsors 
operate central offices and field units in areas of high 
unemployment. Visibility and accessibility do appear to 
have improved. 
DECENTRALIZATION AND THE DISADVANTAGED 
The ideal geographic unit for manpower planning and 
operation has usually been recognized as an economically 
integrated labor market area. CETA has in effect broken up 
planning and operation into smaller units. Without adequate 
incentives to form consortia, it is likely that other metro-
politan areas are undergoing the same experience described 
in the Portland metro area. Planning and operating programs 
within political boundaries tends to separate the place of 
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work from the place of residence, and may limit access to 
job opportunities. 
The cost of possible fragmentation by political geo-
graphy might be borne by the intended beneficiaries of CETA, 
the disadvantaged and particularly the minorities. Central 
cities are losing their jobs to the suburbs, especially in 
manufacturing. Inadequate labor demand in areas accessible 
to ghetto residents contributes to the present occupational 
structure of disadvantaged workers who are concentrated in 
service, laboring, and operative occupations. "According to 
the 1960 census in the fifteen largest metropolitan areas, 
central cities provided nearly two-thirds of the jobs in 
their metropolitan area. By census day 1970 the central 
cities had only 52% of the total metropolitan area jobs. 
If, as is likely, the rates of change of the last decade 
have continued, the suburbs at the present time provide the 
49 
majority of metropolitan area jobs". During the same 
period minorities, primarily Blacks, have been moving into 
the central cities - increasing both their absolute number 
and their percentage of central city population in large 
SMSA's. The White population in these areas has been 
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declining. Given these two sets of statistics and the 
likelihood that many of the eligible units of local govern-
ment will operate their own CETA funded manpower programs, 
it appears possible that the planning and training - if 
geared to jobs within political boundaries - will not 
provide the optimum program for the central city disadvan-
taged. They may in fact be excluded, by virtue of geo-
graphical residence, from training programs and placements 
which may be most suited to their education, abilities and 
aspirations. 
The CETA allocation formula may also result in areas 
with large number of disadvantaged persons, as opposed to 
unemployed persons, receiving lower levels of funding than 
they did in pre-CETA programs. The bill as passed by the 
House included only two elements in the Title I formula; the 
prior year's funding level and unemployment. The Senate 
bill proposed poverty and unemployment as the criteria. The 
final compromise gave precedence to past levels of funding 
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over measures of economic distress. The formula for 
distribution of Title I funds places three times as much 
weight on unemployment as on low income. Distribution of 
pre-CETA funds was based to a greater extent on poverty and 
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other factors. The effect of the CETA funding formula is 
to increase funding to those areas where the ratio of adults 
in low income families to the number unemployed is low. The 
formula will eventually shift funds from the cities, not 
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participating in consortia, to the counties. Temporary 
stability of programs was guaranteed by the requirement that 
no prime sponsor may get more than 150% nor less than 90% of 
the previous year's funding. Over a period of several 
years, the level of funding going to different units will be 
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adjusted with some areas gradually settling at lower levels 
than prior to CETA and other areas receiving increased 
funding. Table III illustrates the adjustment process in 
Fiscal Year 1975. 
In each successive year, unless total funding is 
increased, the amount going to cities will continue to 
decrease. The disadvantaged minorities located in central 
cities will have less access to manpower services as the 
funding to their local unit of general government is re-
duced. Unless Congress amends the allocation formula to 
place more emphasis on low-income or poverty populations, 
the hard-core unemployed will receive less attention than 
they did under pre-CETA programs. A national study of 
participants in Title I programs demonstrates a basic trend 
under CETA: higher proportions of men, whites, persons of 
prime working age, the better educated, the less disadvan-
taged, and persons who where unemployed rather than under-
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employed prior to entry in programs. 
Although CETA legislation requires that participants 
be "economically disadvantaged, unemployed, or underem-
ployed", the exact interpretations of these terms were, 
for the most part, left to the discretion of the prime 
sponsors. ~any liberals feared that the disadvantaged, who 
rarely have powerful interest groups operating on their 
behalf at the state and local levels, would receive less 
Type of 
Sponsor 
City 
County 
Consortium 
Balance of 
State 
All 
Sponsors 
TABLE III 
PERCENT FISCAL YEAR 1975 OF FISCAL YEAR 
1974 MANPOWER FUNDS, BY TYPE OF SPONSOR 
a/ 
Percent FY 1975 Title I Allocations- of Fy 1974 Funds 
Formula Amount Adjusted Amount~/ 
Range Average Range Average 
53-180 77 90-150 90 
68-292 107 90-150 108 
63-143 89 90-134 97 
70-127 91 90-127 95 
53-292 89 90-150 96 
Source: Computed from Manpower Administration data 
a/ Excludes consortium incentives, State funds for manpower services 
- vocational education, and planning, funds for rural CEP's and for 
Guam, Virgin Islands, Samoa, and Trust Territories. 
h/ Funds for programs corresponding with Title I. 
c/ Adjusted to provide each prime sponsor at least 90 percent hut not 
- more than 150 percent of prior year's fund. 
!?/ 
SOURCE: William Muengoff and Lester Rindler, The Comprehensive Employment 
and Training Act (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, 
1976), p. 40. en 00 
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attention than they had under the pre-CETA federal adminis-
tration of manpower. Prior to CETA the local Community 
Action Agencies (CAA) were often involved in manpower pro-
grams - either as a prime sponsor or as the operating 
agency. The involvement of the CAA's benefitted the dis-
advantaged in two ways. The CAA's worked to organize and 
articulate the positions of the disadvantaged in manpower 
programs. Their organization and knowledge of bureaucratic 
processes aided the disadvantaged, who often lack the neces-
sary skills, in obtaining a fair hearing in the policy 
making process. The CAA's also had a direct influence on 
the staffing of manpower programs. It was generally a 
policy in manpower programs associated with CAA's to employ 
clients as staff both during and after training. This 
practice could result in a significant number of the staff 
coming from the client population. CETA legislates no 
direct manpower authority or money to the CAA's and their 
role is left to the discretion of the prime sponsor. The 
CAA's are likely to playa lesser part than they performed 
previously. The manpower staff is likely to be hired under 
more traditional methods, and the proportion of the staff 
who were or are disadvantaged clients will decrease. The 
diminished importance of CAA's in manpower programs is also 
likely to quiet the political voice of the disadvantaged 
groups in these programs. 
Allocations and the Disadvantaged in Portland, Oregon 
The shifts in manpower funding under CETA which have 
been noted nationally are present in the Portland area. 
Funds going to the county governments and the state have 
increased. Table IV demonstrates the breakdown of CETA 
funding. 
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Characteristics of the population being served by the 
different prime sponsors in the Portland metropolitan area 
were essentially projections at the time of the interviews 
in February and March 1975. The prime sponsors had just 
begun operating their Title I programs and were attempting 
to implement their new Title VI programs. In the Portland 
metropolitan area program directors do appear to be care-
fully following the national guidelines and are giving a 
high priority to disadvantaged persons. Although priority 
is given to the disadvantaged, the client population is 
likely to be different than under pre-CETA programs. The 
reason for the expected change is that the populations of 
the prime sponsors of CETA are different than under earlier 
programs. The majority of the clients of the major pre-CETA 
program, CEP, were Black. Most of the Black population in 
the Portland area resides in the City of Portland. Accord-
ing to the 1970 U.S. Census there were 372 Black residents 
in Clackamas County; 188 Black residents in Washington 
County; and 22,155 Black residents in Multnomah County, of 
TABLE IV 
TOTAL CETA MONEY TO PORTLAND METROPOLITAN AREA 
FEBRUARY 1975 - $35,590,008 
A. TOTAL CETA HONEY TO OREGON - $34,308,008 
State of region 
(administration) 
$972,780 
Lane County 
I - $1,314,918 
II - $1,292,515 
VI - $1,510,722 
Portland 
I - $3,919,050 
II - $ 981,821 
VI - $1,420,039 
Clackamas 
County 
I - $788,764 
VI - $358,987 
Oregon's Other 
29 Counties 
I - $5,058,454 
II - $4,572,149 
VI - $4,504,699 
Mu1tnomah -
Washington Consort.i um 
I - $1,413,624 
II - $ 600,000 
VI - $ 689,878 
Mid-Wi11amette Valley 
Consortium 
I - $1,630,732 
II - $1,623,609 
VI - $1,030,024 
CETA III 
American Indians $521,341 
(Includes $196,557 to Portland 
Urban Indian center) 
Oregon Rural opportunities 
Center $794,500 
...,J 
I-' 
TABLE IV (Continued) 
B. TOTAL CETA MONEY TO CLARK COUNTY, WASHINGTON 
I - $688,000 
III - $224,000 (Supplemental funds for Summer Youth Program) 
VI - $370,000 
SOURCE: Willamette Week, March, 1975. 
-.J 
N 
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which 98 percent resided in the City of Portland. Conse-
quently, since clients must reside within the geographical 
boundaries of the prime sponsor, the number of Blacks served 
by four of the five prime sponsors is low. The number of 
Mexican-Americans is likely to increase. But, overall the 
number of minority clients served in the Portland metro area 
is likely to decrease. The county programs are likely to 
have an older, better-educated, and less disadvantaged 
clientele than the city program. 
In the City of Portland program there also appeared to 
be a slightly different philosophy emerging among CETA 
administrators. The CEP program included among its par-
ticipants many "marginal" disadvantaged persons - persons 
whose background or motivation made their ultimate per-
formance in the labor market questionable. Several of the 
persons involved in CETA mentioned that CEP "recycled" too 
many participants and wasted valuable training slots on 
persons who were not sufficiently motivated to obtain and 
hold a job. City Commissioner Charles Jordan, who is in 
charge of CETA I and II, stated, "The situation was pathetic 
before. People who were in the program were not qualified. 
Now, under the City's program, only qualified people are in 
the program. Specific instructions have been given to the 
subcontractors to take only people who are really motivated, 
want to be trained and are ready ... cream the best of the 
disadvantaged, get them placed, and then take the ones that 
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will be time consuming." Two persons interviewed did feel 
that the new CETA trainees are quite superior in education 
to prior CEP trainees. They also felt that the "creaming" 
was unjustifiable, and that CETA was failing to serve the 
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real disadvantaged who needed training. The marginal 
costs and services required by the less disadvantaged 
clients are lower. Commissioner Jordan's position can be 
justified as a rational strategy which will ultimately 
benefit the disadvantaged community. But, if the intent is 
to serve the disadvantaged, the City must ensure that its 
subcontractor is not just admitting the applicants easiest 
to train or those who could obtain a job without CETA -
persons who although presently unemployed would not be 
considered disadvantaged in the usual sense. City personnel 
assured the author that there would be close control, but 
could not give satisfactory answers as to how the monitoring 
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and evaluation system would be designed or implemented. 
The program at the time of the interviews was just beginning' 
operation, and only an evaluation at a later time will 
answer the questions raised concerning the City's clientele. 
No information about the ultimate effect of different 
prime sponsors competing for job placements was available at 
the time of this review. Persons interviewed expected to 
use the Employment Service for placement as well as their 
own individual job developers. But, it is possible that the 
elected officials of the different prime sponsors may 
75 
attempt to influence employers in their areas to accept 
trainees from their manpower programs. Commissioner Jordan 
was hopeful that the City would be able to use leverage not 
available to previous manpower agency administrators to open 
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up jobs to their trainees. The effect of the geographical 
fragmentation of CETA on job placement opportunities is 
unknown. 
The local CAA, the PMSC, is not playing an important 
part in the CETA program. The City originally intended to 
contract with the Portland CEP, which is under the PMSC, to 
perform Orientation, Intake, and Assessment for CETA I and 
II. This contract was ultimately let to Portland Community 
College after a public hearing packed by protesting persons 
primarily connected with the PMSC. The manpower staff hired 
by the City does not appear to be following the CEP pattern 
of hiring many of its own trainees in the program. Mr. C. 
Gilchrist, Director of PMSC states, "The City's CETA I 
program is only hiring the CEP people with degrees or fairly 
established types ••• They are an institution and are not 
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going to hire the poor as we did." PMSC is concerned that 
the essential rapport and empathy which is necessary to get 
failures reinvolved in the system will be lacking in the 
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City's program. Commissioner Jordan feels this criticism 
is irrelevant. To help people and make good d~cisions it is 
absolutely critical to have qualified personnel. He feels 
the criticism is a symptom of the "reservation syndrome" 
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encouraged by federal programs in the 1960's. Instead of 
remaining among their "own kind", the disadvantaged must get 
out of the ghetto and learn to use the whole city and its 
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institutions if they are to succeed. There are certainly 
fewer direct jobs for the disadvantaged under CETA than 
under CEP. 
SUMMARY 
CETA was originally intended to create a decentralized 
decategorized manpower delivery system in which prime spon-
sors could develop flexible comprehensive manpower programs 
aimed at structural unemployment in their geographical area. 
The Congressional tendency to add categorical programs onto 
the CETA legislation has decreased the percentage of CETA 
funds available for flexible prime sponsor use. The inclu-
sion of Title VI and youth programs aimed at cyclical 
unemployment strained the abilities and resources of CETA 
prime sponsors. 
CETA's definition of eligibility for prime sponsors 
created the potential for fragmentation, duplication, and 
inefficiency as many prime sponsors develop independent 
manpower programs in the same labor market area. Potential 
economies of scale are lost as each prime sponsor offers 
similar services. No coordination mechanism exists between 
prime sponsors, and there is apparently little communication 
between units operating in the same labor market area. 
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As each CETA prime sponsor operates independent man-
power programs, the disadvantaged minorities concentrated in 
the political unit of the city may be denied access to 
suitable jobs located within ~he boundaries of another prime 
sponsor. Program combinations offered differ by the type of 
sponsor with cities concentrating on classroom training and 
counties devoting more funds to work-experience programs. 
The CETA allocation formula places three times as much 
weight on unemployment as it does on low income. r.1anpower 
funds at the local level are gradually being shifted from 
the cities to the counties and consortia. This process will 
result in a reduction in funds avilable to the prime spon-
sors within whose geographical boundaries many of the most 
disadvantaged and minorities reside. A basic trend appar-
ently developing under CETA is for the participants to 
include higher portions of men, whites, persons of prime 
working age, the better educated, and the less disadvan-
taged. Shifting the geographical units receiving manpower 
funds has resulted in shifting the population served by 
manpower programs. It is not possible to determine at this 
time whether city prime sponsors are placing the same 
emphasis on training the hard-core unemployed as existed 
under the previous federal manpower programs. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE COMPREHENSIVE EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING ACT: 
PLANNING, An~INISTRATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
AT THE LOCAL LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT 
CETA PLANNING 
Prior to the passage of CETA, manpower planning at the 
local level was primarily limited to participation in the 
Cooperative Area Manpower Planning System (CAMPS) introduced 
by the U.S. Department of Labor in 1967. The CAMPS program, 
which was discussed in Chapter II, was intended to provide 
comprehensive manpower plans for manpower programs under the 
DOL at the local and state governmental levels. The primary 
benefit of the early CAMPS was to provide an opportunity for 
communication between people involved in the manpower system 
rather than a meaningful planning process. In 1971 CAMPS 
was restructured in an attempt to make the program more 
influential. Local recommendations were to be taken into 
account by federal administrators and planning grants pro-
vided funds to state and local units to hire manpower 
planning staffs. The new structure provided for a State 
Manpower Planning Council (SMPC) under the governor; an Area 
T-1anpm'ler Planning Council (AMPC) under elected officials of 
the largest city in each CAMPS area; and an Ancillary 
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Manpower Planning Board (AMPB) for the balance of the state. 
In 1973, in an administrative move intended to precede 
revenue-sharing, the DOL announced that local officials 
would be given more freedom in recommending how EOA and ~DTA 
funds were to be used in their area. When CETA became law 
in December 1973, the CAMPS was discontinued as new regu-
lations carne into effect. Because the local and state CAMPS 
Councils lacked the power to institute their plans, the 
CAMPS' manpower plans were generally a token exercise. But, 
the CAMPS program did familiarize those involved with the 
manpower planning system, and it provided a channel of 
communication between manpower agencies. More importantly, 
through the planning grants it provided funds which devel-
oped a core of manpower planners at the local and state 
levels of government. 
CETA placed an emphasis on local planning as an essen-
tial component of a decentralized manpower system. Planning 
councils are required at the state and local prime sponsor 
levels to submit recommendations to the prime sponsor on 
program plans, goals, policies and procedures, and to moni-
tor and provide objective evaluation of the manpower pro-
grams. The members of Planning Councils are to be appointed 
by the prime sponsor. To the extent practical, members are 
to represent the client community, community-based organi-
zations, the employment service, education and training 
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agencies, business, and labor. Funding for Planning 
Council staff is provided by the prime sponsor. The prime 
sponsor with the aid of the Planning Council was intended to 
develop a comprehensive manpower plan geared to meeting 
local and state needs. 
The role of the advisory Planning Council will prob-
ably vary between prime sponsors due to the differing 
administrative and political environments. But, the Plan-
ning Council does have broader responsibilities than pre-
vious councils. It is possible that an active council could 
provide the prime sponsor with expertise and information 
from groups with differing backgrounds which are concerned 
with manpower. Their input into the manpower plan and their 
interaction with CETA administrators may provide broader 
participation in manpower planning than existed previous to 
CETA. 
Considering the limited experience of new CETA prime 
sponsors prior to 1973, the Congressional sponsors had high 
expectations. Community based organizations, the Employment 
Service, Community Action Agencies and others have been 
participating in manpower programs for more than a decade. 
but generally the important decisions were made by the 
federal government. The proliferation of manpower programs 
under CETA may lead to a critical shortage of qualified, 
experienced manpower personnel. The responsibilities for 
planning, administering, operating and evaluating manpower 
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programs will require skills and competencies not required 
under previous federal legislation. If the goal of planning 
innovative, flexible, comprehensive manpower programs suited 
to the local area is to be realized, local sponsors must 
develop new methods of predicting local labor market needs; 
identifying problems that exist; setting objectives; devis-
ing solutions tailored to the local labor market; garnering 
resources wherever available then monitoring, evaluating and 
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modifying the emerging programs to bring them to success. 
It is doubtful that many of the prime sponsors were equipped 
to deal with the range of problems in 1974. Whether they 
are developing the expertise to do a competent job is yet to 
be determined. 
At least in the short run CETA I plans can be expected 
to closely follow the models provided by previous federal 
programs. The inexperience of elected officials, staff and 
the Planning Council combined with federal pressure to get 
programs into operation do not contribute to a thoughtful, 
meaningful planning process. Consequently, prime sponsors' 
plans for CETA I are likely to be a collection of previous 
programs drawn together under a new administration. In the 
first few years under CETA, the local administration and 
Planning Council are likely to plan programs similar to 
federal programs with which they are familiar. Hopefully, 
as experience in planning, evaluation and administration 
grows, experiments and innovations will presumably be made 
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to align the programs more closely to local needs. 
Regardless of the planning problems encountered under 
the first years of CETA, planning for manpower programs is 
currently a state and local, rather than a federal respon-
sibility. This shift in functions is certain to have an 
effect on the process of manpower planning as well as the 
final outcome, the manpower plan. Elected officials and 
prime sponsors' staffs will be more involved in making 
decisions which will affect their area. The new responsi-
bilities will generate an increased interest in manpower 
programs and the employment situation which in the past 
received only cursory attention at the prime sponsor level. 
Planning in the Portland Metropolitan Area 
Planning has not been a strong point of any of the 
programs operating in the Portland metropolitan area. The 
lack of firm information from the federal government con-
cerning funding levels for the first year of operation and 
short federal deadlines for grant applications under CETA 
have been important factors in the low priority given to 
planning by prime sponsors. For example, the Consortium had 
twenty days to formulate their initial plan which was to 
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become operational thirty days after submission. Meaning-
ful planning was impossible in such a short period of time. 
The emphasis has been on formulating some sort of acceptable 
application and getting the approved programs in operation. 
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All programs appear to be so involved in reacting to various 
crises, deadlines and political pressure that the problems 
of initial program operation are consuming all of their 
time. The State Manpower Director summed up what appears to 
be the prevailing situation in the first year of CETA 
operation, "We don't have much time for meaningful ?lanning. 
Now and for the past eight months we've mainly been con-
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cerned with crisis intervention." There are no new inno-
vative designs or programs, and persons interviewed felt 
that innovative programs geared to their area's needs were 
not likely to be developed in the next few years. All 
programs in operation are similar to previous federal 
programs, particularly the CEP program. 
Although the City of Portland had been active in 
manpower planning under CAMPS and had a manpower staff prior 
to the passage of CETA, the City had more problems in devel-
oping and obtaining DOL approval for their CETA plan than 
did other prime sponsors in the Portland area. Other local 
prime sponsors had their programs in operation by Fall 1974, 
but the City of Portland did not obtain u.S. DOL final 
approval until January 1975. Even given the longer planning 
time, the approved plan was perhaps overly complex and 
contained numerical placement goals which were unrealistic. 
For example, the original City goal was to place 3,000 
persons in on-the-job training during the fiscal year. This 
was revised in Fall 1975 to 450 persons. Lack of experience 
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in manpower programs by the newly elected official in charge 
of the programs and the newly hired staff led to unrealistic 
planning. 
Accurate, useful local labor market area employment 
information did not exist in 1975. No serious plan to 
develop such an information system was under consideration 
by any prime sponsor. But, the Oregon state Employment 
Service Department of Research and Statistics, in conjunc-
tion with the U.S. Department of Labor, is currently attemp-
ting to develop such a system. Until the proposed system is 
operational, city and county prime sponsors are relying 
primarily on information from the Employment Service, their 
own job developers, and intuition. All persons interviewed 
complained that the lack of data hindered successful program 
planning, operation and assessment. 
The role of the advisory Planning Council appears to 
differ by prime sponsor. In the City of Portland the ~an-
power Planning Council did not approve or participate in the 
plans for CETA I and II. In October 1975, the U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor threatened to terminate funding for Portland's 
CETA I and II programs. One of the criticisms was that the 
Manpower Planning Council had not participated satisfactor-
ily in the City's programs. The City increased the Planning 
Council's role and by June 1976, the U.S. DOL felt the 
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participation was satisfactory. In the Multnomah-Washing-
ton Consortium the Planning Council was also not active in 
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planning for the first year of CETA I and II due to time 
pressure. But, the director states that the Council is not 
a rubber stamp for the administration. Instead, it is a 
very hard working and vocal group and interaction between 
the Planning Council and the CETA administrators is con-
tinuous. The Council includes Chicanos, who are suspicious 
of the administrators; business representatives; and persons 
representing various agencies and institutions. The direc-
tor feels the twenty-four member Council is too large and 
had expected the size to decrease by attrition, but this has 
not happened. The Planning Council is active, and parti-
cipating in Consortium planning. 
ADMINISTRATION UNDER CETA 
Prior to CETA, administration of manpower programs was 
a responsibility of federal agencies, particularly the DOL. 
The subcontractors operating in local or state areas were 
generally not government units. Subcontractors were educa-
tional institutions, community based organizations, the 
employment service. etc. The Emergency Employment Act (EEA) 
of 1971 was the first major piece of manpower legislation 
which granted government units - including states, cities 
and counties - direct control of funding and operation of 
manpower programs. Thus, prior to CETA, lower government 
units had only limited experience in administering manpower 
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programs, and perhaps no experience with manpower programs 
aimed primarily at training the hard-core disadvantaged. 
Government units proposing to become CETA prime spon-
sors were faced with the difficult task of assuming new 
responsibilities for which the majority had only limited 
experience. Three significant decisions had to be made by 
each prime sponsor in a short time period. These were: (1) 
Should the unit form a manpower consortium with other units; 
(2) Where should the manpower unit be placed in the govern-
mentis organizational structure; and (3) Should the govern-
ment unit operate any or all of the manpower programs, or 
should it subcontract the operations to other agencies or 
institutions? Each decision would have a significant effect 
on the eventual manpower system. 
The problems involved in forming consortia were dis-
cussed in Chapter III. Surprisingly, many prime sponsors 
considered the potential benefits from forming a consortium 
to outweigh the potential costs. The number of prime spon-
sors choosing to form consortia exceeded expectations. One 
hundred thirty-five consortia were established, comprising 
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one-third of the 402 prime sponsors in fiscal 1975. It is 
impossible to determine at this time the number of consortia 
which cover the majority of their labor market area. The 
motivations for the formation of consortia are considered in 
the following paragraph. 
"Several factors appear to be impor-
tant in the formation of consortia: 
mutual trust developed in other joint 
enterprises; the desire of inexperi-
enced prime sponsors to share the 
expertise of a more skilled unit; the 
wish to avoid direct political account-
ability for manpower programs through 
the use of the more anonymous consor-
tium; and the desire to attain economies 
of scale and greater opportunities for 
job development in a broader labor market. 
Typically, after formation of a consortium, 
a form of joint powers agreement is drawn 
up, assigning overall responsibilities 
to a board or committee made up of dele-
gates of each of the areas and assigning 
administrative responsibilities to a 
lead city or county, or to a unit re-
porting directly to the board. "70 
The second major decision facing new prime sponsors 
89 
was the integration of their new manpower responsibilities 
into the existing government organization. Three conceiv-
able organizational alternatives are: (1) create a separate 
department for manpower with equal status with other depart-
ments in the government; (2) place the manpower unit under 
the office of the chief elected official, insuring his 
attention to manpower issues; or (3) assign manpower func-
tions to an existing department where it must compete with 
other units for the attention of the department head. The 
first alternative would presumably provide the manpower unit 
with the greatest visibility, accessibility to elected offi-
cials, and status. The third alternative is considered to 
minimize these factors. Regardless of the ultimate place-
ment, CETA resulted in manpower units being institutional-
ized in the structure of the prime sponsor's government 
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unit. 
Prime sponsors could be expected to encounter diffi-
culties in setting up administrative machinery for manpower 
functions. Experienced staff were in short supply. Even 
persons who had worked in the manpower field in the past 
were not equipped to deal with the new range of responsi-
bilities required of a prime sponsor. DOL deadlines for 
grant applications, insufficient information on funds 
available, changing appropriations, and the additional 
responsibilities of CETA VI and summer youth programs 
complicated administrative problems. 
Administration in the Portland Metropolitan Area 
The breakdown in consortium negotiations which would 
have resulted in a consortium covering the labor market area 
was discussed in Chapter Three. A consortium between two 
counties was formed and overall responsibilities for the 
consortium was assigned to an Executive Committee consisting 
of the Chief Elected Official in each county or his desig-
nate and one member of the Planning Council. The adminis-
trative unit is separate from both county governments and 
reports directly to the Executive Committee. The adminis-
trator is not responsible to other elected county officials. 
The administrator feels that decisions are generally made by 
his unit with the cooperation of the Planning Council, and 
the Executive Committee approves plans submitted to it. 
Aside from the chief elected officials, other county poli-
ticians are not very aware of the manpower programs or the 
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employment situation. Ninety-eight percent of the admin-
istrative unit's staff has no prior experience in manpower 
programs, including the director. Hiring inexperienced 
personnel was a conscious decision which was made in an 
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attempt to get "fresh" personnel. 
Although the City of Portland was interested in parti-
cipating in a consortium, the withdrawal of the other 
potential prime sponsors from the negotiations forced the 
City to become its own prime sponsor. The inept handling of 
the consortium negotiations and other factors led to the 
termination of the majority of the existing manpower staff. 
A newly elected official, C. Jordan, interested in the 
manpower area, was assigned responsibilities for CETA. The 
grant application was delayed as the newly elected official 
and his staff attempted to put together a proposal. The 
manpower unit was placed in the existing Department of Human 
Resources with the manpower director reporting to the direc-
tor of the Department. A new director for manpower was 
hired a month prior to the date that Portland's manpower 
programs were to become operational. The director had no 
prior experience in manpower programs. The lack of quali-
fied staff greatly hindered preparation of a realistic man-
power plan as well as effective administration of the 
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program after it began operation. The City's program had 
continual problems which culminated in the Regional U.S. 
Department of Labor's Office threat to terminate funding 
effective December 31, 1975. The Mayor of Portland and 
other Commissioners apparently did not interfere in the 
administration of the foundering program. The elected 
Commissioner in charge of the manpower program was direct-
ly involved with the program. In the fall of 1975 the 
manpower director was fired and a new director, familiar 
with the administration of social service programs, was 
hired. Title VI of CETA was placed by the Mayor under his 
office in the Department of Personnel. The director of 
Title VI had no prior experience in manpower, but the pro-
gram was planned and implemented quickly and smoothly. The 
separation of CETA I and II from CETA VI freed the manpowe~ 
unit under Commissioner Jordan to concentrate on the prob-
lems encountered in administering CETA I and II programs. 
THE DELIVERY SYSTEM 
The third major decision facing new prime sponsors 
concerned the operation of manpower programs. For many 
prime sponsors setting up the necessary administrative 
machinery for planning, fiscal accounting, reporting, 
contracting, supervising and monitoring subcontractors, and 
assessing results strained existing capabilities. Operating 
programs in which they had little or no prior experience 
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would add an additional burden. Nevertheless, many prime 
sponsors seriously considered the extent to which the prime 
sponsor should operate programs directly. The factors 
favoring the subcontracting of program operation were: 
- Subcontracting for program operation provided 
a clear demarcation between the prime sponsor's 
planning and administrative functions and program 
operation. 
- Federal funding is always subject to change 
and/or delays. Subcontracting for services 
offered a flexible alternative to dealing with 
the attendant insecurities. 
- Subcontracts could be let to other agencies if 
the existing contract performance was unsatis-
factory to the prime sponsor. Subcontractors 
were responsible for performance. 
In many areas existing agencies had prior 
experience operating manpower programs and 
available facilities to continue programs under 
CETA. 
Factors favoring prime sponsor operation of all or part 
of the programs were: 
- In areas where no manpower programs had previously 
operated, such as rural or county areas, the prime 
sponsor was faced with a lack of alternative 
operators. The prime sponsor was forced to 
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operate the programs or contract to agencies 
with no previous experience. 
- Past performance by existing agencies may have 
been considered unsatisfactory to the prime 
sponsor. 
- To maintain control over program operations, 
the prime sponsor may have desired to shift some 
functions to the prime sponsor while contracting 
for other activities. 
- Political considerations, such as a prime spon-
sorts desire to weaken a community action agency, 
could have resulted in the prime sponsor choosing 
to operate the programs. 
Under CETA, the proportion of programs being operated by the 
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prime sponsor has risen to 33 percent. 
CETA granted authority to each prime sponsor to 
establish comprehensive manpower systems. Although the 
prime sponsor was expected to provide a range of services 
from orientation to followup, the legislation designated no 
presumptive deliverers of services. Prime sponsors were to 
give consideration to programs of demonstrated effectiveness 
and the use of existing services, but they were not required 
to use such programs or services. Agencies which had played 
important roles in manpower training and placement prior to 
CETA were forced to compete for contracts which could be 
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granted by only one prime sponsor in any geographical area. 
The comprehensive manpower system model stresses the 
integration of various manpower services under the direction 
of the prime sponsor. A manpower center would offer a 
combination of services under one roof. Functional opera-
tions, such as classroom training, could be contracted out 
to agencies in different locations, but all activities would 
be coordinated. This model assumes the elimination of 
overlapping activities performed by different agencies 
within the prime sponsor's geographical area. Prior to CETA 
duplication and overlapping of functions between programs 
was a common occurrence. To achieve the goal of a compre-
hensive delivery system, the prime sponsor must choose to 
fund certain existing agencies while eliminating others. 
These decisions have and will continue to result in trau-
matic changes in existing programs and agencies. Those most 
affected by the decisions are likely to be community action 
agencies, community-based organizations, public vocational 
institutions, and the employment services - all of which 
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were active in pre-CETA manpower programs. Making radical 
changes affecting existing agencies, which may have a vocal 
local constituency, results in repercussions to agencies and 
local elected officials. Although prime sponsors can 
generally be expected to move towards the development of 
comprehensive manpower delivery systems, the transition will 
occur over several years. 
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The Delivery System in the Portland Metropolitan Area 
Prime sponsors in the Portland area have chosen dif-
ferent methods to deliver manpower services. In Spring 
1974, the Multnomah-Washington Consortium made a careful 
study of available programs and the past operation of man-
power programs in the City of Portland. The Director 
concluded that the programs had not been effective. The 
consortium decided to operate its own programs in order to 
find out how a manpower system worked. The Director felt 
that no one in Multnomah or Washington Counties knew any 
more than the consortium staff about running manpower 
programs. In early 1975 the consortium had subcontracts 
totalling about $50,000. The remainder of the programs were 
operated by the prime sponsor directly. The Director is 
critical of subcontracting, because, in his opinion, it is 
too hard to terminate a contract once it has been let, even 
if performance is very unsatisfactory. Once a contract has 
been let, political pressure to continue the contract is 
intense. Consequently, the Director prefers to run his own 
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programs and maintain control. 
The City of Portland chose to subcontract most of the 
operation of their manpower programs. Aside from fiscal 
accounting and the payment of client allowances, the City 
contracts for all aspects of program operation. The city 
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commissioner in charge of manpower does not believe that the 
City should set up new bureaucracies to operate manpower 
programs when agencies with the necessary expertise already 
exist in the area. The existing agencies, financed gener-
ally by public funds, should be used rather than setting up 
duplicating city programs. Commissioner Jordan feels that 
the CETA money can be used most effectively by using the 
leverage supplied "by the funds to make existing institutions 
more responsive. Organizations such as the Employment 
Service will continue to function regardless of CETA con-
tracts. If CETA funds can be used to bring about institu-
tional change, the long term benefits to the disadvantaged 
will be greater than if the City sets up its own service. 
Jordan sees the City's performance based contracts and the 
threat of contract termination as the levers which will 
provoke the envisioned changes in existing institutions. 
City representatives optimistically stated in early 1975, 
that contracts to subcontractors would definitely be ter-
minated if performance was unsatisfactory. The following 
paragraphs describe the initial operation of CETA contracts. 
Table V demonstrates the breakdown of CETA f.unds in 
the City of Portland. The local community action agency, 
PMSC, was initially to obtain the Intake, Orientation, and 
Assessment (I, 0 & A) contract. This contract was eventu-
ally let to the Portland Community College which had no 
previous experience in I, 0 & A. The Director of the PMSC 
TABLE V 
CITY OF PORTLAND'S CETA MONEY 
CETA II 
Manpower Staff 
Youth ~anpower 
Human Resources Bureau 
$918,821 $821,423 
CETA VI 
Bureau of Personnel 
Older Workers System 
Human Resources Bureau 
$1,420,039 $33,028 
ADMINISTRATION 
Human Resources Bureau 
Manpower Staff 
$201,082 
SUBCONTRACTS: 
Intake, Orientation & 
Assessment - Portland 
Community College 
$231,552 
Pre-vocational & 
Vocational Training -
POIC 
$282,754 
Job Development and 
Placement - Oregon 
State Employment Division 
$ 75,398 
Hanagement Information System -
Systems Improvements Associates 
$ 90,423 
Allowances (for enrollees) -
Systems Improvements Associates 
$491,647 
SOURCE: Willamette Week, March, 1975 
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feels this was done because of political pressure. The 
approval of the contract by the majority of the City Council 
was necessary. The PMSC director feels that several of the 
council members, who have had past conflicts with PMSC, com-
municated privately to the Commissioner in charge of man-
76 
power, that they would not approve a contract with PMSC. 
These allegations were denied by the commissioners during 
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the public hearing. When the contract was lost the CEP 
program under PMSC was terminated. The local community 
action agency is no longer involved in the manpower delivery 
system. 
A contract authorizing a local community-based organi-
zation, the Portland Opportunities Industrialization Center 
(POIC), to provide pre-vocational and on-the-job training 
services was let by the City without controversy in December 
1974. The performance based contract placed responsibility 
for implementing their portion of the manpower plan on the 
POIC. As the program failed to meet expected goals in the 
first half of 1975, the City's manpower director considered 
terminating the POIC. Political pressure to continue the 
contract was intense, and the POIC contract was maintained. 
City contracts were also let to a private corporation 
to develop and implement a management information system and 
to develop the formats to provide the information for print-
outs on allowance payments. A contract was let with the 
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Employment Service to provide job development, job placement 
and follow-up. 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
Underlying much of the argument favoring decentrali-
zation under CETA was the quest for accountability in 
decision making in manpower programs. Putting manpower 
decision making in the hands of local and state elected 
officials was expected to provide accountability. Local 
elected officials were presumed to be close to the people to 
be served by CETA, and the people could express their satis-
faction or dissatisfaction with manpower decisions through 
the ballot box. Local officials were also presumed to he 
more knowledgeable about the needs of the local labor market 
than were Washington bureaucrats. The interaction between 
elected officials and representatives of business and labor 
were expected to result in manpower systems geared to local 
needs. Representatives of various groups on the Planning 
Council would allow for broad participation in manpower 
planning. 
Local elected officials are certainly more responsive 
to the electorate than were federal bureaucrats. But, their 
responsiveness is often influenced by the political strength 
of the interested parties. Because manpower programs 
generally have low visibility and receive little attention 
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by the average voter, the political pressures brought to 
bear on manpower decision makers are likely to come from 
groups directly involved in the manpower system - the 
clients, operating agencies, business and labor. The 
responsiveness of the elected official will depend on his 
priorities and the level of obligation existing between the 
official and what he considers the constituency responsible 
for his election. For example, a Black mayor elected in 
large part by disadvantaged voters, may be very responsive 
to the potential and existing client population of a man-
power program where another mayor might be much more re-
sponsive to labor interests. Unless a scandal from mis-
appropriation of funds, etc. centered media interest on 
manpower programs, it is unlikely that the elected official 
would need to consider the electorate as a whole in making 
manpower decisions. But, the tendency to broaden client 
groups under CETA, which was discussed in Chapter III, is 
one possible indicator that elected officials are making 
changes in response to their perceptions of the desires of 
the electorate. 
The disadvantaged client population of manpower pro-
grams will in most cases be small, politically ineffective, 
and politically inactive. The exclusion of community action 
agencies from a mandated role in manpower programs will, in 
all probability, decrease their past role of organizing and 
articulating the positions of the disadvantaged population. 
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Although client representatives were to be included on the 
Planning Council, such positions are often token appoint-
ments. Lacking managerial, political and bureaucratic 
skills, disadvantaged persons are often ineffective in such 
positions. Unless the client disadvantaged population has 
an effective lobby at the prime sponsor level they are not 
likely to be influential in manpower decision making. 
If there is increased accountability under the CETA 
legislation, it will be accountability to groups directly 
concerned with manpower and the provision of manpower 
services, rather than accountability to individual voters. 
Political activity surrounding CETA appears to approximate 
the model of "group theorist" David Truman in The Govern-
mental Process. There appears to be little individual 
participation or interest in local manpower programs except 
by individuals representing the groups with which they are 
affiliated. Agencies which have been active in manpower 
programs in the past desire to continue their operations and 
are likely to use whatever political influence they have to 
maintain their position. The legislation, which stipulates 
that "to the extent practical" the Planning Council will 
have representative of community-based organizations, the 
employment service and agencies involved in training, gives 
the involved agencies a potentially effective voice in 
manpower decision making. Regardless of their past or 
present performance, many of these agencies have managed to 
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maintain their position. As the prime sponsors become more 
experienced and assume increasing responsibility for com-
prehensive manpower programs, the power of these agencies 
and institutions may decline. But, as long as manpower 
funds are channeled through lower government units, interest 
group activity can be expected to continue to influence the 
decision making process. 
In the Portland metropolitan area CETA I and II pro-
grams have low visibility. The Multnomah-Washington Man-
power Consortium which operates separately from either 
county government and reports to an almost unknown Executive 
Committee, has received very little attention from the 
media. The problems of the City of Portland's manpower 
programs and statements from Commissioner C. Jordan have 
received press coverage in times of crisis. There has been 
no continuing coverage of any of the prime sponsor's pro-
grams by the media. Little information concerning the 
functioning of manpower programs or the decisions made by 
elected officials is easily available. The bureaucracies 
concerned appeared with one or two exceptions to be gen-
erally suspicious, defensive and secretive. Perhaps the 
level of disorganization and the inexperienced staff members 
contributed to the inability to answer questions or locate 
supposedly public documents. Regardless of the reasons, it 
is difficult to discover what is actually occurring in the 
programs. The average citizen is unlikely to even make the 
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attempt. It is improbable that his vote will be influenced 
by a thoughtful assessment of the local CETA program. 
The proportionately large amount of CETA funds chan-
neled into the Portland area has attracted interest group 
attention. The competition for subcontracts and the poli-
tical pressure brought to bear when termination of contracts 
is threatened has been at times intense. When the city 
commissioner eliminated the PMSC as a subcontractor, all the 
city commissioners were lobbied, law suits were threatened, 
the public hearing was packed and the commissioner's poli-
tical integrity was questioned. An agency which considered 
itself slighted by the Oregon Balance-of-State administra-
tion threatened to march on the state capitol. Similar 
incidents were cited by representatives of all prime spon-
sors interviewed. 
Unfortunately, the active involvement of at least a 
few of these agencies does not necessarily result in better 
manpower programs. The agencies' inclusion or exclusion 
from different programs appears to be more a question of 
politics than performance. All CETA administrators inter-
viewed expressed dissatisfaction with the performance of at 
least one of their agencies under contract. Several of the 
agencies were criticized for their reputed unresponsiveness 
to disadvantaged clientele. The principal hope of the 
administrators is that the threat of "yanking the contract" 
will alter the agencies' performance. Yet, in several 
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instances, the political pressure of the involved agencies 
has prevented the termination of contracts. 
CETA has resulted in elected officials of local prime 
sponsors becoming much more actively involved in the man-
power area. There are differences in the degree to which 
elected officials exercise administrative control of the 
programs, but elected officials do appear to be maintaining 
close contact with manpower administrators. In a period of 
high unemployment, CETA has been a visible, concrete attempt 
to deal with the problem. CETA VI, in particular, provided 
local elected officials with jobs during a period when they 
were critically needed. New channels of communication have 
opened between local units and affected groups. Elected 
officials are generally more responsive to local interests 
than were federal agencies. 
SUMMARY 
Major changes have taken place under CETA in the areas 
of manpower planning, administration and decision making 
accountability. At the prime sponsor level elected offi-
cials and administrative staff, who had only limited prior 
experience in manpower planning, are becoming increasingly 
involved. Planning is being integrated into manpower 
administrative units in local and state governments. Al-
though meaningful planning was limited in the first year due 
to federal deadlines and the necessity of· concentrating on 
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program operation, planning systems have been developed and 
may function more effectively in the future. The role of 
the advisory Planning Council appears to vary between 
different prime sponsors. Councils are not the decision 
making body but their interaction with decision makers can 
affect final decisions. 
Manpower administrative units have become institu-
tionalized in prime sponsor government units. The impor-
tance of the unit varies between prime sponsors as does the 
degree of elected officials' involvement. The lack of 
qualified staff and the inexperience of many elected offi-
cials in the manpower area have generated problems in 
planning and administration. The changes involved in 
developing a comprehensive manpower system have altered the 
manpower delivery system. Traumatic changes affecting 
agencies and others involved in the delivery of manpower 
services have marred the transitional period. Two trends 
appear to be developing under CETA: (1) larger than expec-
ted numbers of prime sponsors are choosing to form consor-
tia; and (2) many of the CETA prime sponsors are choosing to 
operate all or portions of their manpower programs. 
Accountability has improved as elected officials in 
prime sponsor areas become more involved in manpower de-
cision making. Broad citizen participation in the manpower 
area has not developed. The average employed citizen is 
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unlikely to be more aware of the functioning of CETA pro-
grams than he was of the earlier federal programs. Those 
directly involved in manpower programs are developing new 
channels of communication to decision makers. Interest 
group activity has been intense as involved agencies with 
constituencies at the prime sponsor level use their poli-
tical resources in an attempt to influence decisions. There 
is little evidence that local elected officials either "know 
best what their local area needs are" or are able to develop 
innovative programs geared to the local labor market. Prime 
sponsors have tended to continue operating programs closely 
modeled after federal programs, particularly CEP. Political 
pressures appear to make termination of subcontracts dif-
ficult. Unless elected officals and administrators are able 
to resist such pressures, prime sponsor programs may become 
inflexible. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE IMPACT OF THE PORTLAND 
CONCENTRATED EMPLOYMENT PROGRAM 
~1anpower programs for the disadvantaged in the United 
States have been based on the theory that the programs, if 
successful, will result in the participants being better 
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able to compete successfully in the labor market. The 
ultimate objective is to improve the employment and earning 
experience of the disadvantaged target population. Although 
the evaluation of manpower programs is a new and growing 
field, little is known about the impact of the programs on 
the participants after they leave the programs. The nati-
onal studies which have been done to date do indicate that 
the post-training experience of participants in manpower 
programs is substantially more favorable than that of con-
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trol groups without training. Many more studies, parti-
cularly of a longitudinal nature, need to be done before 
firm conclusions can be made concerning the impact of man-
power programs on participants. 
Over fourteen billion dollars was obligated by the 
u.s. Department of Labor (DOL) for work and training pro-
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grams between fiscal years 1963 and fiscal year 1974. 
Like all public programs manpower programs are financed by 
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tax money from private citizens and businesses. The money 
spent on these activities could be used in other enter-
prises. 
This dissertation is based on the premise that impact 
evaluations which seek to assess the extent to which long-
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term objectives are being met, need to be done to deter-
mine whether manpower programs were and are effective. Such 
assessments are necessary to provide a basis for good de-
cision-making. The past practice of creating and continuing 
to fund programs on the basis of scarce knowledge about 
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their impact is both inefficient and costly to society. 
Deliberation on program continuation should include an 
assessment of program effectiveness. 
This portion of the dissertation will not be concerned 
with administrative monitoring, or "process evaluation", 
but will concentrate on the impact, or "outcome evaluation", 
which is primarily focused on the capacity of the program to 
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cause changes in those who are exposed to it. The only 
"outcomes" chosen to measure the impact will be tangible 
change in the income of participants of the manpower program 
and of the control group. This measure of manpower effec-
tiveness was chosen because as Scanlon, et aI, concluded, 
"Given the present state of knowledge, the most appropriate 
framework for effectiveness measurement at present is not 
the national economy ... but the success of the applicant in 
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the labor market." Other possible changes attributable 
III 
to the program, such as decreased crime, improved self-
image, increased social and job satisfaction, and decreased 
governmental dependency, are considered outside the range of 
this study. This research will not attempt to investigate 
the questions of job displacement, or the impact of the 
program on local institutions and the local labor market. 
The assumption is made that an effective program has at 
least the following impacts on the local labor market: (1) 
Increased labor market participation and a larger labor 
market supply; (2) Improved skills among those in the labor 
market; and (3) Reduction in labor market frictions due to 
the participants' increased familiarity with its institu-
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tions. If income redistribution is included as an allow-
able goal for manpower programs, then the question of job 
displacement becomes less important in evaluating programs. 
A program which succeeds in reshuffling employment and 
decreasing the dispersion in the distribution of earned 
incomes would be considered a success. 
THE PORTLAND CONCENTRATED EMPLOYMENT PROGRAM AND CETA 
The general background information concerning the 
creation of the Concentrated Employment Program at the 
national level is contained in Chapter II. The Portland 
Concentrated Employment Program (PCEP) began operation in 
September 1968 and was terminated in January 1975 when the 
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City of Portland under CETA Title I contracted wi'th the 
Portland Community College for manpower services. The PCEP 
acted as a subcontractor to the DOL. The local prime spon-
sor of the program was the Portland Metropolitan Steering 
Committee (PMSC), a local community action agency. Con-
tracts were let by the DOL to the PCEP generally on a yearly 
basis. Federal funds were allocated to the program under 
the Economic Opportunity Act (EOA) of 1964, Title I, Part B, 
and the Manpower Development and Training Act (MDTA) of 
1967, Title II. Table VI shows the budgets for the years 
1968 through 1975. The major purposes of the programs were 
to assist the economically disadvantaged persons within the 
defined target geographic area in finding employment and 
attaining higher incomes. The PCEP also attempted to pro-
vide substantial employment expansion and employment train-
ing for residents of the target area. 
Briefly the PCEP operated in the following manner. 
Outreach staff in the community identified and referred 
potential enrollees to the PCEP. All applicants were 
required to meet the definition of disadvantaged as pro-
mulgated by the DOL. Once screening, selection, and en-
rollment were completed, the client was tested and coun-
selled by an Employment Development Team. The client worked 
with the team to draft an Employability Development Plan 
(EDP) suited to the client's individual needs and the ser-
vices offered by PCEP. The client was then enrolled in a 
TABLE VI 
PORTLAND CONCENTRATED EMPLOYMENT PROGRAM 
BUDGETS AND ENROLLMENTS: 1968-1974 
Contract Cost per Total MDTA- MDTA- Planned 
Date Number Enrollee Funds EOA Inside Outside Enrollment 
1-16-74 - 46-48 $1226* $ 981,000 $780,300 $200,700 None 800* 
1-10-75 
3-1-73 - 36-48 $1667 $1,000,019 $505,000 $379,614 $243,386 600 
1-15-74 
11-5-71 - 26-48 $1843 Sl,474,000 $880,000 $290,000 $304,000 800 
2-28-73 
12-3-70 - 16-48 $2075 $1,681,000 $880,000 $436,847 $364,153 810 
11-4-71 
1-6-70 - 0681 $1290 $1,161,503 $337,503 $308,573 $515,427 900 
12-2-70 
9-68 1681-41** $1221** $ 915,756** $880,000** $115,756** 750** 
1-5-70 
Total $1531 $7,213,278 $4,262,803 $1,731,490 $1,426,966 4,660 
Cost per Enrollee and Planned Enrollment figures are estimates, not actual figures. 
EOA funds are allocated through the Economic Opportunity Act. 
t-' 
t-' 
w 
TABLE VI (Continued) 
MDTA-Inside funds were controlled by PCEP and funded "institutional training" programs 
which have higher costs per enrollee than on-the-job training and work experience 
prog.r-ams. 
MDTA-Outside funds were controlled by the Employment Service and "ocation Education. 
* 
** 
Estimate by Region X, Department of Labor - CEP figure was 1050, but Regional 
officials stated that this was an unrealistic figure. 
DOL could not furnish information on this contract. Figures are estimates given 
by PCEP Director. 
Source: Department of Employment and Training, Region X, U.S. Department 
of Labor, 1975 
f-' 
I-' 
~ 
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program of varying length which oriented him or her to the 
world of work and specific job requirements. This first 
stage was referred to as Intake, Orientation, and Assessment 
(I, 0, & A). The second stage consisted of remedial educa-
tion if necessary and training - general, job-specific, or 
on-the-job training. These services were generally provided 
by other agencies subcontracting with PCEP. Throughout the 
client's enrollment in the program counselling and various 
supportive services, such as medical services, day-care, 
etc., were available. Upon completion of training the 
client was hopefully placed in a suitable job. The particu-
lar combination of services utilized depended upon the type 
of disadvantage confronting the client, and the kind of 
employment desired. A client was contacted at intervals of 
thirty, sixty, and ninety days after job placement. No form 
of follow-up continued after ninety days, and very little is 
known about participants' incomes after this period. Evalu-
ations of the internal administration of the PCEP and 
audits have been performed, but no long-term impact evalu-
ation of the PCEP has been made up to the present time. 
The City of Portland's CETA I program is closely 
modeled after CEP. Although contracts are administered by 
the City and the subcontracting agencies are different in 
some cases, the basic form of the City's manpower programs 
is similar to that of the PCEP. The City is also serving 
the same geographical area although clients may also come 
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from other areas in the city. The present programs consist 
of a comparable set of components directed more or less at 
similar target groups and designed around a particular set 
of assumptions relating the causes and effects of the 
groups' perceived problems in the labor market. For exam-
pIe, the PCEP orientation connected with institutional 
training assumed that the primary problems facing the client 
were insufficient knowledge of the labor market and a lack 
of basic skills. Consequently, the primary services offered 
were intake to identify persons with low skills, counselling 
to determine vocational interests, orientation to the work 
world and its requirements, a classroom training service to 
impart necessary job skills, a stipend to provide financial 
support during training, and a placement service to match 
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clients to available jobs. The basic package of services 
offered under CETA I in the City of Portland is based on the 
same model. The similarity of the programs increases the 
importance of an evaluation of the impact of the peEP on its 
participants. Given that the purpose of both programs is 
primarily to increase the income of participants, the impact 
evaluation of the peEP will provide insight into the valid-
ity of the model on which both programs are based. The 
information on the peEP may provide the present CETA deci-
sion makers with new facts which may assist them in making 
future manpower decisions. 
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RESEARCH DESIGN 
The research is a retrospective study relying on the 
use of existing records at the PCEP. 
In September 1973 the author was given full access to 
all the files of past enrollees in the PCEP, and the files 
of those persons who had been admitted to the PCEP but had 
failed to participate. From these files the author extrac-
ted the information shown in Table VII on every individual 
whose file was closed between 1968 and 1972. Only complete 
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and available files were included. Individuals who com-
pleted the program as well as dropouts who received part, 
but not all, of the intended program were included in the 
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treatment group. Other research has found that exposure 
to the program, regardless of completion, does result in 
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changes which must be included in the evaluation. 
The Control Group 
A basic problem in measuring the impact of manpower 
programs is to obtain valid evidence on the magnitude of 
'each outcome variable which would have emerged had the pro-
gram not existed. Studies lacking control groups leave 
unanswered the vital question of whether training is the 
relevant variable which explains post-training gains or 
losses. The ideal solution is to randomly select a control 
group by dividing like interested applicants in half - pro-
viding one group with the services of the manpower program 
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and excluding the other group, the control group, from the 
manpower services provided by the program. This ideal was 
not a feasible alternative for this retrospective study. 
Another alternative is to compare the pre-training and the 
post-training earnings experience of participants. The 
author recorded the self-reported income for the 52 weeks 
preceding program application for all involved individuals. 
This information was not utilized in evaluating the impact 
of the program. The author concluded that the self-reported 
income was unreliable. PCEP intake personnel indicated that 
applicants were aware of the low income eligibility require-
ment and that generally the income reported was not checked. 
Consequently, applicants were possibly motivated to under-
report their income to qualify for the program. Further-
more, groups with high unemployment levels can be expected 
to have high unemployment levels later, but they will usu-
ally have greater than average increases in employment and 
earnings. This is particularly true for youths and re-
entrants to the labor force. Such income gains are not 
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necessarily attributable to training. The control group 
used in this research is a group of persons who are statis-
tically equivalent to the enrollees in the peEP in all 
respects as far as demographic variables, their application 
to the program, and their eligibility for the program; but, 
who for some unknown reason, did not enter the program. 
other research has concluded that, "until new results 
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emerge, qualified and interested nonenrollees seem to be 
more appropriate control groups than does the general target 
91 
population." They, like the program participants, showed 
an interest in the program and were able to meet the pro-
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gram's entrance requirements. Qualified nonentrants may 
be slightly less qualified or conversely, slightly more 
qualified than the entrants. Other research and the PCEP 
personnel have indicated that reasons for non-entrance are 
varied and may be due to timing, fear of the program, find-
ing a job on their own, moving, etc. All eligible indivi-
duals who had applied but failed to participate in the PCEP 
and whose files contained the essential information were 
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included in the control group. 
Income Data 
The long-range followup of persons who participated in 
the manpower training programs has proved to be both diffi-
94 
cult and costly in previous attempts by other researchers. 
Cost estimates on national surveys of personal interviews 
with exenrollees after six to twelve months ranged in 1972 
from fifty to one hundred and fifty dollars per person. 
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Response rates are frequently unsatisfactory. The disad-
vantaged population which is the focus of the manpower 
programs evidences certain characteristics that make locat-
ing, meeting, and interviewing exenrollees very difficult. 
The peEP attempted in 1973 to survey exenrollees in one 
120 
component of the program. The response rate was less than 
ten percent. Other means of obtaining follow-up data are 
necessary if evaluation of program impact is to be effected. 
The united states Social Security Administration (SSA) 
has recognized that their data, if suitably used so as to 
provide confidentiality, is a useful source of income data 
for evaluating the impact of manpower programs. This re-
search uses SSA data to obtain follow-up information on the 
incomes of the control group and the exenrollees in the 
PCEP. The earnings reported to the SSA are not total earn-
ings, but taxable earnings up to a maximum of $9000 in 1972 
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and $10,800 in 1973. This maximum does not appear to be a 
serious limitation considering the expected earnings for 
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most participants in manpower programs. The SSA records 
cover ninety percent of paid employment under nationally 
uniform laws and procedures. All local units of government 
in the Portland area and the local community action agency 
are covered by the SSA. The response rate is reportedly 
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over 98 percent with accurate Social Security numbers. 
The records collected by the SSA are confidential. 
The SSA provided the author, on a reimbursable basis, the 
earnings information for coded cells containing five or more 
individuals. The author provided the SSA with punch cards 
with the following data elements on PCEP exenrollees and the 
control group: 
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Social Security number 
Last name 
Five digit numeric code - classifying individuals by 
Treatment or Control Group, Sex, Race, Age, and 
Education 
The SSA matched the punch cards to its master file, and for 
every match, wrote out the five digit code field and the 
taxable earning for the years 1972 and 1973. The SSA sorted 
the resultant file according to the five digit code and 
aggregated the incomes of 3330 individuals in cells of five 
individuals or more. Cells with less than five individuals 
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were deleted. The SSA then provided the following infor-
mation for 1972 and 1973 on each coded cell: minimum and 
maximum income; frequence distributions on total earnings by 
year, mean earnings by year, standard deviations on the 
mean, and median earnings including and excluding zero 
earners. The information was provided on computer tape, 
which unfortunately was not usable, and an accompanying 
printout. 
Problems in using Social Security Administration Data 
Several problems are involved in the use of SSA data. 
For each year there is only one earnings amount reported. 
No information concerning the period of employment covered 
is retained. Consequently, it is impossible to compute 
hourly wage rates or to determine whether the reported 
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earnings are for a one-month or a twelve-months period. The 
coverage under the SSA has not been universal. Federal 
employees, who might be manpower participants, are not 
included. Employees of nonprofit organizations and govern-
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ment units may not be covered. Wages paid for yard work, 
domestic services and other "odd jobs" often may not be 
reported. Earnings reported included military wages without 
a label. 
There is a built-in time lag before wage data reported 
by employers can be obtained from the SSA summary earnings 
records. SSA records are not 99 percent complete for non-
farm wage and salary data until October of the following 
calendar year. Preparing special research data is not the 
primary purpose of the SSA. Retrieval of research data may 
be given a low priority. The information for this research 
was submitted in October 1974. The most recent SSA summary 
earnings records at that time were for 1973 earnings. The 
complete SSA compilation of the earnings data was received 
by the author during the summer of 1975. Thus, complete 
earnings data was not available until one and a half years 
after the last year being examined. 
The most serious limitation to research encountered in 
the use of SSA data is imposed by the necessity of maintain-
ing confidentiality of individual records. Income in for-
mation is only reported in cells of five or more individ-
uals. This require~ent seriously limits the number of 
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independent variables that may be included in a cell code 
unless the sample size is very large. The five variables 
included in this research were considered important in 
influencing income levels. Many independent variables, such 
as criminal record, head of household, handicaps, etc., 
could not be included. Furthermore, the reporting of group 
earnings severely limits the ability of the analyst to 
manipulate the data. Although the cells can be aggregated 
- i.e., the total earnings of the group aged 0 - 20 years 
could be added to the total earnings of the group aged 21 -
25 years - the group earnings cannot be disaggregated since 
individual incomes are not reported. These limitations 
inherent in the use of SSA data should be kept in mind when 
reviewing the findings of this research. 
The Dependent and Independent Variables 
Manpower program impact evaluations involve the 
measuring of relationships between program goals, the depen-
dent variable, and a chosen group of independent variables. 
The evaluation attempts to discover which independent vari-
ables are important and the nature of the relationship. It 
is assumed that the dependent variable is a function of more 
than one independent variable. The dependent variables 
were limited in number in order to obtain SSA data, are 
treatment, age, sex, race, and years of formal education. 
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My hypotheses concerning these variables are as 
follows: 
1. Participation in the peEP will have a significant 
positive impact on incomes. Other research has found 
individuals do benefit from participation in manpower pro-
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grams. The income levels of participants will be sig-
nificantly higher than those of the control group. 
2. The age of persons included in the study will 
influence income. Factors associated with age - such as 
increased labor market experience, maturity, family respon-
sibilities, etc. - should result in adults being more stable 
workers and attaining higher income than youths. Labor 
market discrimination against hiring older workers, and 
particularly disadvantaged older workers, will result in 
lower incomes for persons forty-five and over. 
3. Sex of persons included in the study will have an 
influence on income. This hypothesis is based on the 
assumption that women generally have a weaker labor force 
attachment than men, and that sex discrimination in the u.s. 
has resulted in lower incomes for the female labor force 
than the male labor force. In 1969 the earnings of full-
time women workers was 60.5% of full-time men's earnings 
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nationally. Female incomes will be lower than male 
incomes. 
4. The Race of persons included in the study will have 
an influence on income. Discrimination in hiring and 
125 
promotion on the basis of race has been well documented in 
103 
the U.S. Substantial economic disadvantage remains for 
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nonwhites, even at high levels of aggregate demand. The 
mean and median incomes of nonwhites are lower than those of 
whites, and the ratio of nonwhite to white earnings is 
declining in all major geographical areas of the U.S. except 
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the South. Nonwhites will have lower incomes than 
whites. 
5. Years of education attained by persons in this 
study will have a distinct influence on income. Education 
is often used as a screening device by employers. Increased 
years of education generally improves opportunities for 
employment in higher income jobs. Education is positively 
correlated with income in the U.S. Persons with twelve 
years of education and over should have higher incomes than 
those with less education. 
6. Interactions between the five independent vari-
abIes will influence income. 
Table VII provides an explanation of the code sub-
mitted to the SSA and the approximate number of persons in 
each coded cell. 
TABLE VII 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
PCEP PARTICIPANTS AND CONTROL GROUP 1968-1972 
5 Digit Code - ! II III IV V 
I - Treatment 
II - Sex 
III - Race 
IV - Age 
V - Completed 
Years of 
Education 
l. Participant of PCEP 
2. Control Group 
. Male L. 
2. Female 
l. Black 
2. White 
3. ~1exican Amer ican 
4 . American Indian 
5. Other 
.i.. o - 20 years of age 
2. 21 - 25 years of age 
3. 26 - 44 years of age 
4. 45 years of age and over 
5. Blank 
1. 1 - 9 years completed 
2. 10 - 11 years completed 
3. 12 years and over completed 
4. Blank 
5. Blank 
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Example: 11212 - Treated, Male, White, 0-20 years, 10-11 
years of education completed 
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TABLE VII (Continued) 
FREQUENCY BY CODED CELL - PCEP PARTICIPANTS 
Code Number of Persons Code Number of Persons 
Male, Black ~ale, White 
11111 14 11211 23 
11112 107 11212 57 
11113 72 11213 45 
11121 11 11221 15 
11122 72 11222 36 
11123 99 11223 51 
11131 43 11231 32 
11132 64 11232 27 
11133 106 11233 57 
11141 28 11241 14 
11142 13 11242 17 
11143 11 11243 16 
Total 640 390 
Male, Other 
11355 25 
11455 27 
11555 9 
Total 61 
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TABLE VII (Continued) 
FREQURNCY BY CODED CELL - PCEP PARTICIPANTS 
Code Number of Persons Code Number of Persons 
Female, Black Female, White 
12111 16 12211 9 
12112 71 12212 45 
12113 93 12213 58 
12121 8 12221 17 
12122 58 12222 22 
12123 98 12223 34 
12131 30 12231 13 
12132 63 12232 21 
12133 106 12233 38 
12141 14 12241 9 
12142 8 12242 5 
12143 15 12243 16 
Total 580 288 
Female, Other 
12355 7 
12455 13 
12555 6 
Total 26 
TABLE VII (Continued) 
FREQUENCY BY CODED CELL - CONTROL GROUP 
Code Number of Persons Code Number of 
Male, Black Male, White 
21111 7 21211 17 
21112 50 21212 30 
21113 45 21213 38 
21121 7 21221 8 
21122 . 34 21222 22 
21123 54 21223 40 
21131 23 21231 16 
21132 35 21232 16 
21133 59 21233 32 
21141 23 21241 12 
21142 6 21242 11 
21143 9 21243 7 
Total 352 249 
Male, Other 
21355 11 
21455 10 
21555 8 
Total 29 
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Persons 
TABLE VII (Continued) 
FREQUENCY BY CODED CELL - CONTROL GROUP 
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Code Number of Persons Code Number of Persons 
Female, Black Female, White 
22111 12 22211 8 
22112 47 22212 30 
22113 56 22213 30 
22121 11 22221 7 
22122 23 22222 11 
22131 14 22223 25 
22132 34 22231 7 
22133 54 22232 16 
22141 7 22233 31 
22142 5 22241 6 
22143 5 22242 12 
22243 9 
Total 324 192 
Female, Other 
22455 13 
Total 13 
GRAND TOTAL 3144 
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After considering the small number of persons in the ~exi­
can-American, American Indian, and Other cells, and the 
increased complexity introduced by a five-level variable 
versus a two-level variable, these cells were eliminated 
from the study. A two-level variable for race - Black and 
White - was used in the final analysis. A number of the 
frequencies in the coded cells are low, particularly in the 
control group. All available records at peEP were utilized 
in compiling the control group. Three possible alternatives 
were considered: (1) Increasing the number of persons in the 
cell by the process of estimation; (2) Aggregating the 
cells - increasing the frequencies in the involved cells by 
eliminating one of the levels of one of the variables; and 
(3) analyzing the data as reported and noting the possible 
unreliability introduced by the small cell size. The first 
alternative was rejected because of the complexity of the 
task and the questionable validity of the estimated result. 
The second alternative was also rejected because of the loss 
of information and the apparent importance of the different 
levels of the variables as defined. For instance, the cells 
representing persons 45 years of age and over have low 
frequencies. The mean earnings of coded cells 12241 and 
12231 are respectively $961 and $2286. Persons over 45 
years of age in every category earned appreciably less 
income than did those in other categories. The aggregation 
of the categories did not appear to benefit the research. 
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Instead, the low cell sizes in certain categories are noted, 
and less reliance should be placed on the conclusions de-
rived from these cells. 
The original research design included a second code 
including the variables year treated, type of training 
received, length of training, and years of education. The 
earnings information for the second code was reported by the 
SSA. The author intended to compare earnings in 1972 and 
1973 as well as median earnings and mean earnings in the 
different years reported. Unfortunately, the computer tape 
prepared by the SSA could not be utilized. After investing 
a considerable amount of time in an unsuccessful attempt to 
retrieve data from the SSA tape, the decision was made to 
discard the tape. This decision meant that all data to be 
utilized in the analysis had to be keypunched onto computer 
cards from the over four-hundred page computer printout 
provided by the SSA. Constraints on time and funds limited 
the amount of information which could be keypunched. 
The decision was made to perform the analysis on the first 
code which contained both the participants and the control 
group and included larger cell frequencies. Mean earnings 
which reflect more accurately the possible total lifetime 
stream of earnings over time, was chosen as the earnings 
measure. The study is limited to earnings in the year 1973. 
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ANALYSIS OF THE DATA 
The statistical technique chosen for analysis of the 
data was the analysis of variance. ~1ultiple regression 
analysis was rejected due to the large number of dummy 
variables which would have to be included in the equation. 
The general purpose of Analysis of Variance is to determine 
which factors of an experiment have noteworthy effects on 
the scores, and to provide quantitative information about 
the relative importance of different factors and their 
levels. The Analysis of Variance is utilized in this 
research to determine whether the factors previously des-
cribed as the independent variables have noteworthy effects 
on the incomes of the persons in this study. The primary 
interest is focused on the effects of participation in the 
PCEP on income. The different levels of the five factors 
and their effects on income levels are also of interest in 
that they aid in determining which particular categories of 
persons benefit or do not benefit from participation in the 
PCEP or similar programs. 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) is based on the assump-
tions that there are equal scores per condition, the dis-
tribution of the scores within a condition conforms to the 
normal distribution, and the assumption of homogeneity of 
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variance. Actually, it has been demonstrated by Norton 
that the F-test, which is the test of significance used in 
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ANOVA, is fairly robust with respect to heterogeneity of 
variance of normal distributions, and also with respect to 
simultaneous failures of both normality and heterogeneity of 
variance. The Analysis of Variance computer program for 
this research was performed using the original data reported 
by the SSA as well as two standard score transformations. 
There was no significant difference in the results of the 
analysis. 
The Biomed program, Analysis of Variance for Factorial 
Design, was utilized in the analysis of the data. The 
research design is described as a 2 X 2 X 2 X 4 X 3 factoral 
experiment. All five factors are considered fixed factors. 
The Analysis of Variance for Factorial Design program pro-
vided the following output: 
(1) Analysis-of-variance table and the grand mean. 
(2) A breakdown of the sums of squares into orthogonal 
polynomial components for four main effects and all of their 
first order interactions. 
(3) Main effects and first order interactions for the 
factors specified in (2). 
(4) Cell and marginal means. 
To obtain a denominator to be utilized in the F-
Test for Significance, the fifth level interactions were 
pooled with the computed residual term. Tukey's Test for 
Nonadditivity was performed and supported the hypothesis 
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that the components for the fifth IE-vel interaction are 
homogeneous. There was no reason to reject the hypothesis 
of additivity, and therefore the pooling of the fifth level 
interactions provides an estimate of experimental error. 
F-Tests for Interaction 
The F-Test for Interaction was performed prior to the 
F-Test for Main Effects since the existence of interaction 
between two or more factors affects the influence of the 
main effects. For example, two factors such as participa-
tion in the peEP and race of the individual may interact to 
produce an effect which is different than the main effect of 
treatment or race measured individually. 
The interactions found to be significant using the F-
Test for interaction for the fixed effects model are shown 
in Table VIII. 
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TABLE VIII 
F-TESTS FOR INTERACTION FOR FIXED EFFECTS MODEL 
df ,28 
1 
df ,df Sources F F F 
1 2 95 99 99.9 
1, 29 TR, MS 4.20 7.64 13.5 
error 
3, 29 SA, MS 2.95 4.57 7.19 
error 
TRA, MS 
error 
INTERACTIONS SIGNIFICANT AT p~.05 
Treatment, Race F = 5.71 
(1,29) 
Treatment, Race, Age F = 3.47 
(3,29) 
INTERACTIONS SIGNIFICANT AT p~.OOl 
Sex, Age F = 8.69 
(1,29) 
Although the F-Test for interaction indicated that four of 
the five factors had significant interaction with one or 
more other factors, the F-Test for Main Effects was per-
formed for all five factors. All Main Effects were found to 
be significant at the .10 level or higher. Education, the 
factor which had no significant interaction with other fac-
tors, is significant at the .001 level. 
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TABLE IX 
F-TESTS FOR MAIN EFFECTS FOR FIXED EFFECTS MODEL 
df 
1,28 
df ,df Sources F F F' F 
1 2 90 95 99 99.9 
1,29 Treatment 2.89 4.20 7.64 13.5 
Sex MS 
error 
Race 
2,29 Education 2.50 3.34 5.45 8.93 
MS 
error 
3,29 Age, MS 2.29 2.95 4.57 7.19 
error 
Main Effects Significant at p<.10 
Treatment F = 3.49 
(1,29) 
Main Effects Significant at p<.OI 
Race F = 11. 86 
(1,29) 
Main Effects Significant at p<:.OOI 
Sex F = 35.47 
(1,29) 
Age F = 14.08 
(3,29) 
Education F = 12.49 
(2.29) 
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In spite of the significant interactions between 
Treatment and Race; Treatment, Race, and Age, and Sex and 
Age, all main effects except Treatment are significant at 
the .01 level or better. Because of the significant inter-
actions, care must be taken in interpreting the main effects 
due to Treatment, Race, Sex, and Age. The manner in which 
the different levels of the factors with significant inter-
actions are related is most readily shown by the profiles of 
the simple effects for the factors at different levels. 
These profiles are drawn in Figures 3-8. Data for these 
profiles are obtained from the ANOVA summary tables. 
Figures 3-5 represent the profiles of the means at different 
levels of the factors Treatment, Race, and Age. The nota-
tions for the levels follows the code given in Table VII. 
For example T stands for participation in the peEP, R 
1 1 
stands for Blacks, etc. Generally, if two profiles have the 
same shape (i.e., are parallel) all simple interactions are 
zero. The profiles of a three-factor interaction, such as 
shown in Figures 3-5 imply that the third level interaction 
is equal to zero when (1) the profiles of the two-factor 
means are parallel within each level of the third factor or 
when (2) the pattern of profiles for the two-factor means is 
geometrically similar to the pattern for the combined 
levels. A three-factor interaction may be nonzero while the 
two-factor interaction is zero. The TA profiles for the 
combined levels of Race, for example are nearly parallel and 
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Figure 3: Mean profiles for treatment and age by race 
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Figure 4: Mean profiles for treatment and race by age 
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do not cross. Thus, the interaction between Treatment and 
Age may be equal to zero. In fact the interaction was not 
significant. Figure 4 represents the three level inter-
action with the profiles on the far right representing 
Treatment and Race for Combined Ages. The profiles are not 
parallel and cross each other. This implies that the two-
factor interaction for Treatment and Race is not equal to 
zero. The interaction was significant. The interaction 
between Race and Age was also not significant at the .05 
level. The interaction between Treatment and Race is 
presented in Figure 6. The profiles are not parallel and 
the two-factor interaction was significant at the .05 level. 
The interaction between Sex and Age is presented in Figure 
7. The profiles are not parallel and cross each other. The 
interaction was significant at the .001 level. 
In addition to providing information on interactions, 
the profiles in Figures 3-7 indicate the possible differ-
ences between the different levels of one factor and its 
effects on the different levels of another factor. For 
instance Figure 6 represents the profiles of the two fac-
tors, Treatment and Race. The profiles appear to indicate 
that Treatment has a beneficial income effect on Whites and 
a possibly small negative effect on Blacks. Ex~~ination of 
the profiles in other figures provides further information 
and indications of possible relationships which require 
additional testing. 
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It may appear that the main use of analysis of vari-
ance in this research is to generate a number of F statis-
tics on the data. However, the author considers the gener-
ation of F tests as only a small part of the advantages 
gained from the use of ANOVA. The important feature of 
AN OVA for this study is that it permits the separation of 
all the potential information in the data into distinct and 
nonoverlapping portions, each reflecting only certain as-
pects of the experiment. The mechanics of the analysis of 
variance allow for the arrangement and the summarization of 
the data in nonredundant ways in order to make decisions as 
to whether effects exist and to estimate how large or impor-
tant these effects may be. The analysis of variance allows 
the researcher to "pull apart" the factors that contribute 
to variation and to examine the particular, meaningful, 
aspects of the data. The large number of F tests which were 
performed greatly increased the probability that at least 
one of the tests showed spurious significance at the .05 
level. The presence of the same mean square for error in 
the denominator of the test creates some statistical depen-
dency among the various F tests, and consequently increases 
the probability of spurious results. For this reason the 
results of the F tests need to be considered in conjunction 
with the pattern and interpretability of the results in 
order to form a more reasonable basis for evaluation of the 
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data. 
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A Posteriori Tests 
Four variables, not including Treatment, were included 
among the independent variables due to their proven associa-
tion with income in the united States. The research was de-
signed with the intention of testing the five independent 
variables, with their twenty-nine different levels, to see 
which turned out to be significant in affecting the income 
levels of persons included in this study. Such tests are 
called a posteriori or post hoc contrasts. It is recognized 
that such a large number of a posteriori tests capitalize on 
the chance differences that happen to be large for this 
particular study due to sampling variability. To lessen the 
possibility of Type I errors the significance level accepted 
for contrast testing is set at .01, rather than the .05 
level accepted for main and interaction effects. The test 
chosen for the contrasts is the Least Significant Difference 
Test. 
Sex and Age 
Sex and Age demonstrated a significant interaction of 
.001. The profiles representing the interaction were not 
parallel and crossed between Age and Age. The Least 
3 4 
Significant Difference Test demonstrated at the .01 level 
that males matched to females of the same age bracket at all 
ages except 45 years and over earned significantly higher 
incomes than did females. Females 21-25 and 26-44 years 
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earned significantly more than males 45 and over. Males 
ages 0-20, 21-25 and 26-44 years earned significantly higher 
incomes than females in any age category. There is no 
significant difference between the incomes of females age 45 
and over and males ages 45 and over. There is no signifi-
cant difference between males age 21-25 and males age 26-44 
years. Males ages 21-25 years do earn significantly more 
than males aged 0-20 years. Males 0-20 years of age, 21-25, 
and 26-44 years of age, all earn significantly more than 
males aged 45 and over. Females a;es 26-44 years earn 
significantly more than do females ages 0-20 and 21-25 
years. Thus, it would appear that males aged 0-44 years 
earn significantly more than females of that age group. Up 
until age 44 both groups appear to have increased earnings 
with age, or at least to have no significant decrease in 
income as age increases. Apparently, discrimination by sex 
in the labor force, and perhaps within the training programs 
of the peEP, resulted in significant differences between 
male and female earnings in all age groups between 0-44 
years. Sex, rather than age up to age 45, appears to be the 
most important factor influencing incomes in the interaction 
between Sex and Age. 
Treatment and Race 
The interaction between Treatment and Race was sig-
nificant at the .05 level. The profiles between Treatment 
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and Race were not parallel. The Least Significant Differ-
ence test demonstrated that at the .01 level of significance 
there existed no significant difference between Blacks who 
participated in peEP and Blacks in the control group. There 
was a significant difference between Whites who participated 
in peEP and Whites in the control group. But, there was 
also a significant difference between the Black and the 
White control group with the Black group earning signifi-
cantly more than the White group. There was no significant 
difference between the Whites participating in peEP and the 
Blacks who did not participate. This suggests that the 
Blacks who chose not to enter the program for unknown 
reasons may have been superior in terms of labor force par-
ticipation potential, than the Whites who chose not to enter 
the program. The Blacks who participated in the peEP were 
earning significantly better incomes than the Whites in the 
control group. The difference between the White and Black 
participants was not significant. Two different explana-
tions for the differences between incomes by race are 
considered. The finding that Black participants as a whole 
and within different levels of different factors appear to 
earn significantly more than White participants suggests 
that there is a difference between White applicants and 
Whites in the larger labor force. The labor market dis-
crimination against Blacks may result in Blacks with superi-
or labor market potential requiring the services of a 
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manpower program to gain entrance to employment opportuni-
ties. Whites, who experience little or no entrance barriers 
to employment, can be expected to obtain jobs more readily 
without manpower program assistance. The White applicants 
and participants in manpower programs may lack crucial job 
skills or sufficient motivation to obtain and hold a job. 
The White participant and control groups may be comparable 
and the White groups may in fact be more disadvantaged than 
the Black groups. Treatment may significantly benefit the 
White group more than the Black group. Alternatively, for 
unknown reasons, the particular White group who applied and 
did not participate in the peEP may have a different labor 
market potential than the White group who participated in 
the peEP. Although the Black control group does appear to 
be equal to the Black participant group, the White groups 
may not be comparable. If this is the case, the study is 
biased in favor of the White participants. The interaction 
between Treatment and Race appears to be a function of a 
difference in incomes between races in the control group 
rather than an influence of the peEP. 
Treatment, Age, and Race 
The interaction between Treatment, Race and Age was 
significant at the .05 level. The findings suggest that the 
introduction of the age factor does influence the inter-
action between treatment and race. Although the two factor 
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interaction demonstrated no significant difference in income 
between Black and White participants as a whole, there do 
exist significant differences between both the participant 
groups and the non-participant groups and the control groups 
at different age levels. 
Within the first age level, 0-20 years, the only sig-
nificant difference was between treated Blacks and untreated 
Whites. Blacks participating in the peEP did not earn sig-
nificantly more than Blacks in the control group. There was 
no significant difference between White participants and 
Black participants, the White control group, or the Black 
control group. 
Black participants in the second age level, 21-25 
years, earned the highest income received by Blacks in any 
group in the study. There exists a significant difference 
between Blacks participating in the peEP age 21-25 and all 
other groups with the exceptions of White participants age 
26-44, and untreated Blacks ages 26-44 years. Blacks enter-
ing the peEP between ages 21-25 years did significantly bet-
ter than similar Blacks of the same age who did not enter 
the program. 
Between the ages of 26-44 years the highest incomes 
were earned by Whites participating in the peEP and Blacks 
in the control group. There exists no significant differ-
ence between the incomes of these two groups, or between 
their incomes and the incomes of Blacks ages 21-25. There 
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is a significant difference between White and Black parti-
cipants ages 26-44, and the Black control group aged 26-44 
earned significantly more than the Black participants of the 
same ages. Although the Black participants ages 26-44 
years did earn significantly less than the Black control 
group, the White participant group of the same age, and 
treated Blacks ages 21-25 years, they did earn significantly 
more than White participants and control groups ages 0-20 
and ages 21-25, and the Black control group ages 0-20 
years. The White control group ages 26-44 did significantly 
worse than every other group in the study except the White 
control group 45 years and over. 
with the exception of the Black control group, persons 
aged 45 years and over earned significantly less than every 
other group except the White control group aged 26-44 
years. The Black control group ages 45 and over earned 
significantly more than one group, the White control group 
of the same age. Both the Black eTId the White control 
groups aged 45 and over contained small cell frequencies and 
are not considered representative of a larger population. 
The participant groups did contain larger cell frequencies, 
and their income levels, which were significantly lower than 
those of other groups in the study, do suggest that parti-
cipation in manpower programs is not beneficial for persons 
45 years and over. 
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The profiles in Figure 4 representing Treatment and 
Age for combined races suggests that with race not consi-
dered, those participating in the peEP continue to have 
increased earnings as age increases up to age 44 years. 
There exists a significant difference between participants 
ages 26-44 and the control group of the same age. This 
difference for combined races is apparently due to the inex-
plicably low earnings of the White control groups of this 
age. The participant group age 26-44 also earned signifi-
cantly more than did the untreated groups of all ages and 
the treated group ages 0-20 years. 
Education 
The F-test for interaction demonstrated no significant 
interaction between education and any of the other four 
independent variables. The F-test for main effects resulted 
in F = 12.49 for education which is significant at the .001 
level. Education has a significant effect on the incomes of 
persons involved in the study. At the .01 level the tests 
for simple effects found no significant difference between 
persons with 1-9 years of education and persons with 10-11 
years of education. There exists a significant difference 
between persons with 12 years of education and over and 
persons with 1-9 years of education. A significant dif-
ference was also found between persons with 12 years of 
education and over and persons with 10-11 years of educa-
tion. The large difference in earnings between persons with 
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a high school educ~tion and persons with less than a high 
school education on application to the PCEP is present in 
all groups and within all levels except for those 45 years 
of age and over. This finding suggests that regardless of 
treatment, age (with the exception of those 45 years and 
over), sex, and race - persons with a high school education 
prior to application for the PCEP will earn significantly 
more than persons without a high school degree. The possi-
ble significance of this finding will be explored in Chapter 
VI. 
Although no significant interaction was demonstrated 
between education and the other independent variables, sig-
nificant differences do exist between the different levels 
of the four factors and education. 
The following findings are not considered statisti-
cally although the LSD results are reported. They are in-
cluded to present more information on possible relationships 
between the groups in the study. 
Treatment and Education 
Both participants and nonparticipants with a high 
school education or better earned significantly more than 
did all other groups. There was no significant difference 
between participants with a high school education and non-
participants with a high school education. Participants 
with 1-9 years of education did earn significantly more than 
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did the control group with a similar education. There was 
no significant difference between the participants and the 
nonparticipants with 10-11 years of education. Participants 
with 10-11 years of education did earn significantly more 
than nonparticipants with 1-9 years of education. These 
findings suggest that pa~ticipation in the peEP, not con-
sidering other factors, is of more significant benefit to 
persons with 1-9 years of education. 
Race and Education 
Blacks with a high school education did significantly 
better than all other groups including Whites with a high 
school education. Whites with a high school education did 
not earn significantly more than Blacks with 1-9 years of 
education, Blacks with 10 and 11 years of education, and 
Whites with 10-11 years of education. Whites with a high 
school education earned significantly more than only one 
group, Whites with 1-9 years of education. 
The differences notes above between Whites and Blacks 
with different educational levels were influenced by the 
poor performance of the White control group. Inclusion of 
the factor Treatment alters the findings. Black partici-
pants and nonparticipants who had completed high school 
continued to demonstrate significantly higher income levels 
than did any other group. There was no significant differ-
ence between the participant and nonparticipant Black groups 
with 12 years of education. Treated Whites with 12 years of 
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education earned significantly more than all other groups 
with the exception of treated Whites with 10-11 years edu-
cation, and treated and untreated Blacks with 12 years edu-
cation. Treated Whites with 1-9 years of education and 
10-11 years of education earned significantly more than the 
White control groups with the same education, but not more 
than the Black control groups with similar educational 
levels. 
Sex, Education and Treatment 
Treated males at all educational levels earned signi-
ficantly more than did treated females with similar educa-
tions. Treated males with 12 years of education earned 
significantly more than all treated groups. Treated females 
with 12 years of education did not earn significantly more 
than treated males with 1-9, and 10-11 years of education. 
Treated females with 12 years of education did earn sig-
nificantly more than treated females with 1-9, and 10-11 
years of education. Hale participants with 1-9 years of 
education earned significantly more than similar nonpar-
ticipants. Within this group treated White males earned 
significantly more than treated male Blacks and untreated 
Whites. If treated Black males and treated White males are 
compared only to the untreated Black control group with 
1-9 years education, there is no significant difference in 
incomes between the groups. Untreated Black males with 
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10-11 years of education earned significantly more than 
treated Black males and untreated White males with similar 
educations. Treated White males with 10-11 years of edu-
cation earned significantly more than similar treated 
Blacks. There was no significant difference between the 
treated Whites of this group and the untreated Blacks. With 
combined races there was no significant difference between 
treated and untreated males with 10-11 years of education. 
Treated Black males with 12 years of education earned sig-
nificantly more than treated and untreated White males with 
similar education. There was no significant difference 
between treated and untreated Black males with 12 years of 
education, but untreated Black males of this group earned 
significantly more than similar treated White males. There 
was no significant difference between the treated and the 
untreated group with combined races for males with 12 years 
of education. Untreated males earned significantly more 
than untreated females at every level of education. Un-
treated Black females earned significantly more than un-
treated White females at every level of education. Treated 
Black females with 1-9 years of education earned signifi-
cantly more than treated and untreated White females with 
1-9 and 10-11 years of education. Treated Black females 
with 1-9 years of education did not earn significantly more 
than untreated Black females of similar education. Treated 
White females did earn significantly more than untreated 
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White females with 1-9 years of education. Treated White 
and Black females did not earn significantly more than un-
treated Black females with 10-11 years of education, but 
both treated groups earned more than the similar untreated 
White females. With combined races treated females with 
10-11 years of education earned more than untreated females 
with similar education. Untreated White females with 12 
years of education earned significantly less than treated 
White females, and treated and untreated Black females with 
12 years of education. Treated and untreated Black females 
with 12 years of education earned significantly more than 
treated White females with similar education, but there was 
no significant difference between the treated and untreated 
Black females with 12 years of education. With combined 
races there is no significant difference in income between 
treated and untreated females with 12 years of education. 
untreated Black females, treated Black females, and treated 
White females with 12 years of education earned signifi-
cantly more than females in every other female group. 
Age and Education 
All age and education groups except those 45 years and 
over earned significantly more than did the group aged 
0-20 years with 1-9 years of education. With the fore-
mentioned exception, there was no significant difference in 
earnings between persons aged 0-44 years with 1-9 years of 
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education and 10-11 years of education. High school gradu-
ates aged 0-44 earned significantly more than all other 
education groups. There was no significant difference be-
tween the incomes of high school graduates at different age 
levels. All persons ages 45 and over did significantly 
worse than all other age and education groups with the 
exception of persons 0-20 with 1-9 years of education. 
ANALYSIS WITH ZERO EARNERS AND THOSE 
45 YEARS AND OVER EXCLUDED 
The analysis presented in the previous pages included 
all persons including persons reported as having no earnings 
during the year 1973. The author considers that all persons 
included in the study regardless of their present earning 
levels should be included in the analysis. But, because of 
the nonuniversa1ity of the Social Security data and the 
possibility according to Social Security sources, that at 
least 10 percent of the persons reported as having zero 
earnings may in fact have been working in jobs not covered 
by Social Security, a brief analysis of persons in the study 
reported as earning more than zero dollars is included. The 
groups ages 45 years and over were excluded due to the small 
cell size which remained after zero earners were dropped. 
The Analysis of Variance with zero earners and those 
45 years and over excluded resulted in different findings. 
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The F-test for interactions showed no interactions signifi-
cant at the .05 level between the variables treatment, race, 
sex, age, and education. The F-test for Main Effects is 
presented in Table X. The two Main Effects found to be 
significant were education and sex. Treatment, race, and 
age were not significant at the .05 level. Thus, the main 
variables affecting the incomes of the persons involved in 
this portion of the study are sex and education. Sex 
appears to have the greatest effect on earnings, and examin-
ation of the incomes by group demonstrates a large differ-
ence in earnings between males and females. 
A study performed by the Olympus Research Corporation 
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on the Total Impact of Manpower Programs found that both 
pre- and post-wage rates were higher for males than females. 
However, because of their lower starting points the females 
tended to experience greater wage and income increases if 
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employed. The study which utilized interviews to obtain 
their findings was also able to determine whether partici-
pants chose to seek employment following training. Olympus 
Research found that in the WIN programs, which included 
70-85 percent females, relatively few of its welfare mothers 
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chose to seek employment following enrollment. The 
research design of this study made it impossible to detect 
persons actively seeking employment from those who chose to 
not enter the labor market following training or application 
TABLE X 
ZERO EARNERS AND PERSONS 45 AND OVER EXCLUDED: 
F-TESTS FOR MAIN EFFECTS FOR 
FIXED EFFECTS MODEL 
df , df 
1 2 
1,20 
2,20 
Sources 
Sex, HS 
Error 
Education, f\~S 
Error 
Main Effects Significant at p< 05 
Education F(2,20) = 4.00 
Main Effects Significant at p<.OOl 
Sex F(1,20) = 15.5 
F 
95 
4.35 
3.49 
F 
99 
8.10 
5.85 
161 
F 
99.9 
14.8 
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to the program. But, the low mean earnings for females and 
the high percentage of female zero earners relative to 
males, suggests that a higher percentage of females than 
males in this study may have chosen not to seek employment. 
The Olympus study also found that clerical training resulted 
in below average wage rates, but considerable employment 
stability. The director of the peEP program indicated that 
many of the women participants in the peEP program receiving 
skill training were enrolled in clerical courses. This may 
also have influenced female participant income levels. 
The mean earnings by sex, race, and treatment indicate 
that Black male nonparticipants earned $343 dollars more in 
1973 than did Black male participants. When age and educa-
tion are included Black male participants ages 0-20 years 
with 10-11 and 12 years of education earned slightly more 
than did similar nonparticipants. Black male participants 
aged 26-44 years with 12 years of education or more earned 
$1.91 more dollars in 1973 than did similar nonparticipants. 
At other age and education levels Black male nonpartici-
pants earned more than Black male participants in the peEP. 
White male participants earned $521 more in 1973 than did 
White males in the control group. When age and education 
are included, the only White male nonparticipant groups 
with large cell sizes to earn more than the participant 
White males were White males 0-20 years of age with 10-11 
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TABLE XI 
MEAN EARNINGS BY CODE GROUP 1973: 
ZERO EARNERS AND PERSONS 45 
YEARS AND OVER 
EXCLUDED 
Code Group f\1ean Code Group Mean Difference 
Participants Earnings Control Group Earnings 
11111 $2262* 21111 $3015* $ 753 
11112 $2598 21112 $2560 $ 38 
11113 $3686 21113 $3531 $ 155 
11121 $4004 21121 $5208* $1204 
11122 $3295 21122 $4027 $ 732 
11123 $4183 21123 $4415 $ 232 
11131 $3219 21131 $3359 $ 140 
11132 $3674 21132 $4317 $ 643 
11133 $4371 21133 $4180 $ 191 
11211 $2985 21211 $1043 $1942 
11212 $2848 21212 $3505 $ 657 
11213 $3278 21213 $3248 $ 30 
11221 $2793 21221 $3326* $ 533 
11222 $3861 21222 $3192 $ 669 
11233 $3066 21223 $2706 $ 360 
11231 $3139 21231 $2045 $1094 
11232 $4709 21232 $2280 $2429 
11233 $4529 21233 $4291 $ 288 
* Indicates cell frequency less than 10 
Underlined difference indicates control 
group earned more than participant 
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TABLE XI (Continued) 
Code Group Mean Code Group Mean Difference 
Participants Earnings Control Group Earnings 
FEMALES 
12111 
12112 
12113 
12121 
12122 
12123 
12131 
12132 
12133 
12211 
12212 
12213 
12221 
12222 
12223 
12231 
12232 
12233 
$2892 
$1824 
$3191 
$3199* 
$2295 
$3579 
$2164 
$2240 
$3040 
$1357* 
$2170 
$2576 
$2037 
$1902 
$1919 
$2972 
$3333 
$3839 
22111 
22112 
22113 
22121 
22122 
22123 
22131 
22132 
22133 
22211 
22212 
22213 
22221 
22222 
22223 
22231 
22232 
22233 
$1848* 
$1471 
$3539 
$ 477* 
$2050 
$3719 
$3865 
$2483 
$3466 
$ 773* 
$2483 
$2191 
$1867* 
$2804* 
$2943 
$1014* 
$1062* 
$3421 
The grand mean for the total group is $2999. 
Mean Earnings by Sex, Race, and Treatment: 
Black Male Participants - $3431 
White Male Participants - $3507 
$1044 
$ 353 
$ 348 
$2722 
$ 245 
$ 140 
$1701 
$ 243 
$ 426 
$ 584 
$ 313 
$ 385 
$ 170 
$ 902 
$1024 
$1958 
$2271 
$ 418 
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TABLE XI (Continued) 
Total Male Participants - $3459 
Black Female Participants - $2932 
White Female Participants - $2606 
Total Female Participants - $2836 
Black Male Nonparticipants - $3774 
White Male Nonparticipants - $2986 
Total Male Nonparticipants - $3438 
Black Female Nonparticipants - $2943 
White Female Nonparticipants - $2361 
Total Female Nonparticipants - $2752 
Total Males - $3451 
Total Females - $2807 
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and 12 years of education, (those with 12 years of education 
earned only $30 more than the participant group). All other 
White male participant groups by age and education earned 
more than did White male nonparticipants, and often the dif-
ference is fairly large. It must be noted that although 
White male participants earned a total of 76 dollars more 
than Black male participants, the Black male nonparticipant 
group earned $788 more than the White ma18 nonparticipant 
group. With combined races male participants earned only 
21 dollars more than male nonparticipants. Black male par-
ticipants ages 0-20 with 12 years of education or more 
earned more than did similar White participants and nonpar-
ticipants. The incomes of Black males ages 21-25 years with 
12 years of education or better exceed the incomes of simi-
lar White male participants and nonparticipants. 
The mean earnings of Black female nonparticipants was 
almost equal to the earnings of Black female participants. 
with the factors age and education included, the earnings 
of Black female participants ages 0-20 and 21-25 years of 
age with 10-11 years of education exceed similar nonparti-
cipants by $353 and $245 respectively. In Other Black 
female groups with sufficient cell size, nonparticipant 
incomes exceeded those of participants. Female white par-
ticipant earnings exceeded the earnings of similar nonpar-
ticipants by $245. Reliable conclusions concerning the 
effects of age and educational factors are difficult to 
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formulate due to the small cell sizes. It does appear that 
female White participants with 12 years of education or 
better and between the ages of 0-20 and 26-44 earned more 
than similar nonparticipants. Female White nonpartici-
pants with 12 years of education or more ages 21-25 earned 
more than similar participants, but the cell sizes limit 
the reliability of the difference. Black female nonparti-
cipants earned $582 more than did White female nonpartici-
pants. Black female participants earned $326 more than 
White female participants. With combined races female par-
ticipants in the peEP earned $84 more than did females in 
the control group. With the exceptions of females aged 
26-44 at all educational levels, Black female participants 
earned more than White female participants in similar age 
and education groups. 
Median Earnings 1973 
Examination of the median earnings by code group con-
firms the pattern revealed in the analysis of mean earnings. 
The Black male participant group did slightly worse in com-
parison with the Black male nonparticipant group using 
median earnings. The only Black male participant group to 
earn more than the nonparticipant group was the group aged 
0-20 years with 10-11 years of education. The Black male 
participant groups ages 0-20 and 26-44 years with 12 years 
of education which had demonstrated small advantages over 
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the control group using mean earnings, earned less than the 
control group using median earnings. The differences be-
tween the amount earned by participating Black males and the 
control group were greater using median earnings. Among 
White males the findings were reversed in three groups. 
White male participants ages 0-20 with 10-11 years of edu-
cation earned slightly more than the similar control group 
using median earnings. The White male participants ages 
0-20 and 21-25 years with 12 years of education earned 
slightly less than the control groups. Black female and 
white females demonstrated similar relationships with their 
control groups using median and mean earnings. Using median 
earnings the large difference between male and female earn-
ings remained. White male participants continued to earn 
slightly more than Black male participants. The Black 
participant group both male and female continued to earn 
more than the White male and female control groups. The 
relationships between participating White groups and non-
participating Black groups was identical using median 
earnings, i.e., the same Black control groups earned more 
than the same White participant groups. 
FAMILY HEADS AND WELFARE RECIPIENTS IN THE PCEP 
The Olympus study found that the most single important 
variable in statistically explaining the level of post-
training wage rates was the number of dependents. Wage 
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rates rose consistently as dependents increased up to three 
III 
or four, and then turned down with five or more. The 
responsibility to provide income for persons other than 
yourself may increase motivation to obtain and retain em-
p1oyment. Unfortunately, the number of dependents was not 
recorded for persons involved in this study. Information 
was obtained on persons participating in the peEP who 
reported themselves as "head of family" upon enrollment in 
the program. Persons currently receiving welfare payments 
at the time of enrollment were also noted. This information 
was not available on the control group. Persons who re-
ported themselves as "Head of Family" and "Welfare Reci-
pient" cannot be matched with their eventual 1973 incomes on 
an individual basis, but the percentage of each code group 
in these categories was computed. 
TABLE XII 
PCEP PARTICIPANTS REPORTED AS "HEAD OF FAMILY" 
AND "WELFARE RECIPIENTS" BY 
Code Group 
Male, Black 
11111 
11112 
11113 
11121 
11122 
11123 
11131 
11132 
11133 
11141 
11142 
11143 
Male, White 
11211 
11212 
11213 
11221 
11222 
11223 
11231 
11232 
11233 
11241 
11242 
11243 
Female, Black 
12111 
12112 
12113 
12121 
12122 
12123 
12131 
12132 
12133 
12141 
12142 
12143 
PERCENT OF CODE GROUP 
Percent Head 
of Family 
7% 
29% 
14% 
36% 
26% 
38% 
49% 
45% 
49% 
14% 
7% 
7% 
30% 
19% 
13% 
33% 
47% 
31% 
47% 
56% 
51% 
29% 
35% 
25% 
66% 
58% 
51% 
50% 
76% 
63% 
53% 
67% 
79% 
64% 
38% 
53% 
Percent 
Welfare Recipients 
0% 
9% 
7% 
18% 
8% 
7% 
12% 
19% 
10% 
11% 
8% 
0 
22% 
16% 
2% 
13% 
8% 
6% 
22% 
15% 
14% 
29% 
18% 
6% 
33% 
64% 
42% 
50% 
67% 
52% 
57% 
57% 
58% 
21% 
38% 
40% 
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TABLE XII (Continued) 
Code Group 
Female, White 
12211 
12212 
12213 
12221 
12222 
12223 
12231 
12232 
12233 
12241 
12242 
12243 
Percent Head 
of Family 
33% 
2% 
19% 
41% 
36% 
41% 
54% 
76% 
75% 
56% 
60% 
73% 
Total Male, Black 36% 
Total Hale, White 35% 
Total Female, Black 65% 
Total Female, White 39% 
Total Males 36% 
Total Females 56% 
Percent 
Welfare Recipients 
22% 
9% 
11% 
18% 
18% 
29% 
46% 
71% 
57% 
33% 
20% 
45% 
10% 
13% 
54% 
28% 
11% 
46% 
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The presence or absence of a positive relation~hip 
between Head of Family and income is difficult to assess 
without further statistical analysis. There is no method to 
determine the number of dependents in each category. 
Furthermore, within each sex and race category, with the 
exception of Female Blacks, the groups with the highest 
percentages of "Heads of Family" are generally the older 
partjcipants of prime labor force age. However, persons who 
are "Heads of Families" may earn higher wage,::;. The White 
male group aged 21-25 years with 10-11 years of education 
reported 47% "Head of Family". The mean earnings not in-
cluding zero earners of this group were $1068 greater than 
the similar group with 1-9 years of education and 33% "Head 
of Family"; and $795 greater than the similar group with 12 
years of education and 31% "Head of Family". The White 
female groups with 50% or higher "Head of Family" had higher 
incomes than any other white female groups. There is a 
possibility that family responsibilities do have a positive 
association with income. Future studies should include the 
number of dependents as an independent variable. 
TRAINING VARIABLES FOR PCEP PARTICIPANTS 
AND MEAN EARNINGS 
The participants in the Portland Concentrated Employ-
ment Program included in this study were enrolled in the 
program at different times over a four-year period, received 
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differing services and training, for varying lengths of 
time. A second code including these variables on partici-
pants only was submitted to the Social Security Administra-
tion. Earnings for persons in the second code groups were 
reported by the SSA in the same manner as earnings under the 
first code. It is impossible to determine the sex and age 
of persons included in the second code groups. Due to time 
and money constraints, only a brief analysis of the findings 
of the second code group are reported. Earnings were repor-
ted on 1680 persons who had participated in the PCEP and who 
were included in the first code groups. An explanation of 
the code is given in Table XIII. 
The participants in the PCEP involved in this study 
were enrolled in the program during the period from November 
1968 through December 1972. All persons had completed 
training during this period. The SSA earnings are mean 
earnings for the calendar year 1973. Consequently, the 
period intervening between completion of the PCEP and the 
period in which earnings were reported varies from one to 
four years. Table XIV presents earnings information by year 
of completion for participants. 
The highest mean earnings are reported for partici-
pants who completed the program in the year prior to 1973 
and who have the least labor force experience since train-
ing. This suggests the possibility that benefits from 
training may be highest during the year or two following 
TABLE XIII 
SECOND CODE: 
PCEP PARTICIPANTS ONLY 
Four Independent Variables - ! II III IV 
I. Year PCEP Completed - 7. 1968 and 1969 
8. 1970 
9. 1971 
o. 1972 
II. Length of Stay in peEP - 6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
o - 5 weeks 
6 - 25 weeks 
26 - 49 weeks 
50 weeks and over 
III. Years of Education Completed - 6. 1 - 9 years 
7. 10 - 11 years 
8. 12 years and over 
IV. Type of Services: 
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6. Public Employment - Operation Mainstream, STEP 
Neighborhood Youth Corps, 
Work Experience 
7. On-the-Job-Training and NABS JOBS 
8. Basic Education 
9. Orientation Only 
o. Institutional/Skills Training - VOC 1, 2, & 3; 
CEP VOC, MDTA CEP, MDTA OSES 
1. New Careers 
2. Hold Only and Placement 
Example: 0681 - Completed 1972, 0 - 5 weeks length of stay, 
1 - 9 years of education, New Careers 
TABLE XIV 
1973 MEAN EARNINGS BY YEAR TRAINING 
WAS COMPLETED IN PCEP 
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Year Completed Frequency Mean Earnings 
1968 and 1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
368 
307 
495 
368 
$2199 
$2001 
$2418 
$2487 
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the training period or that the training programs offered by 
the PCEP had improved markedly with experience. However, 
other important variables appear to vary by the year train-
ing was completed and may be responsible for the differing 
mean earnings by year. 
Education, which was an important explanatory variable 
influencing income under the first code, appears to explain 
part of the variation between mean earnings by training 
year. Fifty-seven percent of participants who completed 
training in the year 1970, the year with the lowest mean 
earnings, had less than a high school education, as compared 
to forty-seven percent in 1972, the year with the highest 
mean earnings. The percentage of participants completing 
the program each year with a high school education upon 
entrance to the program appears to be directly related to 
the mean earnings by year. Education appears to explain a 
portion of the variation in mean earnings by corrlp1etion 
year. Conversely, mean earnings by years of education 
completed appear to vary by year that PCEP was completed. 
These variations may be due to varying percentages of males 
and females or differing ages between those participants 
finishing the programs in different years. Other variables 
included in the study which may affect the variation in 
income are length of stay in the program and type of ser-
vices received. 
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TABLE '{V 
EDUCATION OF PARTICIPANTS BY YEAR PCEP COMPLETED: 
BY PERCENT 
Year Completed Education Upon Enrollment 
12 Yrs. 
1-9 Yrs. 10-11 Yrs. and Over Total 
1968 and 1969 18% 33% 48% 100% 
1970 14% 43% 43% 100% 
1971 12% 36% 52% 100% 
1972 7% 40% 53% 100% 
TABLE XVI 
MEAN EARNINGS 1973 BY YEARS OF EDUCATION 
COMPLETED AND YEAR PCEP COMPLETED 
Year Completed 
1968/1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
Years of Education 
1-9 Yrs 10-11 Yrs. 
Mean ~ean 
$1421 $1979 
$1900 $1679 
$2023 $1953 
$1523 $2072 
Completed 
12 Yrs 
and Over 
14ean 
$2975 
$2354 
$2725 
$2926 
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Types of Service 
Participants enrolled in the PCEP received many dif-
ferent combinations of services and training. The partici-
pants involved in the study may have received orientation, 
basic education, institutional skill training, placement, or 
any combination of these services. Persons may have been 
enrolled in publicly funded work experience programs such as 
the Neighborhood Youth Corps, Operation Mainstream, STEP, or 
CEP Work Experience. A small percentage of persons were 
enrolled in private on-the-job training programs, NABS JOBS, 
and New Careers. In this study participants were included 
under the category of training in which they spent the 
longest period of time. All participants except those in 
the "Hold Only" category participated in orientation. 
Persons who received basic education and more than four 
weeks of other training were classified under the latter 
category. 
The New Careers program enrolled primarily minority 
people of above average education who were to be given 
access to entry-level white-collar jobs and advanced educa-
tion for those presumed to have the ability and ambition to 
progress from there. Eighty percent of the participants in 
the PCEP enrolled in New Careers had a high school degree or 
better on entrance. The twenty percent who had 10-11 years 
of education received basic education prior to their trans-
fer to the New Careers program. 
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TABLE XVII 
MEAN EARNINGS BY TYPE OF TRAINING: 
Type of Training 
Institutional/ 
Skills Training 
New Careers 
MEAN 
BY PERCENT 
Number of 
Persons 
213 
103 
TABLE 
% of 
Total 
13% 
6% 
XVIII 
EARNINGS BY TYPE OF 
BY PERCENT 
Hold Only and Placement 74 
Public Employment 401 
OJT and NABS JOBS 73 
Basic Education 252 
Orientation 564 
Mean Earnings 
1973 
$2127 
$3724 
SERVICE: 
4% $3410 
24% $2115 
4% $2788 
15% $1611 
34% $2287 
TOTAL 1680 100% $2284 
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Persons included in the "Hold Only and Placement" 
category were considered by the peEP to be "job ready" upon 
entrance. Placement was the only peEP service obtained by 
these participants. Eighty percent of the persons in this 
category had a high school education. 
The NABS JOBS program and the On-the-Job-Training 
programs involved training provided by private employers 
,~ith continued employment after completion of a satisfactory 
training period. Sixty-six percent of the persons in these 
programs had a high school degree on entry. Forty-four 
percent had 10-11 years of education. 
During the first two years of operation, the peEP 
appears to have relied more heavily on orientation, basic 
education, and the public employment programs. Participants 
completing during 1971 and 1972 are more evenly distributed 
among the different services. 
Length of Stay in the peEP 
The period in which a participant was enrolied in the 
peEP varied from one ''leek to over one year. Length of stay 
in the program does not appear to vary directly with income, 
or education. Length oi time in the program did not dictate 
the training content. 
In every year participants who spent 6-25 weeks in the 
program had the lowest mean earnings. The highest total 
mean earnings were received by persons with 0-5 weeks in the 
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TABLE XIX 
TYPE OF TRAINING BY YEAR COMPLETED: 
BY PERCENT 
Type of Training Year Completed 
1968/69 1970 1971 1972 
Institutional/Skills 
Training 9% 13% 11% 20% 
New Careers 0% 7% 5% 15% 
Hold Only 0% 5% 5% 9% 
Public Employment 15% 23% 39% 17% 
OJT/NABS JOBS 0% 0% 8% 9% 
Basic Education 12% 19% 16% 15% 
Orientation 64% 33% 16% 15% 
100% 100% 100% 100% 
TABLE XX 
LENGTH OF STAY AND MEAN EARNINGS 1973 
BY YEAR COMPLETED 
Year Completed 
o - 5 Weeks 6 - 25 Weeks 26 - 50 Weeks 
Fre- Mean Fre- Mean Fre- Mean 
quency Earning quency Earning quency Earning 
1968 and 1969 288 $2306 193 $1993 29 $2509 
1970 123 $2415 106 $1612 42 $1247 
1971 121 $2473 205 $1909 117 $2490 
1972 90 $2914 155 $1917 77 $2283 
Total 622 $2449 659 $1888 265 $2235 
Length of Stay 
50 Weeks 
and Over 
Fre- ~1ean 
quency Earning 
0 0 
36 $2609 
52 $3574 
46 $3899 
134 $3426 
f-J 
co 
N 
Year Completed 
1968 and 1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
TABLE XXI 
PERCENT OF PARTICIPANTS IN "LENGTH OF STAY" CATEGORY 
BY YEAR COMPLETED 
50 I'leeks 
o - 5 Weeks 6 - 25 Weeks 25 - 50 Weeks and Over 
56% 38% 6% 0% 
40% 35% 14% 12% 
25% 41% 24% 10% 
24% 42% 21% 13% 
Total 
100% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
f-' 
co 
w 
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program and 50 weeks and over. Those with zero to five 
weeks were enrolled in "Orientation" and the "Hold Only and 
Placement", with the exception of eight percent who were 
enrolled in public employment programs. Forty-seven percent 
of those with 0-5 weeks in the program had less than a high 
school education. Of those persons in the 50 week and over 
period, sixty percent were enrolled in New Careers, 17 
percent were enrolled in institutional skills training, 15 
percent were enrolled in public employment programs, and the 
remaining eight percent were evenly divided between OJT/NABS 
JOBS and Basic Education. Thirty-four percent had less than 
a high school education. There does appear to be a positive 
relationship between length of stay in the program and Basic 
Education. Two percent of those enrolled in Basic Education 
had a high school degree. Of the ninety-eight percent with 
less than a high school education, those with 26 to 50 
weeks, anu 50 weeks and over received mean incomes of 
approximately $1000 greater than those enrolled in Basic 
Education for 0-5 weeks and 6-25 weeks. This figure may 
reflect differing degrees of motivation during training -
the less motivated having shorter training periods - which 
carried over into employment opportunities. 
Conclusions 
Mean earnings for 1973 vary by the year in which the 
participant completed the program. Percentage of partici-
pants with a high school degree appears to vary directly 
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with increase in mean earnings by year the PCEP was com-
pleted. Differences in years of education completed among 
participants completing the program each year appears to 
have a direct influence on mean earnings. Conversely, mean 
earnings by years of education completed differ according to 
the year the PCEP was completed. These differences may be 
affected by the variables sex, age, type of training, length 
of stay in the program, or other factors not included in the 
study. Participants receiving the highest mean earnings by 
type of services received were enrolled in the New Careers 
program or received only placement services from the PCEP. 
Previous training, education, and work experience contri-
buted to the high earnings of the "Hold Only" group, but the 
placement services available at the PCEP facilitated their 
reentry into the labor force. Eighty percent of those 
enrolled in New Careers had a high school diploma upon entry 
to the program. Persons enrolled in the program were pre-
sumably selected for their abilities and ambition which may 
have contributed to their eventual higher earnings. Al-
though their earnings were high in relation to other PCEP 
participants, they are low compared to the average incomes 
of the u.s. labor force with similar levels of education. 
NABS JOBS and On-the-Job-Training programs, which included 
only four percent of the PCEP participants, resulted in the 
third highest mean income. Seventy-one percent of the par-
ticipants were enrolled in three different types of services 
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and received mean incomes between $2100 and $2300. Of those 
enrolled in institutional skills training, 41 percent had 
less than a high school education and received a mean earn-
ing of $2007. Fifty-nine percent had a high school degree 
and received a mean income of $2210. Of those involved in 
only Orientation, 34 percent had 1-11 years of education and 
received a mean income of $2738. Those with a high school 
degree enrolled in Orientation received a mean income of 
$2053. Of those involved in Public Employment programs, 45% 
had less than a high school degree. There was little dif-
ference in mean earnings between those with a high school 
degree and those without one. Thus, there appears to be 
little direct relationship between type of training for the 
majority of participants and education and their influence 
on income. Differences in sex, age, motivation or other 
variables not included in the second code may explain the 
differences in mean income by training. Persons enrolled in 
Basic Education who received no other substantial training 
were the most disadvantaged in terms of education levels of 
the participants and received the lowest mean income. 
Mean incomes for persons enrolled in the program from 
6-25 weeks were the lowest of any category by length of stay 
in the program. Although 47 percent of those with 0-5 weeks 
in the program had less than a high school education, their 
total mean earnings were higher than the total mean earnings 
of those with similar education. Quick placement in a job 
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may have resulted in higher eventual earnings than training 
programs offered by the peEP. Training periods of over 50 
weeks appear to result in higher earnings, although 66 
percent of those enrolled for this period had 12 years of 
education and over and might be expected to earn higher 
incomes. The longer training period may provide specific, 
marketable job skills which the intermediate length programs 
do not provide. Persons remaining in the program for a long 
length of time may also have greater motivation and persis-
tence than those in the program for shorter periods of time. 
STJMHARY 
Analysis of variance on the 1973 mean earnings of par-
ticipant groups in the peEP and control groups of persons 
who were admitted to the peEP but for unknown reasons failed 
to enroll in the program resulted in the following findings: 
Of the five independent variables - Treatment (Parti-
cipation or nonparticipation in the peEP), sex, race, age, 
and education - there were significant interactions between 
Treatment, Race, and Age; Treatment and Race; and Sex and 
Age. 
The interaction between treatment, race and age 
appears to result from the differing performances of the 
Blacks and Whites by age and treatment. Black participants 
and the White control group earned their highest incomes in 
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the age group of 21-25 years. White participants and the 
Black control group had generally rising incomes as age 
increased up to 45 years. The peEP was not as effective in 
serving mature Blacks as was predicted. All groups ages 45 
years and over earned low incomes relative to other groups 
in the study. 
The interaction between treatment and race is appar-
ently the result of the differing performances of the Black 
and White control groups. The Black control group in most 
cases earned more than the Black participants, White par-
ticipants and the White control group. The Black partici-
pants earned slightly more than the White participants. The 
White participant group appears to have benefitted more from 
participation in the peEP in comparison with their control 
group, than did Black participants. Whites failed to earn 
significantly more than Blacks. Enrollment in the peEP in 
most c~se5 aid not raise the incomes of participants signi-
ficantly higher than the incomes of the control group. 
Sex and age demonstrated a significant interaction 
which is primarily due to the poor performance of males ages 
45 years and over. In all other age groups males had sig-
nificantly higher earnings than did females. Hale earnings 
were highest between the ages of 21-25 years. Female earn-
ings reached their peak between the ages of 26-44 years. 
Sex appears to be a stronger variable than age. The find-
ings confirm the hypotheses that males earn more than 
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females, and that persons 45 years and over have less labor 
market success than younger persons. The hypothesis that 
income increases with age was confirmed, although males 
demonstrated a nonsignificant decrease in income between the 
age groups 21-25 years and 26-44 years. 
As hypothesized, education is an important variable 
affecting incomes. The groups with a high school degree and 
under 45 years of age earned significantly more than those 
without a high school degree. The education group bene-
fitting most from participation in the peEP included persons 
with 1-9 years of education. Persons with 10-11 years of 
education, particularly Blacks, benefitted least from par-
ticipation in the PCEP. This finding implies that the most 
severely educationally disadvantaged persons receive suf-
ficient education or training to enable them to obtain 
better employment than similar persons who did not parti-
cipate in the PCEP. But, the peEP was markedly unsuccessful 
in raising the educational capabilities of persons with lO-
II years of education, particularly Blacks, sufficiently to 
narrow the earnings difference attributable to possession of 
a high school degree. 
Persons who are heads of families may have better 
labor force potential than persons who do not have family 
responsibilities. 
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The greatest benefits from participation in the peEP 
are secured by persons enrolled in the program from zero to 
five weeks and over fifty weeks. Persons enrolled from six 
to 25 weeks received the lowest total mean earnings. 
The majority of participants were enrolled in three 
components of the program - orientation, public employment, 
and institutional skills training. The mean earnings of 
persons enrolled in these programs were similar. Quick 
placement may have been more beneficial than longer training 
for many persons in these components. 
Persons enrolled primarily in basic education were the 
most educationally disadvantaged. This group earned the 
lowest mean incomes by type of service received. Longer 
enrollment periods in basic education are apparently more 
beneficial than shorter periods. 
FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER V 
78. Congress and the agencies administering manpower 
programs placed a high priority on education and 
training and a low priority on correcting the 
acknowledged problem of labor market discrimina-
tion which may prevent the disadvantaged clientele 
for reasons of race, sex, age, education, etc. 
from obtaining jobs which bestow above poverty 
level incomes, employment stability, and other 
benefits to the employee. As Peter B. Doeringer 
and Michael J. Piore point out in Internal Labor 
Markets and Manpower Analysis, employment discrimi-
nation is a complex process. 
"The rules which result in employment 
discrimination are not designed to effectuate 
discrimination alone, but are part of the 
total fabric of labor pricing and allocation. 
The rules represent the desire of the incum-
bent labor force to protect employment bene-
fits such as job security and advancement 
opportunities, and the employers interest 
in minimizing the fixed costs of recruitment, 
hiring and training. For example, where two 
racial popUlations differ significantly in 
terms of the proportion of persons possess-
ing certain desired characteristics, the 
most efficient hiring policy may be simply 
to reject all members of one racial popu-
lation. Screening by race is less expen-
sive than developing a new process to select 
qualified workers from the second race. The 
existing labor force for reasons of self-
interest would be likely to resist attempts 
to a policy intending to give priority in 
hiring and promoting members of the other 
race since this would threaten their own 
positions. Hence, it is not generally 
possible to change the distribution of 
jobs between the races without imposing 
costs on the incumbent employees and the 
employer. Discrimination is most often 
effected by entry, allocation, and wage 
instruments of labor market adjustment 
process. To eliminate discrimination 
with the least possible costs the intri-
cacies of the rules resulting in discrimi-
nation and their effects should be 
thoroughly studied." (Paraphrased by 
the author). 
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CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Manpower programs for the disadvantaged have been 
operated in the u.s. for approximately fifteen years. The 
programs - introduced under the authority of the Manpower 
Development and Training Act, the Economic opportunity Act, 
the 1967 amendments to the Social Security Act and the 
Comprehensive Training and Employment Act - were all con-
cerned with the employment and earnings of certain groups. 
The crucial impact measure, therefore, is that on the lives 
of the enrollees. Has their participation in a manpower 
program led to higher incomes and stable employment? Did 
the benefits of the program justify the costs to both the 
individual participants and the society? 
The evaluation of the impact of the PCEP on the 
incomes of participants does not result in brief, conclusive 
answers to the major questions. In reviewing the findings 
of this research, the constraints imposed by the research 
design and the data on which the findings are based must be 
kept in mind. The primary limitations of the study are 
reviewed in the following paragraphs. 
The control group was selected from applicants to the 
PCEP who did not participate in the PCEP. The reasons for 
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the nonparticipation of the control group are unknown. It 
is possible that the individuals in the control group were 
characterized by superior or inferior labor market potential 
when compared to the participants. The participant and the 
control groups may not in fact be comparable. If this is 
the case, and there is no method to determine whether the 
two groups are completely comparable, then the conclusions 
based upon comparisons between the participant and the 
control groups are unfounded. However, based upon analysis 
of the results, the author endorses the assumption that the 
groups are comparable. The original hypothesis assumed 
that, due to labor market discrimination, Whites in the 
study would earn more than Blacks. This hypothesis was not 
confirmed by the research findings. Instead, both the Black 
participant and control groups earned more in 1973 than did 
the White participant and control groups. The difference in 
earnings indicates that the labor force potential of Black 
applicants to the peEP was superior to that of Whites 
applying to the program. The peEP served a high unemploy-
ment, racially mixed geographic area with a high incidence 
of poverty among the population. Whites living within this 
geographic area and applying to the peEP are apparently 
characterized by a lower ability preparedness than Black 
applicants. This hypothesized initial difference in the 
population by race is consistent with the income findings. 
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Mean incomes differed between races but were fairly consis-
tent within each racial group. Given the size of the 
groups, the similarities in demographic characteristics, the 
similarities in earnings distributions, the corresponding 
percentages of zero earners, and comparable mean earnings -
the author concludes that the Black control group is com-
parable to the Black participant group. 
The smaller number of Whites involved in the study and 
a higher percentages of zero earners among nonparticipant 
White females, leaves in question the possibility that the 
White control group, particularly the female control group, 
may not be comparable to the White participant group. Their 
failure to participate in the peEP may be indicative of a 
weak attachment to the labor force. If this is true, then 
the study is biased in favor of the White participant group. 
The conclusions reached in this chapter are based on the 
assumption of comparability between the participant and the 
control groups. 
For reasons of confidentiality, the Social Security 
Administration's earnings data is reported only on groups of 
five individuals or more. No information on employment is 
provided. Small groups reduce the reliability of the in-
comes reported. Mean earnings reported by group may obscure 
information which would have emerged from analysis of indi-
vidual incomes. The reporting of group earning severely 
limited the ability of the analyst to manipulate the data. 
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The utilization of aggregate data from secondary 
sources imposes constraints on the ability of the author to 
formulate reliable conclusions. Due to limitations on time 
and funds, the research did not utilize primary sources 
which may have provided a valuable check on the incomes 
reported by the SSA as well as more in-depth information 
concerning the reasons for the apparent success or failure 
of the program to effect expected changes. 
These conceivable shortcomings of the research should 
be considered when reviewing the findings in the following 
sections. 
THE IMPACT OF THE PORTLAND CONCENTRATED 
EMPLOYMENT PROGRAM ON THE INCOMES OF PARTICIPANTS 
Over seventy percent of the persons included in this 
study in both the participant and the control groups earned 
incomes below the official poverty level of $4,540 in 1973 
for a nonfarm family of four. Although their incomes were 
generally higher than their self-reported pre-enrollment 
incomes, the participants continued to earn considerably 
less than the average member of the civilian labor force. 
Participation in a manpower program did not raise the mean 
earnings of participant groups above the poverty level. 
The group means for the eight sex/race groups are as 
follows: 
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Participants Nonparticipants 
Black Male 
White Male 
Black Female -
White Female -
$2,618 
$2,539 
$2,129 
$1,738 
Black Male 
White Male 
Black Female -
White Female -
$2,796 
$2,287 
$2,044 
$1,331 
Although there are individual exceptions, the mean earnings 
of the participant and the control groups remain below the 
poverty level. 
The 1970 mean income in Portland, Oregon for all fami-
lies was $11,803. Of persons in the experienced civilian 
labor force, the median earnings for males and females 16 
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years and over were respectively $8,257 and $3,796. The 
mean income for all Black families was $8,142. The median 
earnings for Black males and females in the experienced 
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civilian labor force were respectively $5,806 and $3,427. 
Thus, although the earnings of Whites in this study are 
proportionately lower than those of Blacks to the general 
population, the earnings of both groups continue to be 
substantially below that of the experienced workers in the 
labor force in the Portland metropolitan area. 
Benefits and Costs of Participation 
A difference of means test was used to identify which 
groups gained significant benefits from participation in the 
PCEP or from presumed labor market experience in the absence 
of participation. The groups which experienced significant 
benefit are identified by an asterisk. Other groups in 
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which the difference in mean earnings approached signifi-
cance are unmarked. The eight participant groups which 
earned more than the similar nonparticipant group and are 
considered to have benefitted from participation in the PCEP 
are: 
* White males ages 0-20 years with 1-9 years of 
education 
* Black females ages 26-44 years with over 12 years 
of education 
* White females ages 26-44 years with 10-11 years 
of education 
Black males ages 21-25 years with 1-9 years of 
education 
Black females ages 21-25 years with 1-9 years of 
education 
White males ages 26-44 years with 10-11 years of 
education 
White females ages 26-44 years with 1-9 years of 
education 
White females ages 26-44 years with 12 years of 
education 
Considering income alone, approximately thirteen percent of 
the persons participating in the PCEP gained significant 
benefits from their enrollment in the program. 
In three cases the control group earned more than the 
participant group: 
* 
* 
Black male ages 26-44 years with 10-11 years of 
education 
Black female ages 26-44 years with 1-9 years of 
education 
White male ages 0-20 years with 10-11 years of 
education 
These findings indicate that of the participant population, 
six percent may have benefitted more from continued labor 
mark~t participation than they did from enrollment in the 
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peEP. Participation in the peEP may have cost these groups 
in time and income foregone during and after their partici-
pation. 
The impact of the peEP was measured against a single 
criterion - income. Nonmonetary benefits experienced by 
participants were not considered in this study. The per-
formance of the peEP in affecting income appears to be 
disappointing. Why did the peEP fail to have a significant 
effect on the earnings of so many of its participants? 
Although mean earnings differences were not significant by 
small groups, there did appear to be certain categories of 
participants which benefitted more from participation and 
others in which participation in the peEP failed to have the 
expected effects on income. These categories are examined 
in the following sections. 
Persons 45 Years and Older 
Regardless of race, sex, age or education the popu-
lation age 45 years and over applying to the peEP apparently 
is characterized by a poor potential for employment. The 
higher percentage of zero earners in all groups over 45 
years of age indicates that a large portion of this group 
either failed to seek or were unable to obtain employment. 
Two possible factors may contribute to the low earnings of 
these groups: (1) the population 45 years and over applying 
and/or entering the peEP was characterized by individuals 
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lacking motivation towards employment or evidencing severe 
problems, such as poor health, which necessitated their 
withdrawal from the labor market; or (2) the lack of mar-
ketable skills combined with age presented insurmountable 
obstacles to employment for disadvantaged persons. Both 
factors are likely to have affected the earnings of this 
group. 
Unless more exhaustive selection procedures can eli-
minate the applicants in this group with poor motivation, 
health, etc., or new jobs are developed which are suitable 
to the older disadvantaged worker, this group does not 
appear to be a good investment for limited manpower dollars. 
The group aged 45 years and over are not included in 
the following analysis. 
Sex 
Sex had a significant effect on income. As hypothe-
sized in the original research design, males of both races 
earned significantly more than females of both races. This 
finding was apparently influenced by several factors: (1) 
Labor market discrimination resll.l t.s in women entering lower 
paid employment regardless of education. (2) Institution-
alized discrimination within the peEP channeled women par-
ticipants into traditional female occupations, such as 
clerical work, which are generally lower income jobs. (3) 
Female participants themselves often did not consider 
203 
traditionally male occupations when setting their employment 
goals. (4) White females in the younger age groups had 
higher percentages of zero earners than did other sex and 
race groups. This figure, in all probability, is a result 
of younger White females not seeking employment in 1973. 
The smaller percentages of White female heads of families 
may indicate that these groups contained many second earners 
'vho voluntarily withdrew from the labor market to assume 
family responsibilities. Female Black groups, reporting a 
higher number of heads of families, had approximately the 
same percentages of zero earners as male groups. 
Although females received consistently lower earnings 
than did males, participation in the PCEP appears to have 
had a more beneficial effect on their earnings than did 
participation for males, particularly Black males. This 
finding su~gests that females, prior to training, may lack 
skills or access to employment opportunities, even poorly 
paid employment. The PCEP services apparently decreased the 
barriers to employment encountered by female participants. 
The equivalent number of zero earners between male and 
female groups with high percentages of family heads, sug-
gests that regardless of the differential in wages, women, 
who are heads of families, utilize their training and con-
tinue to participate in the labor market. Training in 
occupations with higher income potential might further 
reduce the number of women withdrawing from the labor force. 
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To improve the effectiveness of manpower programs for 
females and to attain the maximum benefit for training 
dollars expended, program operators should consider using 
the number of dependents, or a similar indicator of the 
strength of labor force attachment, as a screening device 
for admission into a manpower program. Scarce manpower 
dollars are most effectively utilized in training persons 
who will apply their training in employment situations. 
Persons who are initially rejected by the program could 
reapply when they are seriously interested in pursuing 
employment opportunities. Attention should also be paid to 
the type of training and placements which are provided to 
female participants. Efforts should be made to eliminate 
discrimination within the program and to reduce discrimi-
natory practices in the labor market. The program operators 
should examine their counseling services and eliminate 
guidance practices which channel males and females into 
different occupations on the basis of sex. Participants who 
set narrow, traditionally defined goals for employment 
should be encouraged to consider other alternatives. 
Training and placement services should also eliminate dis-
criminatory practices. Training for both sexes should be of 
sufficient quality to be acceptable to an employer. The 
program job developers may find it necessary to attempt to 
influence employers to accept qualified females for nontra-
ditional jobs, just as they must attempt to provide the same 
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service for qualified minority applicants for traditionally 
White jobs. But, at least in initial placements, the 
manpower program should attempt to screen out persons with 
a weak attachment to the labor force and to place persons 
who will be satisfactory workers. Otherwise, employers may 
be disillusioned with their initial experience and dis-
continue the contact with the manpower program" In brief, 
the manpower program operators should attempt to provide 
services for females with a strong labor force attachment, 
and to place females in jobs which provide above-poverty 
income, employment stability and income security. 
Education 
Education had a significant effect on income. Except 
for White male participants, all groups with a high school 
education upon application to the program earned signifi-
cantly more than groups with less than a high school degree. 
Although participants with 1-9 years of education earned 
significantly more than nonparticipants with similar edu-
cation, they earned significantly less than any group with a 
high school degree. The lack of significant interaction 
between treatment and education and the similar slope of the 
income curves for the participant and nonparticipant groups 
by education indicates that the educational services pro-
vided by the peEP, particularly for those persons with 10-11 
years of education, failed to have the intended effect on 
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the income levels of participants. The goal of Graduate 
Equivalency Degree training and other educational services 
was to overcome employment barriers by providing dropouts 
with equivalent educational training. ~he large difference 
in earnings between the dropouts and the high school gradu-
ates suggests that the peEP was unable to eliminate the 
employment obstacle imposed by failure to complete a normal 
high school education. There are several possible explana-
tions for the wage differentials attributable to a high 
school degree: (1) The peEP educational training services 
may not be equivalent to training received in the average 
high school. (2) peEP educational services may not be 
continued for a long enough period to have an effect on 
income. (3) Employers may continue to rely on a high school 
degree, received through the normal educational process, as 
a screening device for higher income employment; or (4) 
Persons who dropped out of high school may lack character-
istics possessed by high school graduates which lead to more 
satisfactory job performance and superior employment stabi-
lity. The latter explanation would prove the least amenable 
to correction by the manpower program. The first three 
explanations imply that the wage differential may be eli-
minated by upgrading the quality of educational services 
offered by the manpower program, placing increased emphasis 
on longer training, and/or influencing employers to accept 
207 
qualified dropouts for jobs requiring a high school degree 
on the assumption that educational training has raised the 
participants to the level of high school graduates. Modi-
fication of educational services may be worthwhile. The 
earnings differentials indicate that there is a significant 
payoff in future earnings for high school graduates. 
Hanpower programs should continue to admit and train 
persons with 1-9 years of education. This educational group 
received the most significant benefit from participation. 
Functional literacy levels were evidently raised suffici-
ently to affect the eventual earnings of this educational 
group. Persons with a high school degree are also bene-
ficiaries of the PCEP. Placement services and such programs 
as New Careers and NABS-JOBS appear to be the most useful 
services provided for high school graduates. 
Black males with a high school degree did better in 
comparison with the control group than Black males with 
lower levels of education. A high school degree had more 
effect on the earnings levels of Blacks than it did on 
Whites. This finding suggests that at least part of the 
earnings differential may be due to racial discrimination. 
Employers may use a high school degree requirement as an 
excuse for not employing Blacks, while relaxing the re-
quirement for Whites. If the income differential is a 
function of racial discrimination, then manpower programs 
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must deal with the issue of racial discrimination as well as 
educational discrimination when attempting to influence 
employers to hire high school dropouts. 
Race 
Race had a significant effect on the income of persons 
in the study, but not the effect hypothesized in the re-
search design. Blacks in both the participant and the 
control groups and of both sexes earned more than Whites. 
There was no significant difference between the White 
participant group and the White control group. It is 
possible that this difference in White earnings is due to 
the poor performance of the control group which may not be 
comparable to the participant group. 
Blacks who benefitted most from their participation in 
the peEP were between the ages of 21-25 years. Black fe-
males benefitted more from participation than did Black 
males. Black males with a high school degree benefitted 
more from the peEP than did Black male high school dropouts. 
Blacks benefitted less from participation in the peEP 
than did Whites. Black males received the lowest incomes in 
comparison with their control group. For example, although 
Black males in the control group with 10-11 years of edu-
cation received mean incomes several hundred dollars higher 
than similar nonparticipants with 1-9 years of education, 
the Black male participants in these educational groups 
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earned similar incomes. The finding that Black males in 
many cases earned less than their control groups suggests 
that the peEP was ineffective in reducing the barriers to 
employment experienced by this group. The peEP may have 
eliminated the expected earnings differential between races 
by placing persons in jobs where racial discrimination is 
minimal due to low wages or unsatisfactory working condi-
tions. At best the peEP failed to place many Black parti-
cipants in jobs whose incomes were as high as those achieved 
by the control groups. 
Whites apparently benefit more from participation in 
the peEP than do Blacks, particularly when comparing the 
success of high school dropouts. Whites who benefitted most 
from the peEP were between the ages of 26-44 years. Al-
though Whites benefit more from the peEP than do Blacks, 
their mean income levels when compared to the average White 
labor force are proportionately less than that of the Black 
participants to the Black labor force. This suggests that 
although Whites benefit from the manpower program, the peEP 
was either dealing with a White population of substantially 
lower potential than the normal population, or the jobs for 
which the peEP trained and had access were of a much lower 
quality than many alternative occupations pursued by the 
average White labor force participant. 
RECO~1ENDED MODIFICATIONS TO IMPROVE THE 
EFFECTIVENESS OF MANPOWER PROGRAMS 
Although impact evaluations which do not include 
program monitoring provide information on what happened, 
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they furnish little knowledge about why the outcome occur-
red. The findings of this study indicate that the benefits 
to participants in the PCEP were not as substantial as 
expected. No definitive answers concerning the reasons for 
the failure of the program to effect the expected changes 
can be formulated from the existing data. Nevertheless, the 
findings indicate that serious modifications in manpower 
program operations may be necessary if participants are to 
gain substantial benefits. 
The most serious implication to emerge from this 
research is that the PCEP failed to train and place par-
ticipants in jobs which provided above-poverty level in-
comes. The income findings suggest that generally the PCEP 
trained and placed persons in jobs which offered no greater 
employment stability or higher incomes than jobs which the 
participants may have attained without participation in a 
manpower program. Unfortunately, it appears that the pres-
sures to move-clients through the system and to keep average 
enrollee costs down by quick training and placements, resul-
ted in few long term benefits for the participants. 
The goal of manpower'programs including the PCEP is to 
obtain not just an immediate job but above-poverty level 
211 
income, employment stabi~ity and income security - a satis-
fying working career. To provide target groups with jobs 
already available to them or to perpetuate their poverty in 
lowly paid dead-end jobs is no gain. Without adequate job 
development and placement services, the attempt to serve as 
many persons as possible with scarce public manpower funds 
results in few benefits to participants. 
Institutional Barriers to Employment 
A manpower program offering skills training, basic 
education and other services is ineffective if it fails to 
develop job opportunities for participants which are better 
than those available to the potential client without the 
manpower program. If job restructuring, anti-discrimination 
enforcement, su~sidized employment or training and other 
functions are necessary to provide access to satisfying 
employment for the disadvantaged, then these functions 
should receive high priority in manpower funding decisions. 
Ignoring the importance of these functions and placing an 
emphasis on the quantity but not the quality of placements 
is of little ultimate benefit to the participants or the 
society. 
The findings of this research suggest that manpower 
programs which focus on effecting only individual change may 
not be sufficient to cause changes in the eventual incomes 
of the disadvantaged. Programs such as the peEP which 
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expend most of their effort on changing the participant by 
increasing his job skills, education, motivation, etc. may 
not be sufficient to affect incomes. Perhaps a higher 
priority needs to be assigned to functions intended to 
reduce the institutional obstacles to employment such as 
racial or educational discrimination. Although services 
such as basic education and skills training will continue to 
be necessary if the disadvantaged are to obtain satisfying 
employment, the existence of institutional obstacles appar-
ently need to be recognized and given a high priority if the 
so-called "primary labor market" is to be opened to the 
disadvantaged participants of manpower programs. 
The Director of the PCEP and the administrators of the 
CETA I programs for the City of Portland and the Washington-
Multnomah Consortium, indicated that intense examination of 
the local labor market and its operation, job development, 
job restructuring, anti-discrimination enforcement and 
superior job placements received a low priority in their 
programs. Persons interviewed recognized the importance and 
need for these services, but due to time and funding limi-
tations, considered it impossible to devote adequate atten-
tion to them. The demands imposed by operating programs 
along established lines, meeting imposed quotas and coping 
with emerging crises leave little time for other consider-
ations. 
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Unfortunately, it is possible that the goal of the 
programs may be 0verlooked as administrators and others 
concentrate on developing and operating smoothly running 
programs. Without impact evaluations or long term followup 
the decision makers have little information on which to 
judge the effectiveness of their programs. Easily meas-
urable and obtainable indicators of program performance, 
such as the number of persons completing the program, are 
used to gauge the success of program operations. The abi-
lity of program operators to meet administrative quotas are 
often the only measured indicators of effectiveness. Con-
sequently, the administrators and operators of manpower 
programs may place a high priority on indicators which 
measure the effectiveness of program operation but not 
program impact. 
The administrators of the PCEP operated the program 
under federal government supervision and guidelines. 
Flexibility in program design and funding allocations were 
limited. Manpower planning was not a responsibility of the 
PCEP personnel. The PCEP met federal requirements. There 
was no indication that the Portland CEP failed to perform 
satisfactorily in comparison with other federal manpower 
programs. Under federal programs functions such as job 
development, restructuring and anti-discrimination enforce-
ment did not receive equal emphasis with manpower services 
intended to cause individual change. 
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Recommendations for CETA Decision ~akers 
CETA, which places the functions of planning, admin-
istering and program operations in the hands of the prime 
sponsor, allows the prime sponsor to set new priorities and 
develop new policies. The first step might be a careful 
examination of the local labor market and the theories of 
low income labor markets. Programs such as the peEP appear 
to be based on the queue theory of low income labor markets. 
"The queue theory asserts that workers are ranked according 
to the relationship between their potential productivity and 
their wage rate •.• The most preferred workers are selected 
from the queue first, leaving the least preferred to find 
work in the least desirable jobs on the fringes of the 
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economy or to remain unemployed." The disadvantaged are 
among the least desired workers. Manpower programs empha-
sizing skill training and education assume that raising the 
productivity of the disadvantaged should move them forward 
in the queue and provide access to primary employment. 
CETA prime sponsors should devote careful study to the 
local labor market to determine whether the continuous model 
of the labor market as postulated by the queue theory is the 
most suitable to their area. If labor market mechanisms are 
working to expand the importance of primary employment and 
encouraging labor market mobility then this theory is 
appropriate as the basis for local policy. If the pro-
portion or importance of secondary employment is large and 
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increasing and barriers to mobility into the primary market 
are growing then policies which are based on the dual labor 
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market theory may be more appropriate. Briefly, the dual 
labor market theory postulates that the labor market is 
divided into a primary market-characterized by high wages 
employment stability, promotion opportunities, and due 
process in administration of work rulas - and a secondary 
market-characterized by low wages, high turnover, little 
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opportunity for advancement, and arbitrary supervision. 
Disadvantaged workers are confined to the secondary market 
by residence, poor skills and work histories, and discrimi-
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nation. 
If the local CETA prime sponsor adopts the dual labor 
market theory as the best explanation of the local low 
income labor market, the most appropriate manpower policies 
may differ from policies based on the queue theory. Poli-
cies based on the queue theory assume that expansion of 
aggregate demand and employment coupled with training to 
increase productivity may solve the employment problems of 
the disadvantaged. Policies developed from the dual labor 
market theory assume that expansion of the primary market 
has little effect on many of the disadvantaged. Instead, 
direct efforts must be made to facilitate the movements of 
workers out of secondary employment by altering worker 
characteristics and to convert secondary jobs into primary 
jobs. CETA sponsors should have an understanding of the 
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above theories and a careful assessment of the characteris-
tics and operation of the local labor market. Policies and 
priorities should be developed which are the most likely to 
yield positive results in their local labor markets. 
If the queue theory of low income labor markets is 
adopted as most applicable to the local CETA labor market, 
then an effective CETA program may place a high priority on 
skills training to increase the productivity of the disad-
vantaged. Furthermore, manpower planners should carefully 
assess the local labor market to determine the occupations 
in which the programs' clientele have the best chances of 
obtaining satisfactory employment. Employers on the Plan-
ning Council might be requested to obtain data from their 
peers in the business community on how employees are trained, 
the length and content of the training and access points to 
employment. Training funds should not be utilized to train 
persons for jobs which are available without training. 
Before training courses are developed, the planner should 
obtain in-depth information about usual training methods. 
Working with employers, the planners and operators should 
develop training courses that provide equivalent training to 
that received by other applicants. 
CETA prime sponsors should attempt to utilize whatever 
channels are available to local employers to obtain direct 
access to jobs which will provide satisfactory employment 
for manpower program participants. Job developers should 
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meet with prospective employers and influence them to accept 
a reasonable match between job requirements and worker 
capabilities rather than pursuing unnecessary qualifica-
tions. If possible, programs which couple initial classroom 
training with on-the-job training should be developed. 
Internal labor markets of large local employers sh ,u1d be 
carefully studied and strategies developed which remedy 
customary discrimination practices at entry points, in 
promotion, and in wage rates. 
Regardless of the theory of the low income labor 
market adopted by the CETA sponsor, CETA decision makers 
might utilize manpower funds more effectively than did the 
PCEP by paying more serious attention to assessment of 
manpower program clientele. Accepting persons into the 
program on a first-come, first-served basis or with little 
consideration of services and jobs available results in a 
clientele with many diverse needs, interests and aptitudes. 
Accepting persons who have a weak attachment to the labor 
force or with such severe barriers to employment as to make 
them unemployable is not the most effective use of manpower 
funds. The findings of this research suggest that persons 
ages 45 years and over may not be good prospective candidates 
for manpower programs. Females who are not heads of fami-
lies may have a weak attuchment to the labor force. An 
orderly, consistent system for making assessments of clients 
should be developed which considers physical and mental 
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barriers to employment as well as the capabilities of the 
manpower program. The extent and severities of employment 
barriers serve as the ultimate cost of the necessary inter-
ventions and the prospects of success. The amount of 
manpower funds available set limits on what can realisti-
cally be .done and manpower decision makers should recognize 
program limitations. Rather than process the maximum number 
of clients with little long term benefit to the participant, 
CETA sponsors should develop a strategy which considers 
available services and jobs as well as the target population 
applying to the program. 
If the dual labor market theory is adopted as the 
basis for policy, the assessment of individual clients and 
the development of skill and behavioral traits appropriate 
to primary employment may receive high priority. Preference 
may be given to adult applicants with stable low wage work 
experience and young people who are entering the transi-
tional period between unstable adolescence and the more 
mature stable patterns of adulthood required in primary 
employment. These two groups may be the easiest to place in 
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primary employment. CETA sponsors may also focus on 
converting secondary employment into primary employment -
stabilizing jobs, building career ladders, increasing wage 
rates, etc. Unfortunately, the tools necessary to force 
this type of change are generally outside the control of a 
local prime sponsor. But, local prime sponsors could begin 
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an active lobby at the state and federal level to encourage 
this process through application of minimum wage legisla-
tion, labor legislation, social security, and unemployment 
119 
compensation. 
CETA sponsors should develop intervention strategies 
which most effectively improve the basic employability of 
individual clients, remove the institutional or systemic 
obstacles to employment for the disadvantaged, and create 
new public or private jobs for specific target groups. To 
concentrate only on individual employability may not have 
the expected impact on income. 
Finally, the findings of this study demonstrate the 
potential value of impact evaluations. CETA prime sponsors 
should consider designing impact evaluations which would 
provide them with information on the effectiveness of their 
programs. Evaluations which include program monitoring 
would enable prime sponsors to determine what the impact of 
their programs are as well as probable explanations concern-
ing why these impacts are occurring. Impact evaluations 
would enable the prime sponsor to reject unworkable projects 
and modify others to improve their effectiveness. 
SUMMARY 
Participation in the PCEP was of significant monetary 
benefit to thirteen percent of the participants included in 
", ." 
this study in comparison to a control group. The groups 
which received benefit were: 
White males ages 0-20 years with 1-9 years of 
education 
Black females ages 26-44 years with over 12 years 
of education 
White females ages 26-44 with 10-11 years of 
education 
Black males ages 21-25 with 1-9 years of education 
Black females ages 21-25 years with 1-9 years of 
education 
White males ages 26-44 years with 10-11 years of 
education 
White females ages 26-44 years with 1-9 years of 
education 
White females ages 26-44 years with 12 years of 
education 
220 
Participation in the peEP nlay have cost six percent of the 
participants. The groups in which the control group earned 
significantly more than the participant groups were: 
Black males ages 26-44 Years with 10-11 years of 
education 
Black females ages 26-44 years with 1-0 years of 
education 
White males ages 0-20 years with 10-11 years of 
education 
Over seventy percent of the persons included in this study 
earned incomes below the official poverty level of $4,540 in 
1973 for a nonfarm family of four. Participation did not 
raise the mean earnings of participant groups above the 
poverty level. The findings of this study suggest that the 
PCEP may have failed to train and place participants in jobs 
which provided above-poverty level incomes. The PCEP appar-
ently trained and placed persons in jobs which offered no 
greater employment stability or higher incomes than jobs 
• 
which participants may have attained without the manpower 
program. 
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Manpower decision makers should attempt to obtain 
access to satisfactory jobs for participants. High priority 
should be given to the functions of job development, job 
restructuring, anti-discrimination enforcement and job 
placement. An orderly, consistent system for making client 
assessments should be developed which considers physical and 
mental barriers to employment as well as the capabilities of 
the manpower program. 
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